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The Im plem entation of the EC M ilk 
Q uota Regulations 
in British, F rench and G erm an Law
He ik e  G e h r k e
Introduction 
Scope for research
"Milk can only be produced by a  milk-giving cow". This sophisticated 
statement was the essential reasoning of a judgement by the German 
Federal Administrative Court contemplating the phenomenon of milk 
quotas1.
Milk quotas linked to a levy system were introduced by the Council of 
the European Communities on the dairy sector in 19842. By the system, a 
levy is imposed on every litre of milk or milk products marketed in the 
European Community and exceeding during a twelve-month-period a so- 
called reference quantity3 ("quota"). The system was originally meant to 
last for five years until 1989, but in 1988, it was extended to another 
three years until the 31st of March 19924 5. In November 1991, the 
Commission submitted proposals to again extend the system over another 
eight years with significant reforms3. In March 1992, the milk quota 
system was prolonged for another twelve-month period up to March
1 BVerwG, (1990) Agrarrecht, p. 57
2 Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 9 0 /10  amending Council Regulation 
804/68 on the common organization of the market in milk and milk products, O. J. 
1968, L 148/13
3 Art. 5 (c) (1) of Council Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 
856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10
4 Council Regulation 1109/88,0 . J. 1988, L 110/27
5 COM (91) 409 final (implementing five proposals set out in COM (91) 258 final, 




























































































19936 and in June 1992, the agreed reform on the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) envisaged the maintenance of milk quotas for an­
other period of seven years6 7 89. The Council passed reformed rules in 
December 19928.
The milk quota Regulation was introduced to correct the increasing 
imbalance between offer and demand on the European dairy market 
which was causing enormous structural surplus on this sector0. Between 
1973 and 1981, milk deliveries grew at 2,5 % per annum increasing to 
over 3,5 % in 1983, while internal consumption of milk and milk prod­
ucts grew at only 0,5 % per annum10. Since 1974, the EEC has been self- 
sufficient as far as milk and milk products are concerned11. In 1983, 
there was a degree of self-sufficiency of 122 % for milk and milk prod­
ucts in the EEC dairy sector12. Stocks of butter and skimmed milk pow­
der increased reaching their peak in 1976, declining for a short period 
and in 1982, the stocks of skimmed milk powder began to build up 
again13. In 1981, about 42 % and in 1983, about 27, 6 % of the expendi­
ture of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
(EAGGF), Guarantee Section was spent on the milk sector14 15. The dairy 
sector thus proved to be the most expensive commodity sector in the 
Community13.
One of the reasons for the increasing deliveries to dairies is the rise of 
the average yield per cow due to improvements of quality and age struc­
ture of herds (because of genetic process) and due to increased efficiency
6 Council Regulation 816/92, O. J. 1992, L 86/83
7 Council Regulation 2074/92, O. J. 1992, L 215/69
8 Council Regulation 3950/92, O. J. 1992, L 405/1, the reformed rules are not con­
sidered. The basis of the research will be the rules up to January 1992, both in the 
Member States and the Community
9 See Preamble of Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90 /10 ; Sorasio, D., 
(1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 533
10 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 26613
11 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1984 Report, p. 52; Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 
1987, C 266/3
12 for butter 145 % and for skimmed milk powder 129 %, Bundesregierung (ed.), 
Agrarbericht 1985, p. 62
13 Harris, S.; Swinbank, A.; Wilkinson, G., The Food and Farm Policies of the 
European Community, p. 105
14 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1982 Report, p. 144; 1984 Report, p. 270




























































































in production, especially as far as techniques of feeding and use of con­
centrated feedingstuffs are concerned16. At the same time, internal and 
external consumption stagnated because of the saturation of the consump­
tion of milk and milk products17.
The negligence of the demand by the producers is to a high extent due 
to the relatively high target and intervention prices for milk and milk 
prices which are yearly agreed upon by the Council18. The realisation of 
the target price is ensured by the instruments of the common organization 
of the market in milk and milk products19, namely the guaranteed price 
support system20. The level of prices agreed upon only aimed at guaran­
teeing sufficient incomes to the producers21. Price policy has been the 
predominant instrument of the CAP in comparison to structural policy, 
which is enshrined in Art. 39 (1) (a), (2) of the EEC Treaty22.
16 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1984 Report, p. 48; Stolwijk, H. I. I. , A simple model of the EC 
dairy market, p. 1; Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun 1985, No 291, 
p. 534, Footnote 2, partly due to Community modernization programs
17 Stolwijk, H. J. J„ A simple model of the EC dairy market, p. 1; Commission of 
the European Communities, Milk, The Quota System, (1984) 203 Green Europe, 
p. 4
18 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fiir Emahrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Milchmarktpolitik, p. 1 et seq, encouraging efficient farmers to in­
crease their milk production capacity and less efficient ones to continue at their level 
of production; see Council Regulation 804/68, O. J. 1968, L 148/13
19 Council Regulation 804/68, O. J. 1968, L 148/13, amending Council Regulation 
13/64, O. J. 1964, L 34, p. 549/64 that set out the fundamental principles of the 
dairy regime, but did not yet contain a unified price system; Harris, S.; Swinbank, 
A.; Wilkinson, G., ibid, p. 94, Snyder, F. G., Law of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, p. 83
20 The common organization of the market in milk and milk products is, together with 
the common organizations of the market in cereals and sugar, supposed to be one 
of the organizations providing a complete price guarantee; see, Jegouzo, Y., 
Agriculture, Régime administratif général, Juris-Classeur administratif, vol. 4, 
Fasc. 358, p. 21; other categories of common market organizations are those pro­
viding partial price guarantees and those without price guarantees; see Snyder, F. 
G., Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, p. 73
21 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fiir Emahrung, Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten, Milchmarktpolitik, p. 1 ; Harris, S.; Swinbank, A.; Wilkinson, G.; 
The Food and Farm Policies of the European Community, p. 96; Boest, R., Die 
Agrarmârkte im Recht der EWG, p. 178; Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché 
commun, No 291, p. 534
22 Pearce, J., The Common Agricultural Policy, in: Wallace, H.; Wallace, H.; Webb, 
C. (eds.), Policy Making in the European Community, p. 147; Harris, S.; 





























































































Remedies to stem overproduction have been taken since the 1970s. 
Both voluntary measures like programs to relate milk production closer 
to demand with the help of premiums for non-marketing of milk and 
compensation for the conversion to beef and sheep production2? or ac­
tions taken to maintain and strengthen the demand by finding new outlets 
for the products23 4 and compulsory measures like the co-responsibility 
levy25 26and last but not least, the establishment of a guarantee threshold in 
198226, were not deterrent enough to correct the structural imbalance27. 
The reason is that the high level of prices has never been reduced28 and 
any proposals in this respect encountered fierce resistance from the dairy 
lobby29. Because of the prices, it was still more attractive to produce 
milk in spite of the co-responsibility levy30 and the guarantee thresh­
old31. The importance of the dairy sector in the agricultural economies of 
the Member States and the social needs of the peripheral regions where 
livestock farming is virtually the only possible activity32 account for the 
Council's reluctance to adpot any significant measures33. In particular, 
the entirely diverse milk production structure in the Member States with 
regard to the average yield per cow and the size of dairy farms seems to 
have prevented any effective reform34.
23 Commission of the European Communities, Milk, The Quota System, (1984) 2O3 
Green Europe, p. 3 et seq; Harris, S.; Swinbank, A.; Wilkinson, G., ibid, p. 104
24 for a survey see Harris, S.; Swinbank, A., Wilkinson, G„ ibid, p. 100 et seq
25 Council Regulation 1079/77, O. J. 1977, L l 3 l/6; the levy initially amounted to 
1,5 % of the target price; Bergmann, D.; Baudin, P., Politiques d'avenir de l'Euro­
pe agricole, p. 94, 96
26 Council Regulation 1183/82, O. J. 1982, L 140/1. This threshold was calculated 
according to the deliveries of milk in 1981 plus 0 ,5  % and could be increased 
yearly. If the threshold was exceeded, appropriate measures would be taken to off­
set the addidonal expenditure
27 Commission of the European Communities, Milk, The Quota System, (1984) 2O3 
Green Europe, p. 4
28 Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 74
29 Josling, T. E.; Moyer, W. H., Agricultural Policy Reform, p. 70
30 Usher, J.A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 74
31 Gomoll, E., (1985) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 31
32 Boest, R., Die Agrarmârkte im Recht der EWG, p. 31
33 Harris, S.; Swinbank, A.; Wilkinson, G., The Food and Farm Policies of the 
European Community, p. 104
34 Harvey, D. R., Milk quotas, p. 13 et seq; Schumann, W., EG-Forschung und 
Policy-Analyse, p. 74; Snyder, F. G., Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, p. 




























































































In June 1983, the Commission was authorized by the Council to pro­
pose new measures to cope with the overproduction in the milk sector35. 
The EEC found itself in a budget crisis because of the milk surplus3 .̂ In 
a number of Member States, farm incomes were still declining37. The 
Commission estimated that a milk price reduction of 12 % during the 
campaign lasting from 1984 to 1985 would be necessary to compensate 
for the expected exceeding of the guarantee threshold38. Such a price re­
duction would result in grievous and immediate consequences on the pro­
ducers' incomes without immediately reducing the production39 40and thus 
be politically unenforcable. The Commission also rejected a differentiated 
increase in the co-responsibility levy. In order to be effective both finan­
cially and socially, the differences between smaller and bigger producers 
would have had to be so great that it would have led to unacceptable in­
equalities among Member States with diverse production structures411.
Therefore, the Commission proposed that the system of the guarantee 
threshold be maintained but ensured by a milk quota system and related to 
a restrictive price policy41. Quotas had the advantage that production 
could be curbed immediately. They would also safeguard farmers’ in­
comes. In addition, they would not disadvantage countries with more ef­
ficient milk production structures as the differentiated co-repsonsibility 
levy does42. The disadvantage of quotas is that production structures are 
frozen and that the competitive capacity of the European dairy sector 
with regard to the world market would suffer43.
35 Bonnafous, P., L'incidence des quotas, p. 22
36 Josling, T. E., Moyer, W. H., Agricultural Policy Reform, p. 66 et seq, p. 70
37 Josling, T. E., Moyer, W. H., Agricultural Policy Reform, p. 67
38 COM (83) 500 final
39 Commission of the European Communities, Milk, The Quota System, (1984) 203 
Green Europe, p. 7
40 Petit, M. et al. Agricultural policy formation in the European Community, p. 125; 
COM (83) 500 final, p. 21; Harvey, D. R., Milk quotas, p. 20; these proposals 
were especially rejected by the British, de Salis, W., (1984) 36 Country 
Landowner, No. 7, p. 8
41 COM (83) 500 final; for draft regulations see COM (83) 548 final; for the decision 
making process within the Commission, DG-VI, see Josling, T. E.; Moyer, W. 
H., Agricultural Policy Reform, p. 71 et seq
42 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: 
Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 87; in particular the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark
43 European Parliament, Resolution of 11 October 1985, Doc. A 2-85/85, O. J. 1985, 




























































































Dramatic negotiations at every level and in every hour followed the 
Commission's proposals44. At the Athens summit in 1983 no solution 
could be found because of the opposition of the French government. The 
Commission submitted revised proposals45. On the Brussels summit on 
the 31st of March 1984, the Council finally decided to introduce the milk 
quota system46.
To sum up, the introduction of milk quotas is a political compromise 
worked out by the Member States in order to limit the development of 
budget expenses without decreasing farmers' incomes too much47. It was 
decided under the pressure of necessity because the future of the common 
organization of the market in milk and milk products was endangered.
The implementation of the EEC milk quota Regulations in the Member 
States demanded, despite their legal nature as Regulations (Art. 189 of the 
EEC Treaty), detailed national rules. This was mainly due to the wide 
discretion, namely the choice between two Formulas (Formula A and B) 
in order to implement the system, that the vague Regulations left to the 
Member States48. The application and impacts of the milk quota 
Regulations were strikingly different in some Member States. In 
Germany, for example, the authorities exceeded the national quota when 
allocating quotas to producers whereas the French and British authorities 
managed not to exceed their quotas. In the United Kingdom a veritable
44 for detailed discussion on the "five stages" of negotiations the milk quota proposals 
and the other 1983 proposals went through till they were finally approved see Petit,
M. et al, Agricultural policy formation in the European Community, p. 28 et seq
45 revised draft regulations, see COM (84) 190 final
46 Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10 and Council Regulation 857/84, 
O. J. 1984, L 90/13. The action of establishing dairy quotas was taken along with a 
package of other measures including in particular the dismantling of positive 
Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) and a shift to a new agricultural unit of 
account (or green ECU) based on the Deutschmark and the reduction of the UK 
contribution burden; Josling, T. E.; Moyer, W. H., Agricultural Policy Reform, p. 
66; Gomoll, E., (1985) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 31
47 Preamble of Council Regulation 856/84; Boussard, J. M., (1985) 12 European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, p. 325; Ehle, D., Abgaben und Erstattungen, 
in: Kruse, H. W. (ed.), Zolle, p. 243; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundes- 
ministerium für Emâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Milchmarktpolitik, p. 3; 
Sorasio, D„ (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 534; Gadbin, D„ 
(1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 509; Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau,
N. , Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D-l, p. 5; Harvey, D. R., Milk quotas, p. 9
48 see Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D-l, 




























































































market of quotas developed what was not the case in France and 
Germany.
From these facts, the idea of comparing the different implementations 
of the milk quota Regulations into British, French and German law arose.
The German regulation is compared with the French and British ones 
mainly because the French and British legislator chose Formula B, 
whereas the German legislator opted for Formula A. Though France 
chose the same Formula as Britain, the administration of milk quotas in 
Britain proved to be more effective49. Because the German milk produc­
tion structures are similar to those of France and are unlike Britain, the 
question arises whether the same difficulties occurred despite the differ­
ent Formulas. Moreover, the British legal system belongs to the so-called 
Common law family and the German and French system belong to the 
Romano-Germanic law family50. Last but not least, in all three countries, 
milk is the most important single product in agriculture. In 1983, the 
percentage of value of the dairy production of national agricultural pro­
duction was 27, 5 % in Germany, 22, 9 % in the UK and 17, 7 % in 
France5!. Germany, France and the UK produce the highest share of milk 
production in the Community. In 1983, the percentage of the value of 
dairy production in the EEC amounted to 23, 3 % in Germany, to 23, 0 
% in France and to 15, 6 % in the UK52.
But what is the purpose of comparing implementation of CAP into na­
tional law?
The purpose when comparing the implementation of the milk quota 
Regulations in the different national systems is to ascertain whether the 
Community objectives enshrined in the Regulations were attained and 
what differences in implementation occurred and why.
The milk quota Regulations have had two main objectives53: The im­
mediate objective is that the overproduction in the dairy sector shall be 
reduced in the short time in order to stabilize the financial resources of
49 HClin, F., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 158, p. 468 et seq
50 David, R.; Brierley, J. E. C., Major legal systems, p. 22
51 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1985 Report, p. 198
52 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1985 Report, p. 200
53 Preamble of Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10; Art. 5 (c) (1) of 
Council Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 




























































































the Community and to regulate the European dairy market. In the long 
run, however, the Regulations seek to restructure the dairy sector.
Since 1984, the Regulations have been amended several times, also in 
order to not endanger the immediate target of the Regulations54. In par­
ticular in 1986/87, the dairy quota system had to be tightened up because 
increasing surplus resulted in another crisis in the sector55. In addition, 
the system of intervention support in the dairy sector has not only been 
limited in time but also in quantity5**. However, since 1985 it has been 
necessary to create a certain flexibility (for example leasing and regional 
and national equalization57) of the quota system to take into account dif­
ferent production structures in certain Member States and, thus, to enable 
the efficient working of the system58.
From the perspective of 1992, the immediate objective of the European 
milk quota Regulations, as enshrined in the initial Regulations, has only 
been partially achieved. The milk market has been stabilized but in 1991, 
there was still a degree of self-sufficiency of 110,7 % for milk and milk 
products5 60̂. In the seven twelve-month periods up to 1990/91, the national 
quotas have been consistently exceeded by an average of 0,9 %, except 
for the first campaign50. The budget costs for the milk sector have been 
reduced from 27,6 % in 1983 to 17,5 % in 199161 of the spendings of the 
EAGGF, but in 1991, the dairy sector accounted still for the most expen­
sive sector. The quotas fixed for 1984/85 and for the subsequent years
54 Bluraann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 
5; ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 4; for the February 1985 and December 
1986 changes see Schumann, W„ EG-Forschung und Policy-Analyse, p. 128, p. 
153
55 Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., ibid., p. 5; Neville-Rolfe, E., British 
Agricultural Policy, in: Britton, D. (ed.), Agriculture in Britain, p. 184; Oskam, A. 
J. et al, The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 31; Bundesregierung (ed.): 
Agrarbericht 1988, p. 76
56 Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 72; 
Sorasio, D., ( 1988) Revue du marché commun. No 313, p. 19
57 for details see second chapter
58 Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 
5
59 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1992, p. 95
60 CNIEL, L 'économie laitière en chiffres, édition 1991, p. 115 et seq
61 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 




























































































still exceeded the actual demand for milk and milk products62. In June 
1992, the Agricultural Ministers decided to prolong the quota system and 
to cut the quotas in 1993/94 and 1994/95 if necessary63. A significant 
price cut which was proposed by the Commission64 has not been agreed 
upon in the dairy sector65.
This research, however, does not attempt to find an answer as to 
whether and why the two immediate objectives of the EEC Regulations 
have been reached or to conclude which of the three Member States con­
sidered contributed most to the success or failure of the quota system. 
This can only be indirectly deduced from the national reports. But, 
rather, more detailed targets and objectives enshrined in the Regulations 
will be scrutinized. It will be asked whether in the three Member States 
considered, the following four objectives were achieved66:
the objective pursued when granting the choice between two 
Formulas
the target not to exceed the national guaranteed quantity when allo­
cating reference quantities
the objective of avoiding the rise of a market of quotas
the intention to consider difficult economic and social situations of
tenants
In answering these questions, apart from the actual application of the 
Regulations and investigations in its legality, both the different national 
legal systems and the national social, economic and political context con­
cerning the agricultural sector will necessarily be revealed. This revela­
tion is important because all of these differences deeply affect the out­
come and implementation of EEC policies67. And what is more, only if
62 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1984, p. 61, Agra-Europe 42/83, Europa- 
Nachrichten, p. 17; Neville-Rolfe, E., British Agricultural Policy, in : Britton, D. 
(ed.), Agriculture in Britain, p. 184
63 Council Regulation 2074/92,0 . J. 1992, L 215/69
64 see COM (91) 100 final, COM (91) 258/1-3 final; von Urff, W„ Agrar- und 
Fischereipolitik, in; Weidenfeld, W.; Wessels, W. (eds.), Jahrbuch der Europai- 
schen Integration 1991/92, p. 108
65 Regulation 2072/92,0 . J. 1992, L 215/65 envisaging only a slight reduction of the 
intervention price for butter and some Italian cheeses from 1993 onwards
66 the objectives will be explained in detail in the third chapter
67 Hoetjes, B. J. S., Policy making and policy implementation in European Agricul­
ture, in: Hoetjes, B. J. S.; Desideri, C. (eds.), Changing agriculture in Europe, p. 
8 et seq; Hendriks, G., Germany and European Integration, p. 229; for differerent 
agricultural legal structures in the Member states see Pikalo, A. Agrarrechtsver- 




























































































these differences in the Member States are known, can demands for har­
monization or other Community measures such as improvements of the 
implementation or of the implemented program be formulated68. Thus, 
this comparative research mainly concentrates on what is known to be the 
main goal of comparative law: the gaining of knowledge69. Moreover, 
the degree of importance of the various reasons (legal, social, economic 
and political) for differences in the implementation process, can be 
judged.
However, it must be pointed out that the scope of this research is lim­
ited in two respects. First of all, it is limited to a special area of 
Community law, the CAP, and, within the CAP, the milk quota 
Regulation. Secondly, a thorough insight into all factors determining im­
plementation processes cannot be given; the main emphasis will be put on 
the legal aspects of the implementation because of limitations of space.
But why compare agricultural policies and law70? European agricul­
ture and food policies account for over 80 % of European legislation and 
judicial decisions71. Agriculture is supposed to be the most integrated 
sector in the Community72. Despite this fact, government and adminis­
tration in the area of agriculture at the international, national and sub-na­
tional level, to mention only one example, has been a grossly neglected 
field of study in public administration73. Studies of implementation of 
CAP Regulations are of great value74, in particular because the legal 
framework for implementing agricultural policies in the Member States is 
strikingly different in some fields of law. For example, the horizontal and
68 Hoetjes, B. J. S., ibid, p. 8
69 Zweigert, K., Rechtsvergleichung, in : Strupp, K.; Schlochauer, H. J. (eds.), 
Wôiterbuch des Vôlkerrechts, vol. 3, p. 80; for agricultural comparative law see 
Pikalo, A., Agrarrechtsvergleichung, in: Handwôrterbuch des Agrarrechts, vol. 1, 
column 95
70 By agricultural law, we mean the whole law dealing with agriculture, either public 
or private law. Private law involves the agricultural tenancies law, family and in­
heritance law affecting agricultural holdings and consolidation of farmland. Public 
law, on the other hand, means economic law, including the common organizations 
of the market and other EEC instruments, see Pikalo, A., (1967) Recht der 
Landwirtschaft, p. 255
71 Snyder, F. G., New directions in European Community Law, p. 19
72 Gilsdorf, P.; Priebe, R., Introduction to Art. 38 EWGV, in: Grabitz, E. (ed.), 
Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Annotation 28
73 Leemans, A. F., Preface, in: Hoetjes, B. J. S„ Desiderie, C. (eds.), Changing 
agriculture in Europe, p. iii




























































































vertical models of integration of the profession vary in the Member 
States75. Another example are the different agricultural tenancies laws in 
the Member States.
Plan:
In order to find out whether the Community objectives could have been 
achieved and find reasons for differences that occurred in the implemen­
tation of the milk quota Regulations, the thesis will be structured as 
follows:
In the first chapter, the general framework of the research will be ex­
plained, taking into account the implementation research in legal and po­
litical sciences and defining a method for the comparative part.
Because of its highly technical provisions, the milk quota system envis­
aged by the European Regulations will be explained in the second chapter. 
Like this, the objectives defined above are clarified.
In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, the implementation in the 
British, French and German legal systems will be presented with relation 
to the Community objectives defined. Separate reports for each country 
will be offered, because the details of the national application can only be 
understood if the whole national system is explained76. The order of the 
national reports does not follow any rules.
In the final chapter, the comparison is being conducted, followed by 
the conclusions.
75 see e.g. in French law, Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 352 et seq; p. 411 et seq




























































































Framework for the Research of 
Comparison of Implementations
A. Framework for implementation research
The purpose of the research is to discover whether some of the objec­
tives of the EEC milk quota Regulations have been fulfilled and what dif­
ferences in the implementation of the milk quota Regulations emerged 
and why. Ascertaining whether objectives have been attained is the im­
mediate practical interest in case studies of the so-called implementation 
research. The goal of the implementation research has always been to find 
out whether a program was successful or not, i.e. whether the manifested 
objectives have been achieved and what obstacles or difficulties arose in 
the implementation77. The remote goal of implementation research is to 
deduce patterns according to which implementation processes proceed78.
It will be defined what implementation means (I.) and to which meth­
ods implementation research in general is subject (II.). Finally, it will be 
revealed how the implementation of the milk quota Regulations will be 
studied (III.)
77 Jones, C. O., An introduction to the study of public policy, p. 165; Clune III, W.,
H. ; Lindquist, R. H., (1981) Wisconsin Law Review, p. 1094, 1105; Elmore, R. 
F., (1978-79) 94 Political Science Quarterly, No. 4, p. 603; for Community law 
see Schwarze, J., Foreword, in : Schwarze, J.; Pollack, C.; Becker, U. (eds.), 
The 1992 challenge at national level, p. 11 et seq, Ehlermann, C.-D., Opening 
speech, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, vol.
I, p. 143; Ziller, J., The Implementation of European Community Policies, in: 
Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 135
78 Wollmann, H., Implementationsforschung, in: Nohlen, D.; Schultze, R.-O. (eds.), 




























































































I. Definition o f implementation
Implementation means the process of accomplishing political objectives 
and programmes through the politico-administrative system79. More de­
tailed, implementation is the general term for all activities of inferior 
administrative bodies such as the application of laws, regulations, rules 
and other measures80. In a broader sense implementation is the process 
and art of deliberately achieving social change through law81.
The implementation phase is one of three phases in the political process 
of problem-solving. These three phases can be distinguished as follows:82 
the phase of policy-formulation, in which expressed needs, proposals 
or demands are transformed either into programmes binding on the 
State or into legal rules. In Community law, in particular legal acts 
like Regulations and Directives are the output of this phase; 
the phase of implementation including, in Community law, firstly the 
incorporation phase, which means the transposition of a legal act into 
the law of the Member States and secondly the enforcement by the 
national administrations and court control83. For incorporation and 
administrative enforcement, the term application can be used as well;
79 Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., The implementation of Community legislation by 
the Member States, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.). Making European Policies 
Work, vol. 1, p. 5
80 Wollmann, H.; Implementationsforschung, in: Nohlen, D.; Schultze, R.-O. (eds.), 
Politikwissenschaft, Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe, vol. 1, p. 355; for Community 
law see Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 
163; Boest, R., Die Agrarmarkte im Recht der EWG, p. 285; Oppermann, T„ 
Europarecht, p. 202
81 Clune III, W. H., Lindquist, R. E., (1981) Wisconsin Law Review, p. 1045, this 
definition must be understood in relation to the beginnings of implementation re­
search in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, where implementation research 
focused on ambitious reforming social programs for education, housing etc.
82 Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C„ The implementation of Community legislation by 
the Member States, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies 
Work, vol. 1, p. 5, 26, for Community Law;
Mayntz, R., Implementation politischer Programme, in: Mayntz, R. (ed.), p. 238 et 
seq; Clune III, W. H.; Lindquist, R. E., ibid, p. 1085, 1079. This standard 
framework of policy analysis is called "forward mapping" because the analyst be­
gins with an objective and examines whether the objective has been carried 
through, as opposed to "backward mapping". Backward mapping analysis would 
start with the last stage by asking what the needs of the recipients are and the re­
sources and structures of the administration and then finally formulate objectives, 
see Elmore, R. F., (1978-79) 94 Political Science Quarterly, No. 4, p. 604 et seq
83 see Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., The implementation of Community legislation 




























































































the impacts of implemented programmes or rules, impacts here 
meaning reactions of the recipients of administrative action.
However, these distinctions are somewhat artificial because the phases 
tire interdependent84. In particular, the reactions of recipients of adminis­
trative actions are closely linked to administrative enforcement since the 
enforcement depends on their reactions and vice versa85.
II. Method of implementation research
Implementation research is an empirical political and administrative 
study8*’, it is usually carried out by descriptive case studies87.
Failures of programmes are, according to the findings of many case 
studies on implementation, either due to insufficient formulations in the 
programmes or to deficiencies in the organization of the implemented or 
to the characteristics of the recipients of administrative action or to all of 
these three reasons88. Case studies thus focus on all the three phases dis­
tinguished above. Before defining the scope of the implementation re­
search of this thesis, a short summary of which factors of each of the 
phases are usually scrutinized in case studies and of the reasons therof 
will be given.
1. Policy-formulation phase
Policy-making at the European level does not take place in isolation
from the national level. Both levels interact involving national and re-
Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 42, 57; Wessels, W., Hrbek, R., in: Azzi, G. C. (ed.), 
L’application du droit communautaire, p. 33
84 Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., ibid, p. 42; Wollmann, H., Implementations- 
forschung, in: Nohlen, D.; Schultze, R.-O. (eds.), Politikwissenschaft, Theorien, 
Methoden, Begriffe, vol. 1, p. 355; Mayntz, R., Implementation politischer Prog­
ramme, in: Mayntz, R. (ed.), p. 239
85 Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., ibid, p. 57 et seq.
86 see Wollmann, H., ibid, p. 355
87 see Elmore, R.F., (1978-79) 94 Political Science Quarterly, No. 4, p. 601; exam­
ples for Community law: Hoetjes, B. J. S., Desideri, C. (eds.), Changing Agricul­
ture in Europe; Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, 
vol. 1 and 2; Azzi, G. C. (ed.), L'application du droit communautaire
88 Mayntz, R., Soziologie der offentlichen Verwaltung, p. 218; Wollmann, H„ 
Implementationsforschung, in: Nohlen, D.; Schultze, R.-O. (eds.), Politikwissen­
schaft, Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe, vol. 1, p. 355; Jones, C. O., An 
introduction to the study of public policy, p. 166; Elmore, R. F., (1978) 26 Public 




























































































gional governments and administration, Community officials and non­
governmental national and European interest groups in every phase of the 
policy-formulation process89. This kind of policy-formulation is called 
either "joint decision making"90 or "two-tier policy making"91. Though 
policy-formulation at the European level is, according to the Treaty, 
carefully divided between the Commission whose function it is to submit 
or withdraw proposals92 and the Council which passes legal acts93, the 
influence of the Council and the Member States has increased over the last 
years at the expense of the powers of the Commission94. In fact, the real 
actors in the policy-formulation phase, in particular in the CAP, are the 
Member States and the various interest groups95. Because the actors have 
different conceptions of the legislative process, these conceptions shape 
the various proposals for the legislation and its eventual outcome9 .̂ The 
resulting Regulations and Directives hence incorporate a collection of 
concessions, derogations and compromises97.
The diverse conceptions adopted by the actors during the policy- 
formulation phase may determine their behaviour when Community law 
is implemented98. Since some actors of the policy-formulation phase even 
apply the passed legal acts the consideration of the policy-formulation 
phase is of great value for the implementation research.
89 Feld, J. W., The Two-Tier Policy Making in the EC, in: Hurwitz, L. (ed.), 
Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration, p. 132
90 see Scharpf, F. W., (1988) 66 Public Administration, p. 239 et seq
91 Feld, J. W„ ibid, p. 123
92 see Art. 149 of the EEC Treaty
93 see Art. 149 of the EEC Treaty
94 Feld, J. W., ibid, p. 133; Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., The implementation of 
Community legislation by the Member States, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), 
Making European Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 73 et seq
95 Hendriks, G., Germany and European Integration, p. 229; Feld, J. W., ibid, p. 
136; Pearce, J., The Common Agricultural Policy, in: Wallace, H.; Wallace, W.; 
Webb, C. (eds.), Policy Making in the European Community, p. 157, 171
96 Snyder, F. G., New Directions in European Community Law, p. 17
97 Pearce, J., ibid, p. 153; Feld, J. W„ The Two-Tier Policy Making in the EC, in: 
Hurwitz, L. (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration, p. 147; 
Glaesner, H.-J., Encadrement communautaire de la transposition du droit euro­
péen, in: Schwarze, J. et al, (eds.) The 1992 Challenge at National Level, p. 17
98 Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., The implementation of Community legislation by 
the Member States, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies 
Work, vol. 1, p. 3, p. 65; Azzi, G. C., Conclusions comparatives, in: Azzi, G. C. 




























































































Case studies inquire in particular into the interaction between the vari­
ous actors and levels in the process of policy-formulation (so-called 
"politics") or into the institutional framework of this process (so-called 
"polity")99 or into the conceptions adopted by the actors.
2. Implementation phase
As far as the implementation phase is concerned, case studies investi­
gate into how the structures, organizations and co-ordinations of the im- 
plementers, namely administrative bodies but also societal organizations 
and parliaments, influence the process of implementation and thus success 
of a programme9 100. In particular, the administrative structure is studied, 
including the politico-administrative culture101, the role and behaviour of 
bureaucrats and their attitudes towards Community law102. In studies of 
Community law, the control of the compliance of the incorporation and 
the enforcement by adminstrative agencies with Community law is ascer­
tained103. The implementation phase is seen as crucial for the success or 
failure of a programme because administrative actions determine the out­
come of programmes to a large degree104.
3. Impacts of implemented programmes
The reaction of the recipients might influence the behaviour of the 
administration. Their structure, their economic status in the sector con­
sidered, their interaction with the administration and their attitude to-
99 for definition of polity and politics; see Schumann, W., EG-Forschung und Policy- 
Analyse, p. 6; 20; Jann, W„ (1983) Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 47, p. 26 et 
seq
100 Mayntz, R., Soziologie der offentlichen Verwaltung, p. 218; examples are case 
studies see Hoetjes, B. J. S., Policy making and policy implementation, in: 
Hoetjes, B. J. S., Desideri, C. (eds.), Changing Agriculture in Europe, p. 4 et seq; 
Azzi, G. C„ Conclusions comparatives, in: Azzi, G. C. (ed.), L'application du 
droit communautaire, p. 343 et seq
101 in comparative researches see for example Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., The im­
plementation of Community legislation by the Member States, in: Siedentopf, H.; 
Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 6 et seq
102 if the research concerns Community law; see Azzi, G. C., Conclusions compara­
tives, in : Azzi, G. C. (ed.), L'application du droit communautaire, p. 348 et seq
103 Azzi, G. C., Introduction, in; Azzi, G. C. (ed.), L'application du droit communau­
taire, p. 10




























































































wards the administration are thus studied105. Recipients may be private 
individuals and/or organized interest groups106.
To sum up, implementation research is carried out through case studies 
and it is mostly conducted in a descriptive way107. However, there is no 
common framework allowing for the inclusion in the implementation re­
search of factors and processes (e.g. socio-economic conditions) that 
might influence an implementation process nor which impacts of imple­
mented programs (all outcomes like micro- or macroeconomic effects or 
limited to compliance and non-compliance with the law) should be inves­
tigated into108. The factors included in the implementation research con­
cerning the milk quota Regulations are yet to be specified.
III. Framework for implementation research
All the three phases should, for the reasons mentioned under II. 1., 2., 
3., be considered in this research to a certain extent. The extent of this 
consideration is yet to be defined.
It will be shown which aspects of the policy-formulation phase should 
be considered (1 b)). Because insufficiencies of a programme are sup­
posed to be one reason for the failure, it should be outlined which legal 
rules determine the policy-formulation phase. Thus, it can be ascertained 
whether the Council acted legally when passing the milk quota 
Regulations (1 a)).
The implementation phase and the impacts of implemented pro­
grammes will be treated as interdependent for the reasons given under I. 
Which aspects of both phases should be considered will be described un­
der 2 b). The application of Community law and its control, which were 
both defined as being part of the implementation phase, is subject to cer­
tain legal principles. Because this research focuses mainly on the legal 
reasons for the success or failure of the fulfillemt of objectives of the
105 Wollmann, H., Implementationsforschung, in: Nohlen, D.; Schultze, R.-O. (eds.), 
Politikwissenschaft, Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe, vol. 1, p. 356; Hoetjes, B. J. 
S., Policy making and policy implementation, in: Hoetjes, B. J. S.; Desideri, C. 
(eds.), Changing Agriculture in Europe, p. 7
106 see Hoetjes, B. J. S., ibid, p. 7
107 see Elmore, R. F., (1978-79) 94 Political Science Quarterly, No. 4, p. 601





























































































milk quota Regulations, these rules should be explained and they have to 
be kept in mind when inquiring into the implementation phase (2.a)).
1. Policy-formulation phase
a) Limitations the Council is subject to when passing EEC Regulations109
The Council enjoys considerable discretion when elaborating Com­
munity Regulations110. It is, however, subject to the principle of the uni­
formity of the market and is required to create equal conditions of com­
petition111.
In detail, the limitations of the Council are of a formal and material 
nature. The procedure leading to the enactment of a Regulation must be 
according to the procedural rules envisaged by the EEC Treaty112. As far 
as the contents of CAP Regulations are concerned, the Council is bound 
by the objectives of Art. 39 of the EEC Treaty113. Moreover, the Council 
has to guarantee the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Art. 40 
of the EEC Treaty. The prohibition of discrimination is merely a specific 
enunciation of the general principle of equality which is one of the fun­
damental principles of Community law114. That principle precludes com­
parable situations from being treated differently unless the difference in 
treatment is objectively justified. Last but not least, the Council has to re­
spect the principle of proportionality and the fundamental rights115.
109 the applying measures the Commission passes are also subject to the same princi­
ples as the Council, moreover, the Commission may only act within the authorized 
delegation of the Council, see Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the 
European Community, p. 145 et seq
110 e.g. Case 197-200, 243, 245 + 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmiihle v Council and 
Commission [1981] E.C.R., p. 3211 (3251); Gilsdorf, P.; Priebe, R„ Art. 39 
EWGV, in: Grabitz, E. (ed.), Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Annotation 2, 3
111 Boest, R. Die Agrarmârkte im Recht der EWG, p. 286 and 282; Blumental, M., 
(1984) 35 N.I.L.Q., p. 36; Case 23/75 Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero 
[1975] E.C.R., p. 1279 (1304)
112 Schwarze, J., Europâisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 383 et seq
113 Gilsdorf, P.; Priebe, R., Art. 39 EWGV, in: Grabitz, E. (ed.), Kommentar zum 
EWG-Vertrag, Annotation 1,6
114 Case C-267-285/88 Wuidart et al v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise et al [1990] 
E.C.R., p. 1-435 (1-480)
D5 see Schwarze, J., Europâisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 401 et seq; Case 
44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R., p. 3727 (3745); Blumental, 





























































































The investigation of the policy-formulation phase is necessarily limited 
to a few crucial points because the scope of the research does not allow, 
focused as it is on the legal aspects, the space to show all divergent inter­
ests concerning the introduction of the milk quotas or even the reforms of 
the quota system. In particular, the interaction between the various actors 
in the process of policy-formulation on the European and national level 
and the institutional framework of this process has not been 
considered1!6.
As seen under II. 1., the real actors in the integration process of the 
CAP are not the common institutions, but the Member States16 17. Hence, 
the national agricultural policies deserve more attention because the dif­
ferences in agricultural policies deeply affect the outcome and implemen­
tation of EEC policies118. That is why a brief summary of the Member 
States' conceptions of the agricultural policy in general and on the dairy 
sector in particular will be made. In this context, reference will be made 
to the Member States' attitude towards the introduction of milk quotas. 
The policy pursued by the Member States with regard to the dairy sector 
subject to quantitive restrictions is, for the purpose of this research, 
called national quota policy. The revelation of the national quota policies 
is necessary in order to ascertain whether the Member States’ policy 
complied with the objectives enshrined in the European Regulations. 
Although a national quota policy is only a conglomerate of the various 
interest groups’ policies (such as producers' organizations, interprofes­
sional organizations, manufacturers and traders), the study must because 
of limitations of space restrict itself to the comparison of national quota 
policies excluding regional or professional policies within each of the
116 as to this see in detail: Petit, M. et al, Agricultural Policy Formation in the European 
Community, p. 42 et seq, p. 79 et seq
117 Hendriks, G., Germany and European Integration, p. 229; Feld, J. W„ The Two- 
Tier Policy Making in the EC, in: Hurwitz, L. (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on 
European Integration, p. 136; Pearce, J., The Common Agricultural Policy, in: 
Wallace, H.; Wallace, W.; Webb, C. (eds.) Policy Making in the European 
Community, p. 157, 171
118 Pearce, J., ibid, p. 153; Hoetjes, B. J. S., Policy making and policy implementa­
tion in European Agriculture, in: Hoetjes, B. J. S., Desideri, C. (eds.), Changing 





























































































Member States1!9. This is also justified by the fact that national policies 
are an outcome of these diverse policies. Where necessary, however, ref­
erence is made to regional diversities within the Member States and to the 
attitude of some of the organizations (see national reports).
Moreover, as far as the agricultural policy of the Community is con­
cerned, in order to understand the national agricultural policies pursued, 
the necessary economic and social context of the issues at stake is of vital 
importance19 20. The measures taken in order to reduce surplus failed also 
because of the diverse milk production structures in the EEC. The reve­
lation of the dairy structures of the Member States thus is of vital impor­
tance. In order to shed light on the socio-economic context for both the 
policy pursued on the dairy sector and the application of the EEC 
Regulations, socio-structural data of the dairy sector are given including 
some general data of the agricultural sector121 (see national reports122).
2. Implementation phase and impacts of programmes
a) Legal rules governing the application and control of Community law
When Community law is supposed to be implemented, the question 
arises as to which institution is competent for the implementation and to 
which principles Member States are subject when they apply Community 
acts (aa). The application of Community Regulations is subject to judicial 
control by both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts 
(bb).
119 see in detail for the attitudes of interest groups in France, Germany and the UK as 
to the quota system, Petit, M. et al, Agricultural policy formation in the European 
Community, p. 37 et seq, p. 53 et seq, p. 97 et seq
120 see Pearce, J., ibid, p. 153, see Snyder, F. G., New Directions in European 
Community Law, p. 14, 19, 31; see Ziller, J., The Implementation of European 
Community Policies, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European 
Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 142; see Butt Philip, A., The application of the Transport 
Regulations, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, 
vol. 1, p. 119
121 as far as Germany is concerned, the five new "Bundeslânder" are excluded, due to 
lack of sufficient data. The general data on agriculture are from 1983/84, the years 
before and in which the milk quota Regulations were introduced. Most of the data 
on dairy farming, however, are from both 1983/84 and 1989/1990/1991 to enable a 
comparison. Data from 1991 were in most cases not yet available.





























































































aa) Competence for implementation of Community law and limitations 
the Member States are subject to
Either Community bodies or the Member States could be competent for 
implementing Community law123. Since the Treaty contains no provisions 
for any division of competence!24, the distinction must be made as fol­
lows : Community bodies are competent as soon as they are explicitly at­
tributed any competence by Community law, as, for example, the 
Commission!23. jn a]] other cases, the Member States are obliged to im­
plement Community law because of their duties enshrined in Art. 5 of the 
EEC Treaty!26. jn practice, Community law is to a large extent applied 
by Member States127 128. This is also true for the implementation of the 
CAP128.
The application of Community law by the Member States is governed 
by two main principles: The first principle is the so-called institutional 
autonomy (1). The application also depends on the nature of the legal act, 
in particular on whether a Regulation or Directive has to be applied (2). 
The second principle is not to modify or reduce the scope of Community 
law when applying it (3).
(1) Determination of competent authorities and procedural rules 
(institutional autonomy)
Community Regulations may expressly disallow the Member States to 
divide the responsibility for taking the necessary executing measures 
among diverse national institutions129. But if Community law has no 
provisions regulating competence, the Member States autonomously de­
cide which administrative institutions are responsible for applying the 
Community Regulations at the national level130 (institutional autonomy).
123 Oppermann, T., Europarecht, p. 202
124 Oppermann, T„ Europarecht, p. 202
125 Art. 155, 145 of the EEC Treaty, Nicolaysen, G., Europarecht I, p. 75
126 Oppermann, T„ Europarecht, p. 202; Gôtz, V., (1986) Europarecht, p. 35; Case 
205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor et al v Federal Republic of Germany [1983] 
E.C.R., p. 2633 (2665); Cartou, L., Communautées européennes, p. 199
127 for a survey see Oppermann, T., Europarecht, p. 202
128 Snyder, F. G., Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, p. 60; Schwarze, J., 
Europâisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 438
129 Case 240/78 Atlanta Amsterdam BV v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1979] 
E.C.R., p. 2137 (2148)
130 Case 51-54/71 International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit 




























































































These decisions also depend on the constitutional and administrative 
structures of the several Member States131. This autonomy is also true 
for the control of the application of Community law132 and for the deci­
sion to which procedural rules their administrative agencies are sub­
ject133.
(2) National incorporating measures in the case of implementation of 
Regulations and Directives
As far as the incorporation of legal acts of the Community is con­
cerned, a distinction must be made between Regulations and Directives as 
the main important instruments of secondary Community law134. 
Directives require national re-enactment though it is recognized by the 
ECJ that a Directive might also have direct effect after the time-limit for 
its incorporation has expired135. By definition, an EEC Regulation is di­
rectly applicable throughout the Community and its terms therefore do 
not need national re-enactment136. That is why the ECJ has held that 
Regulations must not receive national re-enactment since the Community 
law origin of the legislation might thereby be disguised and the general 
application be endangered137. Nevertheless, there are many Community 
Regulations which expressly or implicitly require domestic ancillary or
Agriculture [1978] E.C.R., p. 2429 (2442); Schwarze, J., Europaisches 
Verwaltungs recht, vol. 1, p. 442; Oppermann, T., Europarecht, p. 204; Gotz,
V. , (1986) Europarecht, p. 42
131 Case 51-54/71, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en 
Fruit [1971] E.C.R., p. 1107(1116)
132 Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 163
133 Schwarze, J., Europaisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 444; Oppermann, T„ 
Europarecht, p. 204; Case 205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor et al v Federal 
Republic of Germany [1983] E.C.R., p. 2633 (2665); Case 51-54/71 International 
Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1971] E.C.R., p. 1107 
(1116); Case 39/70 Norddeutsches Vieh-und Fleischkontor GmbH v HZA 
Hamburg-St. Annen [1971] E.C.R., p. 49 (58); Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of 
Agriculture in the European Community, p. 163; see Lasok, D.; Bridge, J. W., 
Law & Institutions of the European Communities, p. 323
134 By secondary Community law, the law enacted by the institutions of the 
Community on the basis of the treaties, like Directives and Regulations according to 
Art. 189 of the EEC Treaty is meant. It opposes primary Community law, mainly 
the treaties of the EEC, the ECSC and the EAC. (see Schweitzer, M.; Hummer,
W. , Europarecht, p. 47 et seq)
135 Case 148/78 Ratti [1979] E.C.R., p. 1629 (1642)
136 Art. 189 of the EEC Treaty
137 Case 34/73 Variola v Italian Finance Administration [1973] E.C.R., p. 981 (991); 




























































































implementing legislation138. The ECJ has ruled that provisions that ex­
plicitly authorize a Member State to enact incorporating measures are not 
contradicting the direct effect of Regulations139 140. Moreover, according to 
the ECJ, Member States are competent and are obliged under Art. 5 of 
the EEC Treaty to enact incorporating measures if any practical applica­
tion of the Community Regulation requires changes in national law in or­
der to achieve the stated objectives1411.
(3) Competences and limitations of Member States when implementing 
Community law
The implementation of Community law is subject to certain limitations 
because uniform application of Community law must be guaranteed in 
order to avoid any unequal treatment of citizens141. These limitations 
were elaborated by the ECJ on the basis of the principle which is en­
shrined in Art. 5 of the EEC treaty: generally speaking, implementing 
Member States may not reduce the scope nor modify the application of 
Community provisions142. Community law application and national law 
application should not be treated differently143. In particular, Member 
States are subject to the general principles of Community law in order to
138 Case 31/78, Bussone v Italian Ministry of Agriculture [1978] E.C.R., p. 2429 
(2445); Glaesner, H.-J., Encadrement communautaire de la transposition du droit 
européen, in: Schwarze, J. et al (eds.), The 1992 Challenge at National Level, p. 
17; Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 
155, Capotorti, F., Legal Problems of Directives, Regulations and their Implemen­
tation, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.). Making European Policies Work, vol. 
1, p. 164
139 see Case 230/78, S.p.A. Eridania and others v Ministry of Agriculture [1979] 
E.C.R., p. 2749 (2771)
140 Case 31/69, Commission v Italian Republic [1970] E.C.R., p. 25 (34); see 
Glaesner, H.-J., ibid, p. 17; Boulouis, J., Droit institutionnel des communautés 
européennes, p. 183
141 Schwarze, J., Europâisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 460; Case 205-215/82 
Deutsche Milchkontor et al v Federal Republic of Germany [1983] E.C.R. 2633 
(2665); Oppermann, T., Europarecht, p. 206
142 Case 265/78 Ferwerda BV v Produktshap voor Vee en Vlees [1980] E.C.R. 617 
(630); Case 205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor et al v Federal Republic of Germany 
[1983] E.C.R., p. 2633 (2666); Snyder, F. G., Law of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, p. 60
143 Case 205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor et al v Federal Republic of Germany 




























































































avoid jeopardizing the objectives of the Treaty144. In detail, Member 
States are subject to two important principles. Firstly, they are obliged to 
obey the principle of non-discrimination. The principle enshrined in Art. 
4 0  (3) of the EEC Treaty applies both to measures enacted by the 
Council and to implementing measures of the Member States145. 
Secondly, the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights, which 
form an integral part of the general principles of Community law146, are 
binding not only on the Council but also on the Member States when they 
apply Community rules147.
bb) Judicial mechanisms for the control of the application of Community 
law
The application of Community law is mainly controlled in two 
ways148: Firstly, the Commission or one Member State may according to 
Art. 169, 170 of the EEC Treaty institute infringement proceedings 
against another Member State. Before the Commission and Member States 
may bring the matter before the ECJ, however, non-judicial proceedings 
have to be carried out. The control by infringement proceedings is a 
centralized control mechanism149. Secondly, single citizens and private 
enterprises may evoke control of the application of Community law by 
appealing to national courts. This right stems from the principle of pri-
144 Schweitzer, M.; Hummer, W., Europarecht, p. 126; Case 77/76 Cucchi v Avez 
S.p.A [1977] E.C.R., p. 987 (1004); Case 36/79 Denakavit v Finanzamt 
Wahrendorf [1979] E.C.R., p. 3439 (3456)
145 Case 139/77 Denkavit v Finanzamt Wahrendorf [1978] E.C.R., p. 1317 (1333); 
Case 213- 215/81 Norddeutsches Vieh-und Fleischkontor v Bundesanstalt f. 
landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1982] E.C.R., p. 3583 (3600); Case 201- 
202/85 Klensch v Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Agriculture et à la Viticulture [1986] E.C.R., 
p. 3477 (3507); Kummer, H.-W., Art. 40 EWGV, in; von der Groeben, H.; 
Thiesing, J.; Ehlermann, C.-D. (eds.), Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, vol. 1, 
Annotation 47
146 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R., p. 3727 (3745)
147 Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Emâhrung und Forstwirtschaft [1988] 
E.C.R., p. 2609 (2639 et seq)
148 Ehlermann, C.-D., Opening Speech, in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making 
European Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 145; other mechanisms are non-judicial con­
trols like information, approvement, cooperation see Art. 33, 6, 42, 213, 220 of 
the EEC Treaty, see Cartou, L., Communautés européennes, p. 192




























































































macy and direct applicability of Community law15*1. This control is called 
the decentralized control mechanism150 51.
The power of the ECJ to give preliminary rulings according to Art. 
177 of the EEC Treaty is by contrast only an indirect control. The ECJ is 
not actually called upon to control the concrete measures for implemen­
tation, but to specify the meaning and scope of the obligations of Com­
munity law to which all implementation procedures are connected152 153.
b) Framework for implementation phase and the phase of impacts of 
implemented programmes
The factors that will be included in the case study are chosen with rela­
tion to the four EEC objectives152:
Each report will start with describing by which legal act the EEC 
Regulations were incorporated into national law. Secondly, the adminis­
trative bodies or other organizations to which competences have been at­
tributed will be presented. Their legal status within the administration of 
the Member States will be given. Thus, the fact that the choice of the exe­
cuting organ has an effect on how law is applied is recognized154. Only 
by understanding how organizations work and which competences they 
have can we understand how policies are shaped in the process of 
implementation155.
Thirdly, it will be asked how the European Regulations with regard to 
their objectives were incorporated. In detail, it will be asked how the 
rules on the allocation of reference quantities were transposed into the 
national systems, which Formula was incorporated and how the transfer 
rules were transposed. Moreover, the question arises, how the rules con-
150 Boulouis, J., Droit institutionnel des communautés européennes, p. 184; Case 
26/62 van Gend en Loos v Niederlândische Finanzverwaltung [1963], E.C.R., p. 
1 (25 et seq); Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] E.C.R., p. 1259 (1269 et seq)
151 Ehlermann, C.-D., ibid, p. 145
152 Capotorti, F., Legal Problems of Directives, Regulations and their Implementation, 
in: Siedentopf, H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 
166
153 see introduction for definition
154 Harmathy, A., The influence of legal systems on models of implementation, in: 
Daintith, T. (ed.), Law as an Instrument of Economic policy, p. 266 ; Jones, C. 
O., An introduction to the study of public policy, p. 173, p. 176; Elmore, R. F„ 
(1978) 26 Public Policy, No. 2, p. 187; see Siedentopf, H.; Hauschild, C., The 
implementation of Community legislation by the Member States, in: Siedentopf, 
H.; Ziller, J. (eds.), Making European Policies Work, vol. 1, p. 26




























































































sidering the economic and social situations of the tenants were transposed. 
To this purpose, the agricultural tenancies laws of the Member States and 
the legal nature of the reference quantity must be referred to. The incor­
poration phase is considered because it can thus be ascertained whether 
legal differences in both the incorporated rules and the existing Member 
States law influenced the divergency of the implementations.
When presenting the incorporation of the rules, their enforcement by 
the administration and other implementers as well as their control by the 
courts and Community institutions will be considered if necessary. Thus, 
it can be discovered whether the achievement of the goals was hindered 
or promoted by the administration and the courts. Though the organiza­
tion and co-ordination between the various implementers will be inquired 
into, a thorough insight into the structures of the implementers such as 
their attitude to Community law or the role of bureaucrats will not be 
given.
As far as the impacts of implemented programs are concerned, it will 
be investigated whether the behaviour of the recipients who are the pro­
ducers and purchasers was in compliance with the EEC Regulations and 
the national regulations as far as the transfer mles and the implementation 
of the Formula is concerned. Thus, it can be ascertained whether their re­
actions contributed to the success or failure of the objectives defined. As 
far as economic effects156 are concerned, the question as to whether a 
market of quotas developed will be scrutinized.
B. Method of the comparison of the implementations
In order to find out for what reasons the Community objetives were 
fulfilled or not both the incorporation of the milk quota Regulations into 
national law and their application by administrative bodies including the 
reactions of the recipients will be compared. By comparing legal institu­
tions and specific problems, a microcomparison will be carried out157. 
The question is to which method this comparison is subject.
'56 economic effects of quotas can be micro-economic effects such as the behaviour of 
the farmers (increasing the average yield per cow) or macro-economic effects such 
as the impact of quotas on landprices or agricultural structure, for details see 
Boussard, J. M., (1985) 12 European Review of Agricultural Economics, p. 325 




























































































One broadly acknowledged method of comparative law is that of func­
tionality158. This essentially means that in order to find out how a foreign 
legal system has solved a concrete problem, one must identify those rules 
of a foreign system which are functionally equivalent to those of the in­
terested party's native law, taking into account both legal and non-legal 
factors. To this end, all national legal dogmatism and technical terms 
must be abandoned in order to directly concentrate on the function of a 
legal or non-legal instrument, i.e. their impact on society159. In this way, 
it is possible to avoid the danger of basing one's comparison on the con­
cepts of one's own legal order and thus of attempting to compare two 
things that strictly speaking are not comparable160. The basic rule of the 
"functionalist" approach is that the different legal systems give the same 
or very similar solutions, even in detail, to the same problems and needs 
of life161.
The "functionalist" method is criticized because it leaves out all non-le­
gal factors that influence a problem-solving process such as the adminis­
trative behaviour, the role of actors such as interest groups and the eco­
nomic and social context by believing that law is functional. Because of 
these non-legal factors, however, the same needs can lead to different so­
lutions162. In particular, this method does not take into account diversity 
of societies and thus wrongly assumes that the legal and societal problems 
and hence needs are the same in all countries163.
Even if one assumes that the functionalist method may, for purely 
technical reasons, have its merits in private law, it is probably not very 
suitable for public law. By public law we mean those rules that concern 
the relationship of an individual to the state and the relationship between 
the holders of public power, which, of course, include administrative and 
constitutional law164. The subject matter of the milk quota Regulation
158 Zweigert, K.; Kôtz, H., Introduction to comparative law, vol. 1, p. 31; Miinch, 
F„ (1973) ZaÔRV 1973, p. 139 et seq
159 Schmidt, F„ in; Festschrift fiir Zweigert, p. 532
160 Zweigert, K.; Kôtz, H., ibid, p. 31
161 Zweigert, K.; Kôtz, H„ ibid, p.36
162 Schmidt, F„ in: Festschrift fiir Zweigert, p. 528
163 Schmidt, F., in: Festschrift fiir Zweigert, p. 528; Constantinesco, L.-J., 
Rechtsvergleichung, vol. 3, p. 54




























































































belongs partly to the administration of levies, though there are also some 
private law regulations.
Public law reflects the ideology, national moral concepts and politics of 
a state165. Because public law is influenced greatly by political concepts 
and economic interests, the exploration of the broader context of a rule of 
public law cannot be neglected when comparing public law166. But, on 
the other hand, the comparison of public law is not identical with political 
sciences. Political sciences consider all factors determining policies, the 
legal factor being only a minor part, whereas comparative public law 
contributes solely to an explanation of the working of the society. The re­
sults gained at by public comparative law are more modest in exploring 
society than those of political sciences167. In focusing on legal aspects 
only, however, it approaches problems more precisely.
The method used in this research will be partly a functionalist one be­
cause a comparison will be made of how the Community Regulations 
were applied by the Member States in order to achieve the Community 
objectives enshrined in the EEC Regulations. Community objectives in the 
sense of the "functionalist" method are the "same needs" or the common 
denominator of the Member States. Taking the joint decision making pro­
cess into account, however, it is apparent that the Community needs will 
not all necessarily comply with the Member States needs. Nevertheless, 
the reference to Community objectives is made for technical reasons in 
order to have a guideline.
To discover whether the Community needs expressed and objectives 
pursued were also the objectives and needs of the single Member States 
the necessary national socio-economic and political context will be re­
vealed to a certain extent (see national reports). However, as outlined be­
fore, the emphasis is put on the legal differences in the Member States.
165 Bernhardt, R„ (1964) 24 ZaORV, p. 432, 441; Kaiser, J. H. (1964) 24 ZaORV, 
p. 396, 401 et seq
166 Kaiser, J. H„ (1964) 24 ZaORV, p. 401; Bernhardt, R„ (1964) 24 ZaORV, p. 
438,441,451




























































































Explanation of the Milk quota Regulations
In order to explain the milk quota Regulations and to highlight the four 
objectives that are scrutinized in the research, the general features of the 
system will be explained first (A) connected with a short survey of the 
structural measures linked to the milk quota Regulations (B). In more 
detail, the rules on the allocation of reference quantities (C), on their 
transfer (D), on the consideration of the economic situation of the tenant 
(E) and on the calculation and amount of the super-levy (F) will be 
examined.
A. General features of the milk quota Regulations
I. Basic Regulations
The three basic Regulations are Council Regulation 856/84 amending 
Council Regulation 804/68168, Council Regulation 8 5 7 /8 4 169 1702and 
Commission Regulation 1371 /8 4 170 _ The latter two adopt general rules of 
the application of the levy. Commission Regulation 1371/84 was revoked 
by Commission Regulation 1546/88171. All Regulations have been 
amended several times since their enactment'72, due to either economic
168 O. J. 1984, L 90/10; amended by inserting a new Art. 5 (c) in Council Regulation 
804/68, O. J. 1968, L 148/13; for convenience, the Council Regulations 804/68 
and 857/84 are designated as "Regulation 804/68 and Regulation 857/84"
O. J. 1984, L 90/13; based on Art. 5 (c) (6) of Regulation 804/68; this version is 
referred to if not indicated other
170 O. J. 1984, L 132/11; based on Art. 5 (c) (7) of Regulation 804/68
171 O. J. 1988, L 139/12
172 as to July 1992: latest amendment of Council Regulation 804/68: Council 
Regulation 2071/92,0 . J. 1992, L 215/64; latest amendment of Council Regulation 
857/84: 817/92, O. J. 1992, L 86/85; latest amendment of Commission Regulation 




























































































and social necessities, judgements of the ECJ or administrative 
difficulties 173.
II. Imposition of the levy on deliveries to dairies and direct sales
The milk quota system principally works by imposing an additional 
levy (also called super-levy174) on every litre of milk and milk products 
marketed in the European Community, that, during a twelve-month pe­
riod, exceeds a so-called reference quantity175. Milk and milk products 
are mainly marketed by deliveries of milk to purchasers (mostly dairies) 
by the producer175, (so-called deliveries to dairies)177. The second, mi­
nor way of marketing is the direct sale178 of milk and milk products by 
the producer to the consumer without going through an undertaking 
treating or processing the milk.
The levy is imposed on every litre notwithstanding the marketing 
method179. As far as the deliveries to dairies are concerned, however, for 
the purpose of implementing the levy, each Member State had the choice 
between two Formulas in order to determine the debtor180. Under 
Formula A, the levy is payable by every milk producer181 on the quanti­
ties of milk and/or milk products which he has delivered to a purchaser 
and which for the twelve months concerned exceed a reference quantity 
to be determined. A producer is a natural or legal person or group of
173 Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N„ Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 
5; ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 4; for the February 1985 and December 
1986 changes see Schumann, W., EG-Forschung und Policy-Analyse, p. 128, p. 
153
174 the expression "additional levy" was employed in the Regulations in order to dis­
tinguish the levy from the co-reponsibility levy; see Sorasio, D., (1988) Revue du 
marché commun, No 313, p. 11; to this purpose, the levy was also called "super­
levy” see Cardwell, M., (1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev., p. 727
175 Sorasio, D„ (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 535; Usher, J. A., 
Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 37, p. 74; Blumann, 
C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 5
176 In 1984, 92,6 % of the milk produced in the European Community from dairy 
herds was delivered to dairies, Commission of the European Communities, The 
Agricultural Situation in the Community, 1985 Report, p. 382
177 for definition of delivery see A rt 12 (g) of Regulation 857/84
178 for definition of direct sale see Art. 12 (h) of Regulation 857/84
179 for deliveries to dairies see Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 804/68 and for direct sales 
see Art. 5 (c) (2) of Regulation 804/68
189 Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 804/68




























































































natural and legal persons farming a holding and selling milk or milk 
products directly to the consumer and/or supplying the purchaser182.
Under Formula B, the levy is payable by every purchaser of milk or 
other milk products on the quantities of milk or milk equivalent which 
have been delivered to him by a producer and which, during the twelve 
months concerned, exceed a reference quantity to be determined. A pur­
chaser is an undertaking or grouping which purchases milk or milk prod­
ucts either to treat or process them or to sell them to one or more under­
takings treating or processing milk or other milk products182.
As far as direct sales are concerned, the levy is payable by every milk 
producer on the quantities of milk and/or milk equivalent he has sold for 
direct consumption and which, during the 12 months concerned, exceed a 
reference quantity to be determined184.
III. Reference quantity and reference year
The amount up to which milk may be delivered or sold within a 
twelve-month period without the risk of paying any levies is called the 
reference quantity185. Reference quantities are fixed according to the 
amounts of milk delivered or sold by a producer from a holding or pur­
chased by a purchaser in a certain calendar year before the introduction 
of milk quotas. This calendar year is called the reference year. The 





Art. 12 (c) of Regulation 857/84 
Art. 12 (e) of Regulation 857/84 
Art. 5 (c) (2) of Regulation 804/68
Instead of "reference quantity", the term "quota" is employed synonymously 
though not referred to in the Regulations in question. "Quotas" as a means of state 
intervention exist in other economic sectors as well. However, quotas on sectors 
like the coal and steel market (Art. 58 of the ECSC Treaty) or the fishery sector, 
mean an absolute restriction of the production; see Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du 
marché commun, No 291, p. 533. Legally, by the super-levy system on the dairy 
sector, no absolute restriction of production is given, see Blumann, C.; Lusson- 
Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 5. Though the term ref­
erence quantity may be more precise, it is suggested that both be employed syn­
onymously for convenience; economists allege that though legally no restriction of 
the production takes place, the economic effect of the levy means a prohibition of 
the production of the exceeding amount, see Boussard, J. M., (1985) 12 European 




























































































April of one year to the 31st of March of the next year (so-called milk 
year186).
B. Restructuring measures related to the milk quota system
The milk quota Regulations are above all an instrument of the market 
policy. However, several provisions are related to the structural policy of 
the CAP. Structural policy aims at improving the conditions of produc­
tion, marketing and sales in the long run and is usually distinguished from 
market and price policy187.
The milk quota Regulations and related measures intend to restructure 
the dairy sector188 189. Restructuring means promoting of farms that are ca­
pable of development1811, but also encouraging producers to cease pro­
duction of a certain commodity. Cessation schemes as instruments of 
structural policy have been operated in the Community since the 
1970s190. In the dairy sector, since 1984, several national191 and 
Community schemes have been introduced to encourage producers to give 
up milk production. Up to now, three types of Community schemes have 
been established192. Apart from the immediate goal of the out-goer 
schemes, to reduce the number of inefficient milk producers, the released 
reference quantities can be used to allocate them to other p ro d u ce rs193. 
Producers' reference quantities can thus be increased without augmenting 
the national guaranteed quantity. Re-allocating reference quantities is con­
sequently the instrument for restructuring the dairy sector.
186 Art. 2 of Regulation 804/68, O. J. 1986, L 148/13
187 Art. 39 of the EEC Treaty; Gilsdorf, P., Strukturpolitik in der EG, in: 
Handworterbuch des Agrarrechts, vol. 2, column 826
188 see Art. 5 (c) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. 
J. 1984, L 90/10
189 A rt 39(1) (a) of the EEC Treaty
190 Directive 72/160, O. J. 1962, L 96/2 ; Council Regulation 1096/88, O. J. 1988, L 
110/1
191 based on Art. 4 (a) of Regulation 857/84, amended several times in order to make it 
more flexible, see Council Regulation 1343/86, O. J. 1986, L 119/34 and Council 
Regulation 3880/89, O. J. 1989, L 378/3
192 Council Regulation 1336/86, O. J. L 119/21; Council Regulation 1899/87, O. J. 
1987, L 182/39; Council Regulation 1183/90, O. J. 1990, L 119/27




























































































C. Determination and allocation of reference quantities
The levy is only due if a certain threshold, i.e. reference quantity of 
milk, is exceeded. The determination and allocation of these quantities 
works as follows194: Firstly, a so-called guaranteed total quantity for the 
Community as a whole consisting of both guaranteed total quantities for 
deliveries to dairies and direct sales is fixed. Secondly, these quantities 
are distributed among the Member States (so-called national guaranteed 
quantities). Thirdly, the Member States divide this sum up between pro­
ducers or purchasers.
/. Guaranteed total quantity and national guaranteed quantities concern­
ing deliveries to dairies195-Community reserve
In 1984, the guaranteed total quantity for the Community for deliveries 
to dairies for the first five-year period of the application of the milk 
quota system was fixed at a sum corresponding to the amount of quanti­
ties of milk delivered in each Member State during the 1981 calendar 
year, plus 1 %196. Since 1984, the amount of the guaranteed total quan­
tity has been both increased197 and reduced by several measures. The re­
duction took place in two ways198: Firstly, since 1986/87, the amount has 
been cut several times199 20with the consequence of a corresponding reduc­
tion of individual reference quantities2110. No such reduction took place if
194 see Preamble of Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10 and Art. 5 (c) (3) 
of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 
90/10
195 direct sales, to which the same principles apply, are not treated, however, are re­
ferred to where necessary
196 Art. 5 (c) (3) of Regulation 804/68, the sum was increased for the first twelve- 
month period in order to allow transition to the new system, see Preamble of 
Council Regulation 856/84 ; for direct sales, see Art. 6 of Regulation 857/84
197 rendered necessary by the accession of Spain and Portugal and the unification of 
Germany
198 The guaranteed total quantity for direct sales was also cut, however, no suspension 
took place, see Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N„ Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, 
Fasc. D -l, p. 6
199 first cut by Council Regulation 1335/86, O. J. 1986, L 119/19; for survey see 
Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 16 et seq
200 see A rt 2 (3) of Regulation 857/84 as amended by Council Regulation 1911/86, O. 




























































































the proportion that had to be reduced could be released by producers who 
were willing to take part in Community out-goer schemes201.
Secondly, since 1987/88, a uniform proportion of each individual ref­
erence quantity has been temporarily withdrawn202 with the consequence 
that the levy shall be due on the amount of milk or milk equivalent, deliv­
ered or purchased during each of the twelve-month periods in question, 
that is, in excess of the amount of reference quantities not withdrawn. 
However, producers are granted a compensation for the quantities 
withdrawn203.
The reason for the first cuts and withdrawals in 1986/87 were the in­
creasing stocks and expenditures of the EAGGF from 1985 onwards204 
because in 1985/86 and 1986/87 the quantities produced in Member States 
exceeded the guaranteed total quantity205.
The guaranteed total quantity for the Community is distributed among 
the Member States on the basis of deliveries on their territory during the 
1981 calendar year plus 1 %206.
A so-called Community reserve is constituted in order to supplement, 
at the beginning of each twelve-month period, the guaranteed quantities 
of the Member States in which implementation of the levy system raises 
particular difficulties liable to affect their supply or production struc­
tures207. Since the beginning, the amount has been increased significantly
201 first scheme: Council Regulation 1336/86, O. J. 1986, L 119/21; second scheme: 
Council Regulation 1637/91, O. J. 1991, L 150/31. Because in most Member 
States there were not enough participants in the first programme, Member States 
were authorized to compensate producers whose reference quantities had to be re­
duced, Art. 5 (5) of Council Regulation 776/87, O. J. 1987, L 78/9; Sorasio, D., 
(1988) Revue du marché commun, No 313, p. 17; Bundesregierung (ed.) 
Agrarbericht 1988, p. 76
202 first withdrawal see Council Regulation 775/87, O. J. 1987, L 78/5; for survey see 
Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 16 et seq
2°3 A rt 2 of Council Regulation 775/87, O. J. 1987, L 78/5
204 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1987 Report, p. 38, T/298; COM (86) 645 final, p. 1
205 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1987 Report, T/297
206 enlisted in Art. 5 (c) (3) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 
856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10; for structural reasons, Italy, Ireland and Spain were 
allowed to use 1983 as reference year, Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 
90/10; for Spain see Council Regulation 1335/86,0 . J. 1986, L 119/19
207 Art. 5 (c) (4) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84,0 . 
J. 1984, L 90/10; for both direct sales and deliveries to dairies see The Federation 




























































































and its use has been extended to certain categories of producers208. In 
particular, so-called "SLOM-producers"200 and producers with "special 
needs" (so-called "Nallet quota") were considered210.
II. Determination o f reference quantities for deliveries to dairies within 
each Member State211
1. Choice between two Formulas by the Member State
The levy system shall be implemented in each region of the territory of 
the Member States in accordance with one of the two Formulas212. The 
choice of the Formula also determines who is allocated reference quanti­
ties213. Under Formula A, thus, the producer who is the debtor of the 
levy is allocated reference quantities214, whereas under Formula B, the 
reference quantities are allocated to purchasers who distribute them 
among producers215.
2. Objective when granting the possibility of a choice between two 
Formulas
The possibility of a choice between two Formulas was provided for in 
order to take into account the diversity of milk production structures and 
of milk-collecting in the different regions of the Community, the 
administrative problems arising and the regional development policy216.
Northern Ireland and Ireland were considered initially, see Art. 1 of Commission 
Regulation 1371/84, O. J. 1984, L 132/11
208 Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 
8; see Council Regulation 818/92, O. J. 1992, L 86/87
209 ^  under II. 4 a)
210 The Community reserve was increased in 1989 by 1 % at the expense of the guar­
anteed total quantity (so-called Nallet [=French Agricultural Minister] quota); 
Council Regulation 3879/89, O. J. 1989, L 378/1
211 direct sales are not treated. Except for the choice of the Formulas, the same princi­
ples apply for them; see Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., JurisClasseur ru­
ral, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 6
212 Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 857/84
213 Art. 2 of Regulation 857/84
214 Art. 2 (1) of Regulation 857/84
215 Art. 2 (1) of Regulation 857/84
216 see Preamble of Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10; as for milk-col­
lecting see Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 
856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10; objectives confirmed by Case C-267/88 - C-285/88, 




























































































The implementation of either Formula in a region, whether in part or all 
of the territory of the Member State, shall, consequently, comply with 
one or more of the following three criteria. The first criterion is the 
administrative viability, the second the need to facilitate structural change 
and adaption and the third are regional development requirements, one 
consideration being the need to avoid the desertification of certain 
areas217. The Formulas thus should enable the Member States to 
implement the levy in a way that is most suitable for their production, 
administrative and regional structures.
If a producer under Formula B remains in one twelve-month period 
below his reference quantities, the purchaser to whom he delivers may, at 
the end of the milk year, equalize these unused quantities with the quanti­
ties of other producers, who delivered milk and milk products in excess 
of their reference quantities218. This method of equalization under 
Formula B is not expressly mentioned in the Regulations. However, the 
Preamble of Regulation 857/84 recognizes this possibility and the fact that 
the purchaser is the debtor implicitly allows the equalization. This was 
confirmed by an ECJ judgement219 20.
Unused quantities would occur in particular in regions with inefficient 
milk production structures229. The equalization thus might help facilitate 
structural adjustments and avoid the desertification of areas because the 
effect of the levy on exceeding producers is mitigated221. Fewer milk 
producers might be forced to give up milk production. Structural adjust­
ment was important in some Member States where the dairy sector was in 
the process of restructuring, namely in France222 23.7 Thus, diverse milk 
production structures within the Community are taken into account. By 
the distribution of unused reference quantities within a region a regional 
development policy can be conducted222. As far as the administrative vi­
ability is concerned, the administration and control under Formula B
217 Art. 1 (2) of Regulation 857/84
218 Harvey, D. R„ Milk quotas, p. 21
219 Case 61/87, Thevenot et al v Centrale laitière de Franche-Comté [1988] E.C.R., p. 
2375 (2391 et seq)
220 Wehland, W., (1988) top agrar, No 4, p. 118
221 Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 509; see also Art. 5 (c) (1) of 
Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 
90/10
222 for details see fourth chapter




























































































seems less complicated because under Formula B, there are fewer debtors 
than under Formula A224 256.
Originally, only Formula B was envisaged by the Commission propos­
als223. Implementing a system based on the producers' levy liability 
(Formula A) in a Member State would, however, result in a more per­
sonal and financial responsibility of the producers for exceeding quanti- 
ties22f\  In addition, any reduction of surplus would be much easier to at­
tain, because there is no possibility of equalization under Formula A227. 
Because the producers' levy liability does not depend on the situation of 
over- and underdeliveries of their purchasers, it can moreover be ensured 
that the producers of different purchasers are equally treated228. Unequal 
treatment would in particular occur between producers in Member States 
with diverse milk production and milk-collection structures within their 
borders: In inefficient regions, there would be a high amount of unused 
quotas advantaging producers with overdeliveries229. The larger the col­
lection zone is and thus the greater the amount of milk collected, the 
higher the probability of the same amount of under- and overdeliver­
ies230 231. These last aspects were the reason the introduction of a second 
Formula was suggested during the negotiations23!. As far as the adminis­
trative viability is concerned, under Formula A, purchasers are not 
charged with a levy and might probably be less involved in the adminis­
tration of the levy-system. In addition, under Formula B, reference 
quantities are allocated on two levels - to the purchasers and producers; 
whereas under Formula A, only producers receive reference quantities.
224 Burrel, A., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 79
225 COM (83) 500 final, p. 23; Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 
291, p. 538
226 Harvey, D. R„ Milk quotas, p. 21
227 Oskam, A. J. et al, The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 36
228 Oskam, A. J. et al, The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 36; Dillen, M.; 
Tollens, E., Milk quotas, vol. 1, p. 17
229 Wehland, W., (1988) top agrar, No. 4, p. 118
230 Harvey, D. R., Milk quotas, p. 28
231 Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 538; see COM (83) 
548 final; Petit, M. et al, Agricultural policy formation in the European 




























































































The possibility of introducing Formula A was strongly favoured by the 
Germans232. Member States may change the Formula during the applica­
tion of the superlevy system233.
3. Definition of a region
The Formulas are implemented in each region of the territory of the 
Member States234. The definition of the regions is fixed in Art. 2 (1) of 
Regulation 857/84. A region may be part of the territory of a Member 
State which has geographical unity and in which the natural conditions, 
the structures of production and the average yields of the herds are com­
parable. Alternatively, all of the territory of the Member State may con­
stitute a region235. Whether in this case the whole territory must have 
geographical unity and comparable structures was not made clear. The 
ECJ who was referred to for a preliminary ruling held that the Member 
States must, when choosing whether the whole territory constitutes a re­
gion or whether their territory consists of several regions, take into ac­
count the geographical unity and economic conditions. But a Member 
State may regard its whole territory as a region even if the territory is 
not a geographical unit in which the natural conditions, structures of pro­
duction and average herd yields are comparable unless such a decision is 
manifestly unsuited to the structures of the Member State in question236. 
Member States thus enjoy considerable discretion in determining whether 
the whole territory can be regarded as a region.
4. Determination of the reference quantities of each producer or 
purchaser
a) Basic rule and producers in special situations 
The reference quantities of producers or purchasers are equal to the 
quantities of milk or milk equivalent delivered by the producer during
232 Agra-Europe 43/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 22
233 see Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D-l, 
p. 7; In the first twelve-month period, the UK e.g. chose Formula B for its whole 
territory except for Northern Ireland, where Formula A was implemented, Oskam, 
A. J. et al, The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 28
234 Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. 
J. 1984, L 90/10
235 Art. 1 (2) subparagraph (1) of Regulation 857/84
236 Case C-267/88 - C-285/88 Wuidart et al v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise et al 




























































































the 1981 calendar year (Formula A) or to the quantity of milk or milk 
equivalent purchased by a purchaser during the 1981 calendar year 
(Formula B), plus 1 %237. If a producer under Formula B changes his 
purchaser, the reference quantity of the latter will be increased23**.
This basic rule of calculating the individual reference quantity only 
applies if the Member State does not avail itself of the possible choice of 
either 1982 or 1983 as the national reference year239.
Producers240 in so-called special situations are subject to a different 
method of calculating reference quantities. They are allocated specific or 
additional reference quantities. These producers are, according to Art. 3 - 
4 of Regulation 857/84, producers who invested into dairy facilities by 
e.g. having adopted milk production development plans under Directive 
72/159241 lodged before 1 March 1984 and the so-called "SLOM-produc- 
ers" (Slacht en Omschakelingspremie)242. Moreover, young farmers set­
ting up after 31 December 1980243, milk producers whose milk produc­
tion has been affected by exceptional events occurring during or before 
the reference year chosen by a Member State244, so-called small produc­
ers245, producers in disfavoured or mountain areas246 and newly in- 23
232 Art. 2 (1) of Regulation 857/84; no express rules are provided for the calculation of 
the producers' reference quantities under Formula B, see Gadbin, D., (1985) 
Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 513
238 Art. 8 of Regulation 857/84; Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 
291, p. 544
239 Art. 2 (2) of Regulation 857/84
240 both under Formula A and B
241 O. J. 1972, L 96/1 on the modernization of farms
242 Art. 3 (a) of Regulation 857/84 as amended by Council Regulation 764/89, O. J.
1989, L 84/2; amended again by Council Regulation 1639/91, O. J. 1991, L 
150/35; The SLOM-producers had taken part in the Conversion and Non-marketing 
of Milk Premium Scheme introduced in 1977 (Council Regulation 1078/77, O. J. 
1977, L 131/1) and operated by the Community in the period from 1977-1981. 
Because participating producers were obliged to withhold from milk production for 
five years, some of them did not qualify for a reference quantity. Under a prelimi­
nary ruling, the ECJ held the Regulations to be void because they infringed the 
principle of legitimate expectation. (Case 120/86 Mulder v Minister van Landbouw 
en Visserij [1988] E.C.R., p. 2321 (2353) and Case 170/88 von Deetzen v HZA 
Hamburg-Jonas [1988] E.C.R., p. 2355 (2372))
243 Art. 3 (2) of Regulation 857/84
244 Art. 3 (3) of Regulation 857/84
245 Council Regulation 3880/89, O. J. 1989, L 378/3, amending Regulation 857/84; 
Art. 3 (c) of Regulation 857/84, as amended by Council Regulation 1183/90, O. J.
1990, L 119/27
246 as defined by Directive 75/286, O. J. 1975, L 128/1, amended by Council 




























































































stalled farmers247 are considered. Finally, producers realizing a milk 
production development plan approved after the entry into force of 
Regulation 857/84 under Directive 72/159 and milk producers undertak­
ing farming as their main occupation248 are taken into account. Of all 
provisions concerning "special situations", only Art. 3 No 3 of Regulation 
857/84 is a mandatory provision249.
b) Sources for the allocation of reference quantities for producers in 
special situations: national reserve
The quantities which are allocated to producers in "special situations" 
shall be drawn from a so-called "national reserve" which is constituted by 
the Member States250. The quantities supplying the national reserve must 
not exceed the national guaranteed quantity25!. The sums of the national 
reserve may derive from three main sources: First of all, Member States 
were entitled to withhold a certain percentage within the limits of their 
guaranteed quantity252. Secondly, reference quantities may be subtracted 
from the transferor in case of a transfer of a holding or parts thereof and 
may be added to the national reserve. Thirdly, the major source are ref­
erence quantities released by a producer giving up milk production under 
an out-goer scheme253.
To sum up, the main rule governing the allocation of reference quanti­
ties is that the Member States are obliged to guarantee that the national 
quantity will not be exceeded when reference quantities, in particular 
specific and additional reference quantities, are allocated254. The rule is 
deduced from Art. 5 (c) (3) of Regulation 804/68255 and Art. 5, 6 of 
Regulation 857/84.
247 Art. 3 (c) of Regulation 857/84, as amended by Council Regulation 3880/89, O. J. 
1989, L 378/3 establishing the so-called "Nallet" quota, see under C. I.
248 Art. 4 ( 1 ) (b) (c) of Regulation 857/84
249 Sorasio, D„ (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 540
250 Quantities for some groups of the producers in special situations such as the 
"SLOM-producers" are drawn from the Community reserve, see under C. I.
251 Art. 5 of Regulation 857/84
252 Commission of the European Communities, Milk, The Quota System, (1984) 203 
Green Europe, p. 11 ; see Art. 2 (3) and 5 of Regulation 857/84
253 Art. 4 (2) of Regulation 857/84; Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris- 
Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 7
254 Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 535, 541; Case 120/86 
Mulder v Minister van Landbouw [1988] E.C.R., p. 2321 (2350)




























































































D. Transfer of reference quantities
Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84 and Art. 5 of Commission Regulation 
1371/84256 provide for the rules of transfer of reference quantities. 
These rules are governed by the principle of attachment of quotas to the 
holding.
I. Principle o f attachment o f quotas to a holding 
1. Meaning of the principle
According to Art. 7 (1) of Regulation 857/84, all or part of the corre­
sponding reference quantity is transferred to the buyer, tenant or heir, if 
an undertaking is sold, leased or transferred by inheritance25?. From the 
wording of this article, the principle of the attachment of the reference 
quantities to a holding is deduced258. jt purports that the reference 
quantities that are allocated to the producer are attached to the exploited 
holding or parts therof259. The consequence of the principle is, on the 
one hand, that reference quantities are transferred in case of the transfer 
of the correspondent holding or parts of it. On the other hand, reference 
quantities are not transferable unless a holding or parts of it are sold, 
leased or transferred by inheritance26!).
In practice, the principle of attachment of reference quantities to a 
holding implies that apart from getting allocated quotas from the Member 
States, producers can only receive or increase quotas by acquiring or 
leasing a holding or parts of it at the same time256 789061.
256 O .J. 1984, L 132/11
257 see Art. 6 (5) of Régulation 857/84 for direct sales
258 Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd édi­
tion, p. 16; Gadbin, D.; Charles-Le-Bihan, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 
131, p. 72
259 Mégret, J. (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 113
260 Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analytique, Quotas laitiers 
(régime juridique), p. 786; Hâhnel, W. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hahnel, W., 
Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 2nd édition, p. 37
261 Crossley, G., (1985) 24 Farmland Market, p. 16; Dillen, M.; Tollens, E., Milk 




























































































2. Reasons for attaching reference quantities to the holding
The legislator introduced a restrictive Regulation by attaching refer­
ence quantities to a holding in order to prevent disproportionately high 
amounts of reference quantities from being concentrated on few 
parcels262. Intensive farming would probably have been promoted if ref­
erence quantities were not attached to the holding. In addition, the 
draftsmen intended to avoid the emergence of a market where detached 
quotas would be tradeable assets and be subject to speculations263. A 
market would occur if quotas were detached from land. On such a mar­
ket, the financially strong producers would get the bid and purchase ref­
erence quantities out of underdeveloped regions, above all out of those 
with a large proportion of grassland26'*. Attaching reference quantities to 
land thus supports farming in less favoured areas. It reflects, moreover, 
the general EEC policy of trying to preserve the family type farm265. 
The most distinct feature of a family farm is, despite a common defini­
tion266, that the production is linked to a certain amount of land267 268. The 
danger of attaching reference quantities to a holding, however, is that of 
freezing the existing milk production structures and of preventing the de­
velopment of an adequate milk production structure26**.
In order to avoid the emergence of quota markets, a set of transfer 
rules have been elaborated. When explaining them, firstly the conditions 
for the transfer of reference quantities and secondly, the legal conse­
quences once the conditions are fulfilled, will be looked at.
262 Lorvellec, L., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 136, p. 527, 532; Wienberg, D.; 
Holler, T., (1986) Berichte iiber Landwirtschaft, p. 206
263 Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classseur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 
9; Lorvellec, L., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 136, p. 527; Boon-Falleur, 
(1990) Revue de droit rural. No 184, p. 299; Gadbin, D.; Charles-Le-Bihan, D., 
(1985) Revue de droit rural, No 131, p. 72
264 Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edi­
tion, p. 15; Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 543; 
Wienberg, D.; Holler, T., (1986) Berichte iiber Landwirtschaft, p. 206
265 Rohr, H.-J., (1984) Agrarrecht, p. 296; Gomoll, E., (1985) Recht der Land­
wirtschaft, p. 32; Zeddies, J.; Heim, L„ (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie 
rurales, No 7, p. 102
266 see Snyder, F. G., Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, p. 157 et seq
267 Gomoll, E„ (1985) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 32
268 Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 535; Oskam, A. J. et 




























































































II. Conditions for the transfer o f reference quantities
1. Transactions of the holding or parts of it that entail the transfer of 
reference quantities
Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84 enlists the sale, lease and inheritance of a 
holding269 or of parts of a holding as examples for transactions that entail 
the transfer of reference quantities. According to Art. 5 (3) of 
Commission Regulation 1371/84270, transfers that have comparable legal 
effects to those brought about by the transfer of the holding upon a sale, 
lease and inheritance entail likewise a transfer of reference quantities.
The EEC Regulations do not define what the comparable legal effects 
to those brought about by the transfer of a holding by lease, sale or in­
heritance are. However, the ECJ ruled that the surrender of a tenanted 
holding upon the expiry of a lease has comparable legal effects to those 
brought about by the transfer of the holding upon the grant of the lease, 
for both transactions entail a change in the possession of the production 
units in question within the contractual relations created by the lease271. 
Deducing from the ECJ decision, any change in the property of the pro­
duction units in question has comparable legal effects to those brought 
about by the transfer of the holding upon the sale and inheritance.
To sum up, any change of the right of possession (resp occupancy) or 
property (resp ownership) subsequently entails the transfer of reference 
quantities. But exactly which legal transactions have comparable effect 
depends on the legal orders of the Member States and their concept of 
possession and property.
2. no transaction concerning the holding or parts therof required in the 
case of leasing
Since 1986/87 Member States have been authorized to introduce the 
possibility of the temporary re-allocation of unused reference quantities 
between producers of one purchaser for one twelve-month period without 
any transaction of the holding272 (so-called leasing). The facultative pro-
269 A holding comprises, according to Art. 12 (d) of Regulation 857/84, all the pro­
duction units operated by the producer and located within the geographical territory 
of the Community
270 now Art. 7 of Commission Regulation 1546/88,0 . J. 1988, L 139/12
271 Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Emâhrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] 
E.C.R., p. 2609 (2638)




























































































vision was passed in order to take into account producers' unused refer­
ence quantities during a twelve-month period273. Structural adjustments 
could be facilitated274 275. Another reason was to recognize the temporary 
re-allocation of reference quantities that was already practiced in some 
Member States, namely in the UK273. The possibility of leasing enables 
producers to produce milk in excess of their reference quantities. At the 
same time the principle of attachment of reference quantities to a holding 
is breached.
III. Legal effects of lease, sale and inheritance and other transfers with 
similar effect
If a lease, sale and inheritance and other transfers with similar effect 
took place, the reference quantities being attached to this holding or parts 
of the holding are automatically transferred to the transferee (1). Depart­
ing from the principle of attachment of reference quantities to the hold­
ing, the whole amount or parts of the reference quantities may be trans­
ferred to the national reserve (2) or be retained by the transferor (3).
1. General legal effect: transfer of reference quantities to the transferee 
If an entire holding is sold, leased or transferred by inheritance, all of 
the corresponding reference quantity shall be transferred to the pur­
chaser, tenant or heir276.
If parts of a holding are transferred, the corresponding reference 
quantity shall be transferred277. The corresponding reference quantity 
has to be fixed according to the areas used for milk production or accord­
ing to other criteria278. Other criteria might be cattle or other parts of 
the dead and live stock279. These rules fix the principle of proportional­
ity, which means that reference quantities have to be apportioned in the
273 Council Regulation 2998/87, O. J. 1987, L 285/1
274 Sorasio, D., (1988) Revue du marché commun, No 313, p. 14
275 see The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 8, p. 27
276 Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84
277 Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84
278 Art. 5 (2) of Commission Regulation 1371/84, O. J. 1984, L 132/11 now Art. 7 
(1) of Commission Regulation 1546/88, O. J. 1988, L 139/12
279 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410; Lorvellec, L., (1985) 




























































































case that parts of the holding are transferred280. However, the wording 
of the provision, which intends to avoid the speculation with reference 
quantities, leaves a wide discretion to the Member States in fixing the 
criteria for the apportionment of the reference quantities281. In particu­
lar, it is not clear whether the apportionment has to be made in a strictly 
proportionate way nor who controls it.
2. Transfer of reference quantities to the national reserve
Entirely facultative provisions envisage the addition of reference 
quantities to the national reserve. Reference quantities may be released to 
the national reserve in case of any transfer of these quantities282 or if 
only parts of a holding are transferred whose size is below a certain 
number of ha fixed by the Member State283. The latter rules try to avoid 
the speculation with reference quantities, in particular the transfer of a 
disproportionately large amount of quotas with a small piece of land 
only284. Finally, if a holding or parts of it are transferred and the land is 
not used for milk production285 286and if land is transferred to authorities 
and/or is supposed to be used in the public interest280, the corresponding 
reference quantities may be transferred to the national reserve. In both 
these latter cases, the transferee does not need reference quantities287. 
The rules on the release of quotas to the national reserve thus serve 
mainly to avoid quota markets but they also serve to increase the refer-
280 Gomoll, E„ (1985) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 32
281 Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 513; Lorvellec, L„ (1987) 
Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410
282 Art. 7 (3) of Regulation 857/84 as amended by Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 
1985, L 68/1
283 Art. 5 (2) of Commission Regulation 1371/84, O. J. 1984, L 132/11 now Art. 7 
(2) of Commission Regulation 1546/88, O. J. 1988, L 139/12, only in 1987, the 
Commission clarified that the amount that is not transferred may be released to the 
national reserve, Commission Regulation 1681/87,0 . J. 1987, L 157/11
284 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 416
285 Art. 5 subparagraph 4 of Commission Regulation 1371/84 as amended by 
Commission Regulation 1881/87, O. J. 1987, L 157/11, now Art. 7 subparagraph 
4 of Commission Regulation 1546/88, O. J. 1988, L 139/12
286 Art. 7 (3) of Regulation 857/84 as amended by Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 
1985, L 68/1





























































































ence quantities for producers in special situations who are allocated refer­
ence quantities from the national reserve288.
3. Reference quantities are retained by the transferor 
Member States may regulate that the reference quantities are retained 
by the transferor if land is transferred to administrative agencies and/or 
for public use289 290. As for the retention of quotas by the tenant see below.
E. Consideration of a difficult economic
I. Retention of reference quantities by the tenant 
1. Principal rules
Acccording to the European rules, tenants who occupied the holding in 
1984, are allocated reference quantities because they are producers. 
Tenants who return the leased land are subject to the general principles, 
i.e. they have to transfer the corresponding reference quantities back to 
the transferor because the surrender of a tenanted holding upon the ex­
piry of a lease has legal effects comparable to those brought about by the 
transfer of the holding upon the grant of the lease, (see above)
In 1985, Art. 7 (4) of Regulation 857/8429() introduced an exception to 
this rule. According to this entirely facultative provision291, Member 
States may provide that, in the case of rural leases due to expire, where 
the lessee is not entitled to an extension of the lease on similar terms, all 
or part of the reference quantity corresponding to the holding or the part 
therof which forms the subject of the lease be put at the disposal of the 
departing lessee if he intends to continue milk production. Tenants are put 
in difficult economic and social situations if they have to restitute refer­
ence quantities because the amount of milk they can produce in the future 
is restricted292. This is especially serious in Member States where tenants
288 see Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410
289 Art. 7 (1) of Regulation 857/84 as amended by Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 
1985, L 68/1
290 as amended by Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 1985, L 68/1
291 Lorvellec, L„ (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410
292 see Preamble of Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 1985, L 68/1; Lorvellec, L., 




























































































may only ask for the extension of their contract under exceptional cir­
cumstances. But even if the landlord agrees to an extension, tenants who 
are not protected by state controlled rents or by procedures of rent re­
view would probably have to pay a much higher rent than before, because 
the value of the land has increased since the introduction of the quota 
system. Under such legal conditions, the tenants whose contracts expired 
either had the possibility of renewing the contract with a higher rent or 
of continuing without a certain amount of reference quantities293. This 
regulation was mainly elaborated because of German pressure294 295.
2. Infringement of the tenant's fundamental rights - the "WachauF case 
To sum up, the tenant quitting the holding only enjoys protection under 
exceptional circumstances. The application of this rule is purely at the 
discretion of the Member States. The question arises as to whether this 
Regulation is compatible with the fundamental rights of the tenants. The 
tenant may be deprived of the fruits of his labour and of his investments, 
in particular if he built up a dairy enterprise on a leased holding before 
the super-levy system was introduced. In such a context, by way of a pre­
liminary ruling, however, the ECJ ruled that the Community legislation 
was adequate. According to the ruling, the Community Regulations leave 
the competent national authorities a sufficiently wide margin of apprecia­
tion to enable them to apply the Community rales in a manner consistent 
with the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights, either by 
giving the lessee the opportunity of keeping all or part of the reference 
quantity if he intends to continue milk production, or by compensating 
him if he undertakes to definitively abandon such production293. The lat­
ter possibility refers to the participation of tenants in out-goer schemes. 
However, the Regulations do not specify whether the landlord's consent is 
required296.
293 Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 513; Sorasio, D., (1985) 
Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 544
294 see G.A. Jacobs in Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernâhrung und 
Forstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2631); Lukanow, J., Nies, V. in: 
Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hâhnel, W., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 2nd edi­
tion, p. 20; Rohr, H.-J., (1984) Agrarrecht, p. 296; Bernard, A., (1987) Revue de 
droit rural, No 150, p. 53
295 Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernâhrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] 
E.C.R., p. 2609 (2640)




























































































The ECJ does not define the precise fundamental rights of the tenants 
which might be infringed if he is deprived of the fruits of his labour but 
the court assumingly referred to the right to property297.
The foremost objective of the Community, therefore, when providing 
for rules favourable to the tenants, was to consider the difficult economic 
and social situation of some groups of tenants that arise because of na­
tional agricultural tenancies laws. The ECJ has underlined that the appli­
cation of the rules must comply with the fundamental rights of the ten­
ants. But to discover exactly which rights the tenant enjoys with regard to 
the quota, the legal nature of the quota and the owership of the quota 
must be investigated.
II. Legal nature and ownership o f the reference quantity
1. Reference quantity as an instrument of market management?
The Community Regulations do not specify the legal nature of the ref­
erence quantity298 but provide ambiguous rules299. By attaching refer­
ence quantities to a holding or parts of it, the reference quantities are not 
yet legally qualified.
According to the Commission, the reference quantity was created as a 
mere instrument of market management300. This instrument is deemed to 
have no economic value and thus, no property rights can exist in relation 
to it.
The reference quantity, however, gained an economic value in practice, 
evidenced by increased rental and capital values for holdings with refer-
297 Cardwell, M„ (1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev., p. 743
298 G. A. Jacobs in Case 5/88 W achauf v Bundesamt für Ernâhrung und 
Forstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2630); see in detail Hélin, F., Les quotas 
laitiers. De l'autorisation administrative au droit des patrimoines, p. 139 et seq; as 
far as the legal nature of the reference quantity under French law is concerned see 
p. 176 et seq; under English law p. 227 et seq; access to the completed thesis has 
not yet been possible by the end of the academic year 1991/92
299 Pinfold, E., (1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 1313; Bonneau, J. R., (1984) Gazette 
du Palais, (2e sem.) doctrine, p. 406; Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris- 
Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 10
300 Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernâhrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] 
E.C.R., p. 2609 (2630); Lorvellec, L., Dorit rural, p. 488; Boon-Falleur, (1990) 




























































































ence quantities30!. Because the transfer rules were mitigated as leasing 
was allowed, the reference quantities that are leased out are tradeable and 
negotiable assets as is illustrated by the prices that are paid for these 
quantities302. Because of this economic reality, it is suggested that the 
reference quantity be considered as a property right303. Deplorably, the 
ECJ in the case "Wachauf" has not specified whether the quota is a prop­
erty right.
2. Ownership of the quota
The European Regulations do not define the ownership of the quota, 
but provide ambiguous rules: On the one hand, reference quantities are 
attached to a holding and thus to the owner of the holding. On the other 
hand, they are allocated to producers thus also to tenants who are not nec­
essarily owners304. This contradiction becomes apparent in the case of the 
restitution of leasehold land. However, in this case the reference quanti­
ties have to be retransferred to the landlord, although there is the possi­
bility of exceptions. This proves that the reference quantities do not be­
long to producers but are attached to the holding and may be used by per­
sons with a right to this holding. Other interpretations stating that the ref­
erence quantity belongs to the producers neglect the fact that the possibil­
ity of tenants retaining a certain amount of reference quantities is only an 
exception to the rule305.
The explanation for the lack of clarity as far as the legal nature and the 
ownership of the reference quantity including the position of the tenant 
are concerned might be that the subject matter in question, the law of 
property and the agricultural tenancies laws, in the Community have been
see e.g. UK, the size of a dairy farm's quota became the biggest factor in its selling 
price and holdings with a poor quota have seen their land values drop by up to 40 
per cent in comparison with 1983, see Crossley, G., (1985) 23 Farmland Market, 
p. 15
3 0 2  B l u m a n n ,  C . ;  L u s s o n - L e r o u s s e a u ,  N . ,  J u r i s - C l a s s e u r  r u r a l ,  v o l .  3 ,  F a s c .  D - l ,  p .  
9 e t s e q
303 "droit réel" and "object de propriété", Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris- 
Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 10; see Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 488
3 0 4  according to Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 513, under 
Formula B, reference quantities could be considered as being personal property of 
the purchasers
305 see Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 543 et seq who 




























































































up to now entirely governed by national law306. That is why the 
Community legislator leaves the final decision as to who is entitled to the 
reference quantities to the Member States307, though the super-levy sys­
tem has a significant impact on the relationship between landlord and 
tenant.
Apart from this legal reason, it is apparent that the Community legisla­
tor did not want to fix the ownership of the quota because in this case the 
legislator would have admitted that a property right can arise in a quota. 
Recognizing the quota as a property right meant encouraging the rise of 
quota markets308 309.
F. Calculation and amount of the levy
1. Calculation o f the levy-Equalization
For the purpose of levy calculation, under Formula B, equalization 
between over- and underdeliveries takes place (1.). In 1985, the possibil­
ity of equalization was also introduced under Formula A. (2.)
1. Equalization under Formula B
Under the original Regulations, the purchaser who was liable to pay a 
levy passed on the burden in the price paid to those producers who have 
increased their deliveries, in proportion to their contribution to the pur­
chaser's reference quantity being exceeded300. In practice, the actual levy 
paid by the producer is less than 100 % of the target price, because the 
full amount of the levy paid by the purchaser is spread over the total 
amount of exceeding reference quantities310.
Because the deterring effect of the levy was not sufficient and the fi­
nancial reponsibility of the producer was mitigated, the Formula B rules
308 Cardwell, M„ (1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev., p. 744
307 Cardwell, M„ (1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev., p. 743
308 see a]so g .A. Jacobs, Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt fur Emahrung und 
Forstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2630)
309 Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. 
J. 1984, L 90/10; in addition, a so-called butterfat calculation takes place






























































































were reformed in 1987311. The economic background was that of the 
ever increasing surpluses and stocks in 1986/8731 12 31456. The idea of the new 
levy-calculation is to ensure that the levy falls most heavily on those who 
exceed their quota by the most. According to Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 
804/68313, oniy a certain proportion of the whole amount of exceeded 
reference quantities is liable. For this proportion, however, the full rate 
of the levy must be paid. This proportion is calculated by determining 
which producers exceeded their reference quantities by the most3!4. 
Apart from this mandatory regulation, Member States were authorized to 
enforce the financial responsibility of the producers by facultative provi­
sions such as only making certain categories of producers profit from the 
equalization315.
2. Regional and national equalization under both Formulas 
In 1985, the Council enacted provisions which allow an offsetting un­
der both Formulas3!6. According to the Regulation, Member States may 
allow equalization between producers or purchasers of one region (so- 
called regional equalization) and, if necessary, between producers or pur­
chasers of different regions (so-called national equalization). Thus, the 
equalization which already existed under Formula B was generalized3!7 
and it is not necessary to pay a levy if the national guaranteed quantity is 
not exceeded318. The levy system is "nationalised" in that the amount of 
the payable levy no longer depends only on the situation of over- and un­
derdeliveries of the purchaser a producer belongs to but also on the situ- 
tation in the whole Member State319 320. The economic background of the 
reform is the phenomenon of the "dead quotas"321). "Dead quotas" are
311 Preamble of Regulation 773/87, O. J. 1987, L 78/1
312 Agra-Europe (ed.), The failure of milk quotas, (1986) Agra Briefing, No. 12, p. 
24
313 as amended by Council Regulation 773/87,0 . J. 1987, L 78/1
314 In the UK, the so-called "treshold principle" is used; see "The new superlevy sys­
tem”, Milk Producer, February 1987, p. 20
315 Art. 5 (c) (1) of Regulation 857/84, as amended by Council Regulation 773/87, O. 
J. 1987, L 78/1
316 Council Regulation 590/85,0 . J. 1985, L 68/1
317 Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 
7
318 Sorasio, D„ (1988) Revue du marché commun, No 313, p. 13
319 see Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 546




























































































those reference quantities of the national guaranteed quantities that could 
not be used during one twelve-month period. In particular France had 
urged for this reform321. This possibility was initially introduced for the 
first twelve-month period322 and has been prolonged since then323.
Those Member States who do not implement the facultative provi­
sion324 3256of regional and national equalization may use the collected levy 
for the purpose of financing national out-goer schemes, if the quantities 
delivered or sold in the twelve-month period in question do not exceed 
the national guaranteed total323.
II. Amount o f the levy
The amount of the levy was intially 100 % of the target price for pur­
chasers under Formula B and 75 % for producers under Formula A and 
direct sellers32** in order to avoid discriminations between Formula A 
and B producers327. Under Formula A, in the third twelve-month period 
the amount of the levy was set at 100 % of the target price328. In 1989, 
the Council decided to increase the amount of the levy to 115 % of the 
target price for both Formulas329.
The levy is thus set at a level which may exceed the guaranteed support 
price, and it constitutes a penalty330. The levy which is paid yearly by the
321 Rép. min. Agriculture et Forêt, J. O. Débat Sénat, 24. 1. 1985, (1986) Revue de 
droit rural, No 134, p. 251
322 Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 1985, L 68/1
323 until the ninth twelve-month period see Council Regulation 817/92, O. J. 1992, L 
86/5
324 Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 546; facultative ver­
sion introduced by correction of Council Regulation 590/85, see O. J. 1985, L 
73/31
325 Art. 5 (5) subparagraph 2 of Council Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council 
Regulation 1298/85, O. J. 1985, L 137/5 and Art. 9 (4) of Regulation 857/84 as 
amended by Council Regulation 1305/85,0 . J. 1985, L 137/12
326 Art. 1 (1) of Regulation 857/84
327 See Preamble of Regulation 857/84; Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris- 
Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D -l, p. 9; Gadbin, D.; Charles-Le-Bihan, D„ (1985) 
Revue de droit rural, No 131, p. 73
328 Art. 1 (1) of Regulation 857/84 as amended by Council Regulation 774/87, O. J. 
1987, L 78/3
329 valid from the seventh twelve-month period onwards, see Council Regulation 
3880/89, O. J. 1989, L 378/3




























































































producers or purchasers is used to cover the costs of the disposal of the 
exceeding quantities331. The levy system thus has introduced a financial 
responsibility of the producers for the marketing of exceeding 
quantities332.
331 Art. 5 (c) (5) of Regulation 804/68, as amended by Council Regulation 865/84, O. 
J. 1984, L 90/10; Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 
3, Fasc. D -l, p. 5; Burrei, A., Milk quotas in England and Wales, p. 1
332 Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 510; Ehle, D.; Abgaben und 




























































































Implementation of the quota Regulations in English Law333
A. Agricultural policy and quota policy
/. Agricultural policy
The UK has been a significant net importer of agricultural products334 
and a net contributor to the European budget. For these reasons, despite 
surplus production in the EEC, further expansion of farm output has been 
proclaimed since the UK joined the Community3 435. The UK government 
has always favoured a moderate price policy in the EEC, also because of 
its concern for constraint on public spending336. Traditionally, the most 
important goal of British agricultural policy was not income support, but 
the increase of productivity and low consumer prices. This is also due to 
favourable farm structures and a considerable degree of efficiency337. In 
1987, the average number of ha per farm in the UK was 68, 9, in France 
30, 7, in Germany 17, 6 and in Europe 16, 5338.
333 Direct sales are not treated. The system explained is the English and Welsh system, 
because for Scotland and Northern Ireland, slightly different rules exist, partly be­
cause of the different legal systems and partly because of different milk production 
structures. The principles, however, apply to Scotland and Northern Ireland as 
well. Only general features can be examined, a "pursuit" of every litre of milk that 
is subject to the levy system proved to be unmanageable
334 Hodge, I„ The Changing place of Farming, in: Britton, D. (ed.), Agriculture in 
Britain, p. 36
335 Trede, K.-J., Vereinigtes Konigreich, in: Priebe, H.; Scheper, W.; von Urff, W. 
(eds.), Agrarpolitik in der EG, p. 94; Blumenthal, M., (1984) 35 N.I.L.Q., p. 28
336 Neville-Rolfe, E., British Agricultural Policy, in: Britton, D. (ed.), Agriculture in 
Britain, p. 179
337 Blumental, M„ (1984) 35 N.I.L.Q., p. 28
338 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 





























































































Both the average yield per cow and average number of cows per farm 
are highest in the UK (see Annex). In the UK dairy sector, there are re­
gional differences between Northern Ireland, Scotland and England and 
Wales. In 1984, in Scotland, the average size of the herds was 90 cows 
per herd, with the Aberdeen and District having 118 cows per herd, in 
Northern Ireland 36 cows per herd and in England and Wales the average 
size was 67339 3401. In 1983/84, the average milk yield per cow was 4 950 
litres in England and Wales, 4 970 litres in Scotland and 4 850 in 
Northern Ireland349.
In 1984, the Milk Marketing Boards adamantly opposed quotas and so 
did the National Farmers' Union (NFU) and Country Landowners' 
Association34!. The British government, with the support of the MMB 
pressed for significant price cuts342. The UK reached their main political 
goal during the discussion on the reform of the dairy market, budgetary 
discipline and a restrictive price policy. The demand of detaching quotas 
from land could not be enforced343. Detaching quotas from land and 
making them tradeable has been pleaded for by British farm and produc­
ers' organizations since the beginning344. Some even advocate that quotas 
should be tradeable across national borders345.
One of the reasons for these demands is that the efficient British milk 
industry was about to expand during the 1980s largely because the British 
milk market remained under-supplied by home production346. The de­
gree of self-sufficiency is low, amounting to 74 % concerning cheese and
339 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 38
340 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 40
341 de Salis, W., (1984) 36 Country Landowner, No. 7, p. 8; News from the NFU, 
22 November 1984, p. 2
342 Agra-europe 44/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 15
343 Josling, T.; Moyer, W. H., Agricultural Policy Reform, p. 77
344 Hélin, F., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 158, p. 469; Swarbrick, R„ (1984) 36 
Country Landowner, No. 6, p. 34; Amies, S. J., Transfer of Milk Quotas in 
England and Wales, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in the European Community, 
p. 159: Carter, D., (1991) 36 Farmland Market, p. 13; NFU, Briefing, 27 
February 1991, p. 3
345 The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 23
346 Swarbrick, R., (1984) 36 Country Landowner, No. 6, p. 34; Burrel, A. (1988) 




























































































77 % concerning butter in 1983347. New entrants and expanding farmers 
were important to supply to the milk market348. Restructuring the milk 
industry was only a minor issue of the British quota policy because most 
of the farms already had a high level of productivity in comparison to 
other European competitors. This level was hoped to be maintained by 
transfer of quotas349. Out-goer schemes were even seen as disturbing 
transfer operations350 351.
Annex: Average number of cows per farm and yield per cow in 1984 and 
1989/90351:
Average number 









Germany:352 4 622 4 909
France: 3 969 4 928
UK: 4 804 5 197
Europe: 356 4 285 4 769
347 France: 116 % for chesse, 131 % for butter, Germany: 96 % for cheese, 155 % for 
butter, Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in 
the Community, 1985 Report, p. 250
348 de Salis, W„ (1984) 36 Country Landowner, No. 3, p. 26
349 Burrel, A. (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 94
350 Milk Producer, October 1987, p. 12
351 Source: CNIEL, L'économie laitière en chiffres, édition 1991, p. 13, 107, 109, 
(figures for 1990 are estimated) Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1990, p. 12, 
The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 38; 
Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1991 Report, T/l 16
352 without the five new "Lander"
353 number of dairy cows per herd
354 comprising 10 Member States
355 comprising 12 Member States




























































































B. Legal acts incorporating the EEC milk quota Regulations 
into English Law
On the 24th of July 1984, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food and the Secretaries of State for Wales and Scotland elaborated so- 
called Dairy Produce Quotas Regulations (DPQR 1984)357 based on sec­
tion 2 (2) (b) of the European Communities Act 1972358. Section 2 (2) 
(b) of the Act authorizes the competent authorities to pass necessary sub­
ordinate legislation in order to incorporate EEC Regulations359. 
Regulations enacted under the European Communities Act have to be 
elaborated in the form of statutory instruments360. The DPQR have been 
revoked several times. The actual regulations considered are The Dairy 
Produce Quota Regulations 1991 (DPQR 1991)361.
C. Institutions charged with the application of the milk quota 
Regulations
There are three principal institutions charged with the application of 
the DPQR: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Intervention Board for 
Agricultural Produce (IBAP) and the Milk Marketing Boards (MMBs).
The UK is a centralized state with decentralized territorial administra­
tion362. Administration is carried out in the UK by either the Crown or 
by other administrative authorities which are for the most part local gov­
ernment authorities, the police and public corporations363. Public corpo­
357 S.I. 1984/1047
358 Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 17, p. 28 et seq; Sources of law are the case 
law (English law) and statute law. English law is divided up into common law and 
equity. Statute law consists of subordinate legislation like Regulations and Orders 
and Acts of Parliament (statutes); David, R.; Brierley, J. E. C., Major legal sys­
tems, p. 366; Jones, B. L., Gamer's administrative Law, p. 57 et seq
359 as opposed to EEC directives, see European Communities Act 1972, s 2 (2) (a); 
Notes to Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, Halsbury's Statutes of 
England, vol. 17, p. 32
360 European Communities Act 1972, Sch 2, para 2 (1), see Statutory Instruments Act 
1946, Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 41 requiring special procedural rules
361 S.I. 1991/2232; where necessary, reference is made to revoked Dairy Produce 
Quotas Regulations; the DPQR 1991 are actual law of January 1992
362 Loewenstein, K., Staatsrecht und Staatspraxis in GroBbritannien, vol. 2, p. 131; 
Scotland and Northern Ireland are treated as special regions




























































































rations are autonomous bodies, having corporate personality and estab­
lished with specific tasks to perform364.
I. Ministry o f Agriculture and IBAP
As far as agriculture is concerned, the central government, namely the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food365, to a large degree admin­
isters agricultural subject matters. The local governments are only 
charged with the agricultural administration to a lesser extent366. The 
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (IBAP), set up under the 
European Communities Act 1972, is a public corporation367. It is 
charged with the performance of obligations of the UK under the CAP 
and is subject to the control and direction of Ministers368 369.
II. Milk Marketing Board
Under the Agricultural Marketing Act 1931 and 1933, the creation of 
so-called marketing boards for certain commodities was envisaged3619. 
The Milk Marketing Board for England and Wales was set up by the 1933 
Milk Marketing Scheme370. Marketing Boards were supposed to over­
come the lack of development of voluntary UK producers co-operatives 
and to create a strong producers' bargaining position during price nego­
tiations in order to ensure producers' incomes, which were low in the 
1930s371.
364 Jones, B. L., Gamer’s administrative Law, p. 24
365 there are Agricultural Departments for Scotland and Wales, if functions are exer­
cised for Great Britain as a whole, the MAFF and the Secretary of State for 
Scotland and the Secretary of State for Wales act jointly; see Stansfield, J. O., 
Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 1 (2), p. 582
366 see Jones, B. L„ Gamer’s administrative Law, p. 468
367 see Jones, B. L., Garner's administrative Law, p. 354 et seq; European 
Communities Act 1972, s 6 (1)
368 European Communities Act 1972, s 6 (1)
369 Anderson, P. D., (1978) 5 Agricultural Administration, p. 60
370 The other four Milk Marketing Boards were created at almost the same time; see 
Anderson, P. D„ (1978) 5 Agricultural Administration, p. 71, Footnote 2
371 Whetstone, L., The marketing of milk, p. 9; Anderson, P. D., (1978) 5 
Agricultural Administration, p. 60; Hollingham, M. A.; Howarth, R. W., British 




























































































All producers subject to a Board Area372 0f  0ne of the five British 
MMBs and who wish to offer milk for sale must register with the 
MMBs373. The MMBs have the exclusive right to purchase all milk of­
fered for sale in bulk by registered producers and has the obligation to 
take up that right provided the milk is of marketable quality374. To this 
purpose, the MMBs dispose of statutory powers such as regulating the 
quality of the milk which may be sold, the prices at and the persons to 
and through whom the milk may be sold375. The collection and transport 
of milk from the farms to the first destination is the responsibility of the 
MMBs376. Moreover, the MMBs maintain the only official milk record­
ing scheme377.
The legal nature of the Marketing Boards is ambiguous. Because only 
some of the members of the Board, which is the policy-making organ, are 
appointed by the government and the rest are elected by registered pro­
ducers, they are not pure public corporations378, but miscellaneous bod­
ies379. Because of the compulsory registration, the MMBs are compul­
sory producers' marketing co-operatives380.
After the UK joined the European Community in 1972, the structure 
and the functions of the MMBs could only be maintained because of ex­
ceptional Community Regulations381. However, the monopoly of 
purchasing fresh milk and the pricing system382 of the MMBs as well as
372 The Milk Marketing Schemes do not apply to a few Scottish Islands, the Isles of 
Scilly and both the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands; see The Federation of UK 
MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 12, Anderson, P. D„ (1978) 
5 Agricultural Administration, p. 590
373 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 11
374 Whetstone, L., The marketing of milk, p. 9; The Federation of the UK MMBs, 
ibid, p. 11; Rodgers, C. P., Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 1 (2), p. 449
375 Rodgers, C. P., Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 1 (2), p. 447; Burrel, A., 
(1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 78
376 Anderson, P. D., (1978) 5 Agricultural Administration, p. 66
377 Anderson, P. D., (1978) 5 Agricultural Administration, p. 133 et seq
378 Members of public corporations are appointed by public authorities; see Jones, B. 
L., Gamer's administrative Law, p. 354
379 Jones, B. L., Gamer's administrative Law, p. 369
380 Anderson, P. D., (1978) 5 Agricultural Administration, p. 131
381 Council Regulation 1422/78, O. J. 1978, L 171/14; Commission Regulation 
1565/79, O. J. 1979, L 188/29; see Rodgers, C. P., Halsbury's Laws of England, 
vol. 1 (2), p. 446
382 so-called price discrimination or multiple-pricing and pooling price; see Whetstone, 
L., The marketing of milk, p. 21; M A F F  (ed.), At the fanner's service, p. 53; 




























































































the links between the government and the MMBs have been questioned by 
both Community authorities383 and the producers. Recently, a fierce 
debate has been taking place in the UK on whether the compulsory form 
of the MMBs should be abolished384.
D. Observance of national guaranteed quantity when allocating 
reference quantities
The UK managed not to exceed their national guaranteed total when 
allocating reference quantities385. The legal rules determining the alloca­
tion will be considered.
I. Allocation of reference quantities to regions, purchasers and producers
For the purpose of implementing the EEC milk quota Regulations, the 
United Kingdom has been divided up into regions386. The regions com­
prise firstly the five MMB regions which are England and Wales, three 
Scottish regions and Northern Ireland387 and secondly a number of small 
regions, varying during the campaigns, that are not subject to a MMB 
area388. In each of these regions, the Formula B applies389. The national 
guaranteed quantity for the UK, called national wholesale quota390, has
383 The Commission has, e.g., begun infringement proceedings against the UK, be­
cause the Board exercises its exclusive purchasing powers also over low fat milk; 
Case C-40/92 R injunction, Commission of the European Community v United 
Kingdom, not yet reported
384 Gummer, J., MAFF News Release, 6 November 1991, p. 1; News from the NFU, 
7 March 1991, p. 1
385 see Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/11
3»6 DPQR 198-4 (S.I. 1984/1()47), reg 5 (2)
387 see Pinfold, E„ (1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 1307
388 namely Islands and Kintyre; Orkney, Shetland; Isles of Scilly; see The Federation 
of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 68; 1989 edition, 
p. 67; the Minister may change the regions in each campaign, see DPQR 198-1 (S.I. 
198-4/10-47), reg 5 (2), (3); DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 6
389 DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 4; The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years 
of Milk Quotas, p. 9; In the first quota year, Formula A applied in Northern Ireland 
and the Isles of Scilly, see Apsion, G., Milk Quotas, Law, Tax and Practice, p. -19




























































































been divided proportionately between the regions391. Wholesale means 
that the whole of milk is sold to purchasers by the producers392 in con­
trast to direct sales. The regional quotas are allocated to the purchasers of 
the regions393, which in most cases are the MMBs394. In 1984, the pur­
chasers allocated reference quantities to the producers based on their 
1983 milk production less nine per cent395.
//. Allocation o f reference quantities for producers in special situations
The categories of producers in special situations that were allocated 
additional or specific reference quantities changed during the various 
campaigns396. Most of the categories envisaged by the European Regula­
tions have been taken into account, except for farmers who realized a 
milk development plan after Regulation 857/84 entered into force and 
young farmers397. In particular, so-called "development claims" could be 
made if producers invested in dairy facilities before 1984398.
For the purpose of allocating reference quantities to producers in spe­
cial situations, a national reserve399, regional400 and regional running 
wholesale reserves401 were created. Reference quantities that are not al­
391 Pinfold, E„ (1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 1307; so-called regional wholesale 
quota; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 5 (2) (3); the amounts may be changed in 
every milk year by the Minister, see DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 5 (2), (3); 
DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 6
392 Pinfold, E., ibid, p. 1307
393 so-called purchaser wholesale quota; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 2 (1)
394 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 59; 
only producers who are not subject to a MMB area may sell their milk to purchasers 
other than the MMBs, see above; Apsion, G., Milk Quotas, Law, Tax and Practice, 
P- 5
395 so-called primary wholesale quota or basic quota; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), 
Sch 2, para 4 (c) with different deductive percentages for parts of Scotland; see 
DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 4 (c); Burrel, A., Milk quotas in 
England and Wales, p. 1
396 e.g. in 1985, a "small producer provision" was introduced, see DPQR 1985 (S.I. 
1985/509), reg 8, Sch 6 and in 1986, a "general wholesale provision", see DPQR 
1986 (S.I. 1986/470), reg 19
397 Usher, J. A., Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p.77
398 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 7; Apsion, G„ Milk Quotas, Law, Tax 
and Practice, p. 4
399 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 57
400 Apsion, G., Milk Quotas, Law, Tax and Practice, p. 3
401 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 16, Sch 2; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 




























































































located among the regions supplement the national reserve, a proportion 
of producers' quotas that was left apart in the beginning was added to the 
regional reserve402 and quantities released in out-goer schemes are added 
to the running regional reserves.
In 1984, it turned out that the litres awarded to the producers who had 
applied for additional and specific quotas outstripped the quantities avail­
able in the regional reserves. Subsequently, all extra allocations were 
scaled down apart from one category of producers which was honoured 
in full403. Only 64,7 per cent of litres awarded under successful devel­
opment claims were allocated initially404. In 1985/86, more litres re­
leased by out-goer schemes could be allocated to increase the specific and 
additional quotas. The "Nallet" quota established by the Community in 
19894°5 was allocated partly to producers with a development award so 
that development awards could be scaled up to 80 % in 1989406. The al­
location of additional and secondary quota in the UK thus depended on 
how many quotas were available. This was true for all categories of pro­
ducers in special situations because the Minister would make a provision 
once reference quantities were available for producers in special 
situations407.
E. Implementation of Formula B
The five above-mentioned regions of England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland in which Formula B was implemented were deliberately 
chosen because they represent the regions of the five British MMBs. In 
the case of the UK, purchaser thus meant the first purchaser of milk from 
the farmer. The administrative structure provided by the MMBs was ideal
402 2,8 %, see The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 9; 
MAFF (ed.), Milk production before and after quotas, p. 50
403 the so-called exceptional hardship claim; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, 
para 17 (2)
404 The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 9; Usher, J. A., 
Legal Aspects of Agriculture in the European Community, p. 77; The MMB of 
England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 27
405 see second chapter, C. I.
406 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 58
407 in 1985 for example a "small producer provision"; see DPQR 1985 (S.I. 




























































































for the administration of the milk quota system408. Because every litre of 
milk sold by producers passed through the tanks and registers of the 
MMBs, Formula B was the suitable Formula409. However, the most im­
portant argument in favour of Formula B was that the super-levy was 
only payable if the whole of one Board area exceeded its purchaser 
quota410. This would be particularly ideal in the huge area of England 
and Wales.
I. Diversity o f milk production structure; equalization
For the purpose of levy calculation, in the huge area of the Milk 
Marketing Board of England and Wales over- and underdeliveries are 
equalized within the Board area411. In fact, before Formula B was re­
formed in 1987/88, the producers in the English and Welsh region had to 
pay only a low fraction of the levy rate412, amounting, for example to 
0.8 % of the target price in 1985/86413. The national and regional equal­
ization is carried out by the Minister414 with the help of the MMB 
data415. The Ministry calculates the levy416, the MMBs as purchasers and 
debtors collect the levy from the producers and are liable for payment of 
the levy to the Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce417.
408 The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 9; Hélin, F., 
(1987) Revue de droit rural. No 158, p. 468
409 Harvey, D. R., Milk quotas, p. 27
410 Harvey, D. R„ Milk quotas, p. 27; Burrel, A., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et so­
ciologie rurales, No. 7, p. 80
411 The Federation of the UK MMBs, UK Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 60, 
for the threshold system practised in the UK see, Milk Producer, Februray 1987, 
p. 20; This equalization is also true for the other Board areas
412 see The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 38; Burrel, 
A., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 80
413 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87,0 . J. 1987, C 266/19
414 DPQR 1985 (S.I. 1985/509), reg 9 D implementing Art. 4 (a) of Regulation 
857/84, DPQR 1991, (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 21, Sch 8
415 Interview in the MAFF with M. Thomas and F. Nash, 15th of January 1992
416 DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 21, Sch 8
417 DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 23, according to reg 25 (2), the MMB and the 
IBAP may enter into an agreement providing for the discharge by the MMB of any 
functions of the IBAP (like fat calculation); however, for the levy payment as such 
there is no agency agreement; see The Federation of the UK MMBs, Dairy Facts & 




























































































Unequal treatment between producers within one Board area did not 
emerge; however, between the five Board areas, there are slight differ­
ences of levy rates4!8. In Northern Ireland, there have been fewer 
overdeliveries during the campaigns than in the English, Welsh and 
Scottish Board areas4!9. Since 1989, at the end of the campaign the 
Minister has been able to temporarily re-allocate unused reference quan­
tities of one purchaser to producers in special situations of the same pur­
chaser; consequently, inequalities between producers in special situations 
might be avoided418 920.
II. Administrative viability
The MMBs administer the whole of the quota system. They calculate 
yearly the individual reference quantities and the producers' levy, includ­
ing the cut and suspensions, register all producers and their amount of 
quota in a quota register421, collect the levy and pay it to the IBAP. They 
operate the leasing schemes, and all transfers of quotas have to be indi­
cated to them and they have to register them. They keep the producers in­
formed through their monthly detailed quota analysis in their periodical 
"Milk Producer". The MMBs perform these tasks on behalf of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food under an agency agreement 
and they are supervised by the Ministry422. The Ministry is responsible 
for all decisions taken by the MMBs as their agents.
As far as additional and specific quotas were concerned, the producers 
were subject to a deadline when they applied for them423. Either local
418 see The Federation of the UK MMBs, Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 edition, p. 69; 
1989 edition, p. 63; the levy rate the producers paid in the small regions which fall 
outside of the Board areas have not been considered in this research
419 see for 1987-1990, The Federation of the UK MMBs, Dairy Facts & Figures, 1991 
edition, p. 69
420 DPQR 1989 (S.I. 1989/380), reg 16
421 see DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 13 (2) and DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), 
reg 28
422 DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 26 (1); see Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., 
Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 117 ; The agency agreement has not 
been published and is confidential (Interview in the MAFF with M. Thomas and F. 
Nash, 15th of January 1992)
423 in 1984, application had to be made by August 28, 1984, DPQR 1984 
(1984/1047), Sch 2, para 7; Apsion, G., Milk Quotas, Law, Tax and Practice, p. 




























































































divisional offices of the Ministry of Agriculture or so-called Dairy 
Produce Quotas Tribunals424 were responsible for their application. 
Dairy Produce Quotas Tribunals have also been established to consider 
appeals against allocation of primary quota425 and their so-called local 
panels for the review of special case claims426.
F. Transfer of reference quantities
I. Quota markets
In England and Wales, a veritable market of quotas emerged soon after 
the introduction of the super-levy system427. The quota is a tradeable as­
set of its own. This is verified by the prices paid in pence per litre for 
both transferred and leased quotas428. In England and Wales, in 1984/85, 
0.7 % and in 1985/86, 3.1 % of the national guaranteed quantity were 
transferred, in 1986/87, 6.3 % , in 1987/88, 7. 8 % and in 1988/89, 6.8 
% of the national quota were transferred or leased out429. By contrast, 
the success of the out-goer schemes has been modest430, only 2.6 % of the 
total 1984/85 reference quantity was released in five years in the UK, in 
comparison to France, where 11.5 % of the total 1984/85 was released in
DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 17 (4); for small producers see DPQR 
1985 (S.I. 1985/509), Sch 6, para 7
424 as regards exceptional hardship quota; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 
17(5)
425 after unsuccessful objection to the Minister, DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, 
para 6(1), (4)
426 comprising the so-called base-year revision claims and development claims, DPQR 
1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 2 (1) implementing Art. 3 (1) and (3) of Regulation 
857/48; DPQR 1984 (SI 1984/1047), reg 6 (2), Sch 5; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 
1984/1047), Sch 2, para 8 (6) (8); para 9; after rejection, appeal was allowed to the 
Dairy Produce Quotas Tribunals; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 9 (6)
427 MAFF (ed.). Milk production before and after quotas, p. 50; Crosseley, G., 
(1985) 24 Farmland Market, p. 16; Sweeney, J., (1987) 28 Farmland Market, p. 
10; Crossley, G., (1985) 23 Farmland Market, p. 15; Burrel, A. (1988) Cahiers 
d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 94
428 see for example The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 
44
429 see The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 44
430 Oskam, A. J. et al, The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 39 et seq; The MMB 




























































































the first four years431. Out-going producers in the UK kept the quotas 
and used their capital value by leasing them out or even selling them432. 
Hence, the value of quota is not only recognizable by increased land 
prices and rents, but the quota itself has been given a value433. Brokers 
and auctioneers arrange the transfers of quotas by large advertisements in 
the farming press without any hint to land transactions434 435. Under which 
legal schemes such a market could develop will be explored.
II. Conditions for the transfer o f reference quantities
1. Transactions of the holding or parts of it that entail the transfer of 
reference quantities
When incorporating Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84, the English legislator 
had to define all transactions concerning holdings or parts of it that entail 
the transfer or reference quantities.
Under English land law, both estates and interests (except lease) in land 
are real property433. The transactions that under English law affect legal 
estates or interests in land and thus property do not necessarily result in a 
change of occupation436. According to English lawyers, the English legis­
lator therefore had to define the legal operations entailing the transfer of 
reference quantities in such a way as to adapt the common law to the con­
tinental approach enshrined in Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84437.
433 Dillen, M.; Tollens, E., Milk Quotas, vol. 1, p. 22; the success or failure is also 
due to the conditions of the schemes, the conditions in France were more 
favourable; see Dillen, M.; Tollens, E., ibid, p. 22
432 Dillen, M.; Tollens, E., Milk Quotas, vol. 1, p. 25; The MMB of England and 
Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 15
433 for land prices see Crossely, G., (1985) 23 Farmland Market, p. 15
434 Burrel, A., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 92; see 
Farming News, January 10Ih 1992, p. 22: "Specialist Quota Broker offers com­
plete professional service with the necessary legal documents"
435 Riddal, J. G., Introduction to Land Law, p. 48; James, P. S., Introduction to 
English Law, p. 421; In England, all land is still held from the Crown by tenure. 
The duration of a tenancy is termed the estate for which the tenant holds the land. 
Interests in land are rights and duties, liabilities and obligations connected with the 
land, present or future, directly or under trust. A lease is an interest in land and so 
are mortgages. Riddal, J. G„ Introduction to Land Law, p. 21; Pinfold, E. (1985) 
82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 1307
436 Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 226




























































































a) "Transfer" and "change of occupation"
According to the British quota rules, every transfer of a holding or 
parts thereof which implies a change of occupation is a transaction entail­
ing the transfer of reference quantities438.
Under English land law, there are principally two forms of holding 
land by farmers439: the freehold land owned by the landlord (so-called 
owner-occupier440) and the tenanted land owned by the landlord, but 
farmed by a tenant.
Because tenancy arrangements and grazing licences were mostly 
important for transferring quotas, other transactions such as sales will not 
be treated441.
aa) Leases and grazing and/or mowing licences
A tenancy is a lease442. Leases are contracts but also interests in land 
and leases give by definition an exclusive right of possession443. Most of 
the types of tenancy contracts are protected by the Agricultural Holdings 
Act 1986 in that they give security of tenancy444.
Apart from tenancies, there are extremely short-term agreements that 
can be concluded such as a grazing or mowing licence445. Licences, as 
opposed to leases or tenancies, do not give the licensee an interest in the 
land which would entitle him to exclude all other persons from the 
premises but are mere contracts446. The signor of a grazing licence has, 
moreover, no guarantee that the land or its replacement will be available
438 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 8; DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 8
439 other interests like mortgages or interests under trusts will not be treated in this re­
port; see e.g. Pinfold, E„ (1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 1307
440 under English law, he must correctly be described the holder of a fee simple, be­
cause all land is held by the Crown, by tenure, see Riddal, J. G., Introduction to 
Land Law, p. 50
441 see MAFF, Discussion paper on Quota Mobility, published in: House of 
Commons, Session 1984-1985, Second Report of the Agriculture Committee, 
Annex VII, London 1985, p. xxii
442 Riddal, J. G., Introduction to Land Law, p. 262; as to the terminology, lease and 
tenancy are in law both the same creature, see Riddal, J. G., ibid, p. 44
443 James, P. S., Introduction to English Law, p. 424; Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural 
Law, p. 29; Riddal, J. G., Introduction to Land Law, p. 255
444 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 32; for meaning of security of tenancy see G.
I.
445 Hill, B., (1985) 19 Agricultural Administration, p. 193




























































































for the following season447 because a licence is generally not protected by 
the Agricultural Holdings Act. A grazing licence is often referred to as a 
"sale of the grass keep"448.
At the beginning, there was considerable uncertainty concerning which 
transactions, other than a disposal of the freehold or part of the freehold, 
would enable reference quantities to be transferred449. In particular, it 
was not clear whether grazing and/or mowing agreements would be suf­
ficient if they gave no exclusive right of possession. The reason for the 
uncertainty was that neither a "transfer" nor "change of occupation" are 
precisely defined in the regulations450. The definitions of transferee or 
transferor were useless, because the "transferor" and "transferee" of milk 
quotas are, respectively, defined as the persons replacing and the persons 
becoming, the "occupier" of a holding or part therof451. Occupier was 
not defined in the initial regulations.
bb) Transfer of reference quantities by short-term agreements
In practice, extremely short-term grazing and/or mowing agreements 
were used to transfer quotas permanently and parts of holdings tem­
porarily in the following way: because milk quotas are transferred if ar­
eas used for milk production are transferred, the transferee did not use 
the transferred land for milk production but, for example, for grazing 
sheep. On restitution of these areas, they were consequently no longer ar­
eas used for milk production and thus no longer had quotas attached to 
them452.
These short-term arrangements were legal under the initial DPQR, be­
cause both a transfer and a change of occupation took place. Their accor­
dance with Community law, however, is doubtful. Though such an agree­
ment would be a "lease" in the sense of Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84453,
447 Hill, B., (1985) 19 Agricultural Administration, p. 193 et seq
448 Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 with annotation, p. 5/2
449 Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 117
450 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 314
451 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 2 (1)
452 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 318; The MMB of England and Wales, Five 
Years of Milk Quotas, p. 13; Amies, S. J., Transfer of Milk Quotas in England and 
Wales, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in the European Community, p. 158; 
Crossley, G„ (1985) 23 Farmland Market, p. 15; for illustration : Milk Producer, 
May 1985, p. lO




























































































the non-exclusive nature of the arrangement might encourage the trans­
feree not to occupy the land.
In practice, in fact, misuse of the transfer rules occurred often. 
Agreements were frequently not followed through because the transferee 
never occupied the transferred land, although he disposed of the trans­
ferred quotas454. There was, apparently, a lack of control by the 
Ministry455. This practice clearly infringed Community law since the 
quotas are detached from land given that no genuine transaction of land 
takes place.
By 1984/85, the Commission had asked the Ministry of Agriculture to 
stop any rule-breaking from taking place456. Warnings from the 
Ministry, however, to investigate into, quota transfers, were not taken 
very seriously by the producers457. Apparently, only the amendment of 
the DPQR, which was undertaken in 1988458, could ensure compliance 
with EEC rules.
b) Reform of the Regulations - no "transfer" by definition
The purpose of the reform was to restrict the use of very short-term 
grazing agreements459 by defining certain transactions that may, for the 
purpose of the application of the transfer rules, not be treated as "trans­
fers". First of all, a licence to occupy land is not a transfer460. From this 
provision scholars deduce that all licences and agreements that do not 
confer exclusive rights of possession to the transferee and thus are not 
tenancies, will not result in a transfer of milk quotas461. Secondly, any 
tenancy of any land under which a holding, or part of a holding, in
454 Farming News, January 17th, 1992, p. 1; see Final award in an arbitration process 
of 14th November 1990, unpublished, delivered by arbitrator Rickard, T.R., 
FRICS (Fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors)
455 see Final award of 141*1 November 1990, unpublished
456 Hdlin, F., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 158, p. 471, Crosseley, G., (1985) 24 
Farmland Market, p. 16; In 1987, the Court of Auditors pointed to the circumvent­
ing practices in the UK, see Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/11 et seq
457 Crossley, G., (1985) 24 Farmland Market, p. 16; Milk Producer, February 1988,
p. 11
458 DPQR (Amendments) 1988 (S.I. 1988/534), reg 5
459 Rodgers, C. P. Agricultural Law, p. 317 et seq; The MMB of England and Wales, 
Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 29
466 DPQR (Amendents) 1988 (S.I. 1988/534), reg 8 (7) (a); DPQR 1991 (S.I. 
1991/2232), reg 8
461 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 307; Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential 




























































































England and Wales462 is occupied for a period of less than ten months 
does not entail the transfer of milk production quotas463. Thus, the use of 
grazing tenancies for quota transfers is restricted464.
Currently, two kinds of tenancies that are not protected under the 
Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 are used for transfers465: Tenancies of 
more than one year and less than two (so-called Gladstone v Bower 
agreement466) and grazing and/or mowing tenancies if the let is for more 
than 10 months and less than 364 days467.
The minimum time-limit introduced by the reform only prevents the 
transfer by using extremely short-term agreements, but the reform does 
not hinder misuse through longer-term agreements in which land is not 
occupied468. This is a question of control by the Ministry, which has in­
dicated that it supervises whether genuine transactions have taken place 
and whether there is a change of occupation469. However, English 
lawyers allege that the Community Regulations do not make it clear 
whether the transferee really has to exercise his excluive right of 
possession470.
After the introduction of the new regulations, the volumes of transfers 
decreased and the number of producers involved in leasing arrangements, 
increased471.
462 DPQR (Amendments) 1988 (S.I. 1988/534), reg 8 (7) (c) (d): for Scotland eight 
months; for Northern Ireland twelve months, see also DPQR 1991 (S.I. 
1991/2232), reg 8 (7) (c) (d)
463 according to DPQR (Amendments) 1988 (S.I. 1988/534), reg 8 (7) (b)
464 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 317
465 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 317; Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential 
Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 119
466 according to a case ; Gladstone v Bower (1960) 2 QB, p. 384
467 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 3 (a); Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 1, p. 
732 et seq
468 examples: (1992) Farming News, January 17th, p. 1; Carter, D., (1991) 36 
Farmland Market, p. 12
469 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 315
470 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 318, thus contractor arrangements are con­
cluded in practice
471 Figures for England and Wales, see The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years 




























































































2. Temporary re-allocation of quotas
Because of high demands for quotas, leasing has been discussed largely 
in the UK since 1986472 *. Thus, quota leasing schemes operated by the 
MMBs have existed since 1986/87 in England and Wales475, based on 
Art. 8 of Regulation 857/84 envisaging the management of milk quotas by 
the purchasers474. However, this interpretation of Art. 8 circumvents 
Art. 7 of Regulation 857/84 because Art. 7 did not initially allow any 
transfer between producers without land475. Moreover, short-term graz­
ing agreements were also used in order to re-allocate milk quotas tem­
porarily. After the authorization of leasing by the European legislator, 
the possibility of leasing between producers of one purchaser was intro­
duced by the DPQR (Amendments) 1988476.
Most of the quotas transferred permanently or temporarily were used 
to avoid super-levy liability477. However, it is not clear by which legal 
transactions the volumes enlisted above (under I.) were transferred per­
manently478. The development of quotas to a tradeable asset was presum­
ably encouraged by the legal permanent transfers described above, by the 
illegal detachment of quotas of land and by leasing arrangements.
3. Formal requirements for transfer of reference quantities
The transferee shall notify the change of occupation to the Ministry, 
including information on the apportionment of the quotas and the holding 
or parts of it that is transferred479. However, under the agency agree­
ment, the notification has to be made to the MMBs, which register the 
change of quotas480. The Minister takes a sample of transfers to make 
sure that the transfers are legal481.
472 see Burrel, A., Milk quotas in England and Wales, p. 4
475 The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 27, p. 11
474 The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 8
475 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/12
476 S.I. 1988/534
477 The MMB of England and Wales, Five Years of Milk Quotas, p. 14
478 see Amies, S. J., Transfer of Milk Quotas in England and Wales, in: Burrel, A. 
(ed.), Milk Quotas in the European Community, p. 159
479 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 8 (1) (a); DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 8, 
reg 11
480 Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 117 et 
seq




























































































Quotas will be automatically transferred by operation of law, whether 
there is a contractual term or not482, if the necessary conditions (see 
above) are fulfilled.
1. Transfer of reference quantities to the transferee
In the case of the transfer of an entire holding, all the reference quan­
tities are transferred to the transferee483.
If parts of a holding are transferred, quotas may be apportioned by 
agreement of the parties concerned484. If no agreement is reached, either 
the parties or the Ministry may refer the matter to an arbitrator485. The 
Ministry may refer to the arbitrator if he considers that the areas used for 
milk production on a holding are not those specified by the parties in the 
forms submitted to the MMBs486.
The apportionment between parties must be made according to the ar­
eas used for milk production487. The apportionment may be based on the 
present use488. The arbitrator shall base his award on findings made by 
him as to areas used for milk production in the five years preceding the 
change of occupation489.
"Areas used for milk production" were not defined in the initial regu­
lations. However, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court490 de­
III. Transfer o f reference quantities as legal effect
482 Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 116
483 MAFF, Discussion paper on Quota Mobility, published in: House of Commons, 
Session 1984-1985, Second Report of the Agriculture Committee, Annex VII, 
London 1985, p. xviii
484 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 19; DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 
11
485 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 18, para 19; DPQR 1991 (S.I. 
1991/2232), reg 8, reg 14, Sch 4; the DPQR 1984 envisaged that if an agreement is 
not reached and if parties do not refer the matter to an arbitrator, the reference 
quantities may be apportioned according to two automatic Formulae. In particular, 
where a holding comprises a dairy unit, the quota is allocated to the part of the 
holding which contains the dairy unit; DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 
19
486 Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 118
487 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 19; DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232), reg 
11; MAFF, Discussion paper on Quota Mobility, ibid, p. xix
488 Watt Muir, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 240
489 DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), Sch 2, para 6; DPQR 1991 (S.I. 1991/2232) Sch 4, 
para 3




























































































fined the term by giving it a broad interpretation491. The following areas 
are, according to this definition, included492: buildings and yards of a 
dairy unit; land used for dairy or dual purpose animals if bred for the 
herd and not resale; land used for dry cows between lactations, land used 
for heifers if they are necessary for continuance of the herd; and also 
land used to produce forage. Apart from the interpretation of the term 
"areas used for milk production", this judgement is important in that it 
also confirms the principle of a proportional division of milk quotas ac­
cording to the areas used for milk production493. Reference quantities 
must be apportioned on an acre to acre basis494.
2. Transfer of reference quantities to the national reserve or retained by 
transferor
The English legislator did not envisage any provision according to 
which reference quantities are transferred to the national reserve.
No maximum amount of reference quantities per hectare above which 
reference quantities are retained by the transferor has been fixed by the 
Regulations. Ministry guidance, however, indicates that the Agricultural 
Department will inquire into transfers of more than 20,000 litres per 
hectare495.
Until 1989, however, reference quantities were retained by the trans­
feror if changes of occupation of parts of a holding which were less than 
one quarter of the area of the remainder of the holding and also no larger 
than 5 hectares occurred496. In addition, either the interest of the occu­
pier who comes into that part of the holding must be a tenancy of less 
than a tenancy (i.e. licences497), having a duration of less than one year. 
Or the transferor's interest must have been a tenancy or less than a ten­
491 Carter, D., (1987) 3 Agricultural Law Association Bulletin, p. 22; Helin, F., 
(1989) No 171 Revue de droit rural, p. 140
492 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 320; Pucknowle Farms Ltd v Kane (1985) 3 
All ER, p. 794
493 Hdlin, F., (1989) Revue de droit rural, No 171, p. 410; Gregory, M.; Sydenham, 
A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 119
494 Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 119
495 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 318
496 so-called minor changes, DPQR 1984 (S.I. 1984/1047), reg 2 (1), Sch 3, para 19; 
DPQR 1986 (S.I. 1986/470), reg 8, abolished by DPQR 1989 (S.I. 1989/380), see 
explanatory note




























































































ancy, having a duration of less than one year. This provision implements 
Art. 5 (3) of Commission Regulation 1371/84 and aims at ensuring the 
transfer of small amounts of land by short-term tenancies or grazing lets 
without quota498 (as to the retention of reference quantities by the tenant 
see below).
G. Position of the tenant
Before examining whether difficult economic and social situations of 
the tenants were considered by incorporating Art. 7 (4) of Regulation 
857/84, reference should be made to the tenancy structure. Finally, which 
rights other than the retention of reference quantities were given to the 
tenant as to reference quantities and how the legal nature of the quota is 
regarded under English law will be briefly inquired into.
As far as the proportion of rented land in the UK is concerned, 38 per 
cent of the total agricultural area was rented in the UK, with a proportion 
of 24 % of leased entire holdings in 19834" .  For a long time, there has 
been a consensus on the British landlord and tenant system because it is 
alleged that the separation of fanning and landowning functions relieves 
the tenant farmer of the problems associated with the management of land 
and associated fixed assets, resulting in a more efficient and prosperous 
farming sector500. The security of agricultural leases in the UK has 
therefore always been remarkably high in order to protect the tenants' 
interests501. Since 1875, various Agricultural Holdings Acts have been 





MAFF, Discussion paper on Quota Mobility, published in: Flouse of Commons,
Session 1984-1985, Second Report of the Agriculture Committee, Annex VII,
London 1985, p. xx. In practice, however, because of a further provision of the
DPQR, only grazing licences were exempt from the transfer rules, see Pinfold, E„
(1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 1311
Hill, B., (1985) 19 Agricultural Administration, p. 191
Hill, B., (1985) 19 Agricultural Administration, p. 199




























































































The UK did not implement Art. 7 (4) of Regulation 857/85. In order to 
understand its reasons, the security English tenants enjoy with respect to 
the termination of a tenancy must be examined.
The current Agricultural Holdings Act 1986502 provides for manda­
tory rules of security if contracts have been concluded that are lettings of 
land or an agreement of letting of land, for a term of years or from year 
to year503. But a number of other licences or tenancies are, by statutory 
provision in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, converted into a pro­
tected tenancy under certain circumstances504.
In order to terminate a tenancy protected under the Act, at least 12 
months' notice to quit an agricultural holding or part of a holding505, 
expiring at the end of a year of the tenancy, must be given506. This re­
quirement applies not only to yearly tenancies but also to notices exercis­
ing options to break leases for fixed terms507. The notice to quit shall not 
have effect, if the tenant, not later than one month from the giving of the 
notice to quit, serves on the landlord a counter-notice and the 
Agricultural Land Tribunal508 does not consent, on an application by the 
landlord, to the operation of the notice to quit509. Consent can only be 
granted if the landlord satisfies one of the six grounds of possession set 
out in the Act, and subject to the overriding requirement that the circum­
stances must be that a "fair and reasonable" landlord would demand pos­
session510. Only in rare cases, can the landlord satisfy one of the grounds, 
for example prove that the management and productivity of the holding
502 Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 1, p. 732 et seq, repealing The Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1984 and The Agricultural Holdings (Notices to Quit) Act 1977, 
(Schedule 15 of the 1986 Act) The 1986 Act is a consolidating act, the tenant's 
right as to the termination was not altered by the 1986 Act, the range of tenancies 
being protected was even extended see Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 5. 
The situation outlined in this research is thus principally the one of tenants under 
the 1984 Act. Security of tenancy was introduced in 1947; Muir Watt, J., 
Agricultural Holdings, p. 86
503 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 1 (5)
504 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 2 and 3
505 for definition of holding see Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 1 (1), (4)
5 0 6  Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 26; Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 81
5 0 7  Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 81
508 as to function and composition see Stansfield, J. O., Halsbury's Laws of England, 
vol. 1 (2), p. 595
509 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 26
510 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 27; in the 1977 Act, only five provisions existed




























































































can be improved511. There are, however, eight situations in which the 
tenant's right to serve a counter-notice is excluded, e.g. if the tenant has 
not paid the rent512 513. The rules on the notice to quit basically apply to 
parts of a holding, too515.
As far as the rent is concerned, tenancies governed by the Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1986 are subject to three-yearly rent reviews by arbitra­
tion514. The Agricultural Holdings Act 1984 introduced a complex for­
mula setting out in detail which factors arbitrators are to take into ac­
count, and which they are to disregard, in an attempt to tie the rent to the 
productive capacity of the holding rather than the free market rental 
value515. The possession of the milk quota by the sitting tenant is a ben­
efit which should be considered in assessing the rent properly payable in 
case of rent arbitration516 517.
With regard to the outlined secure position of the tenants as to the 
termination of a tenancy and a rent review granted that prevents a specu­
lative increase in rent, no retention of reference quantities has conse­
quently been foreseen on quitting. The rule according to which the trans­
fer of parts of a holding below 5 ha are disregarded (see under F. III. 2.), 
gave protection to tenants, who at the time when the quota system was 
introduced, occupied small areas under grazing lets or tenancies, both for 
under 1 year512. These agreements are not protected by the Act.
511 Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 90
512 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, Sch 5, no change as to the 1984 situation, see 
Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 108
513 Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, s 31, see Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 
101
514 Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 121; 
this period was also true under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1984 and rent rev'ew 
has been existing since 1948; Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Tenancies, p. 65,67
515 Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Tenancies, p. 65; see Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, 
s 12,13
516 Muir Watt, J., Agricultural Holdings, p. 227; see Agricultural Act 1986, s 15, 
Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 1, p. 873 et seq, providing that quotas which 
were transferred to the tenant by virtue of a transaction, the cost of which was 
borne wholly or partly by him, may be disregarded in this assessment
517 MAFF, Discussion paper on Quota Mobility, published in; House of Commons, 
Session 1984-1985, Second Report of the Agriculture Committee, Annex VII, 





























































































An out-going tenant has to ask for the landlord's consent when apply­
ing for compensation under an out-goer scheme5111. According to the 
regulations incorporating the Community outgoers-scheme, the landlord's 
refusal is only irrelevant if the refusal is unreasonable518 19.
2. Quota as improvement of the holding 
a) The Agricultural Act 1986
In 1986, the legislator enacted provisions to grant compensation to ten­
ants for milk quotas on termination of a tenancy, incorporated in the 
Agriculture Act 1986520. The Act filled a lacuna, because under the exist­
ing compensation rules, no compensation could be granted to the tenants 
since the possession of the milk quota is no improvement521. The unclear 
relationship between landlord and tenant over the quota was clarified522 523. 
Eligible tenants are persons who have milk quotas registered in their 
name in relation to land because they have been allocated quotas or were 
in occupation of the land as tenant on April 2, 1984 and had the milk 
quota subsequently transferred to them525. Tenants who replace tenants to 
whom the quota was originally allocated will not be entitled to compensa­
tion524. The tenants are entitled whether or not they have been given no­
tice to quit525. The amount of the tenant's compensation is intended to 
reflect the extent to which the tenant had, by efficient farming or the
II. Compensation rights as to reference quantities
518 de Satis, W„ (1984) 36 Country Landowner, No 9, p. 12; Carter, D., (1986) 4 
Agricultural Law Bulletin, p. 5
519 Milk (Community outgocrs Scheme) (England and Wales) Regulations 1986 (S.I. 
1986/1611), reg 9, as amenended by S.I. 1987/410 and S.I. 1987/909
520 Agricultural Act 1986, reg 13, Sch 1, Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 1, p. 
873
521 Muir Watt, J„ Agricultural Holdings, p. 226
522 Rayment, J„ (1986) 4 Agricultural Law Bulletin, p. 25; Pinfold, E„ (1986) 280 
EG, p. 1212
523 Agricultural Act 1986, s 13, Sch 1, Halsbury's Statutes of England, vol. 1, p. 873; 
tenancies not protected under the Act are not included; see Gregory, M.; 
Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 121
5 2 4  ^  an exception, statutory succession, assignemts and sub-tenancies cases are enti­
tled to a compensation




























































































provision of fixed equipment, increased the amount of quota registered in 
respect to the agricultural holding526.
b) Infringement of tenant's fundamental rights
Because the 1986 Act has no retroactive effect527, tenants who quit the 
holding after 1984 and before 1986 were not entitled to apply for com­
pensation. A tenant who left the farm in March 1985 claimed by judicial 
review that the Ministry should extend to tenants who quit their farms 
between 1984 and 1986 the same rights as were given by the 1986 Act. 
The tenant relied on the "Wachauf case528. He was granted leave to ap­
ply for judicial review by the Court of Appeal529 5301. So far, no judgement 
has been delivered on this point559. The NFU, however, expects a gov­
ernment regulation to fill the lacuna531.
This group of tenants who were in occupation of a holding when refer­
ence quantities were allocated are neither given the possibility of retain­
ing reference quantities532 or of applying for a compensation for the 
quota nor can they take part in an out-goer scheme without the landlord's 
consent. They are deprived of the quotas which are the fruits of their 
labour and their investments533 and hence their right to property granted 
by the Community legal order534 may be infringed535. Though there is 
an agreement that the quota is a licence, the quota can also be regarded as 
a property right, in particular when considering the possibility of leas­
526 Densham, H. A. C.; Scartimeli, W. S„ Scammell and Densham's Law of 
Agricultural Holdings, p. 318
the tenant's share is calculated by fixing the so-called "standard quota” and calculat­
ing the "tenant's fraction" and the value of the quotas purchased by the tenant 
("transferred quota"), see Gregory, M.; Sydenham, A., Essential Law for Land- 
owners & Farmers, p. 123
527 see purchas, L. J. in: R v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte 
Bostock, Court of Appeal (1991) 1 C.M.L.R., p. 691
528 see second chapter, F. I. 2.
529 r  v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Bostock, Court of 
Appeal (1991) 1 C.M.L.R. 687, on appeal from the Queen's Bench Division 
(1991) 1 C.M.L.R., p. 681
530 as to January 1992
531 Interview with J. Cleater, NFU, 23rd of January 1992
532 except when areas below 5 ha are restituted that have been leased under short-term 
tenancies agreements; see under F. III. 2.
533 however, they are granted compensation for investments like stables etc
534 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R., p. 3727 (3745)




























































































ing536. The Advocate General in "Wachauf" recognized that there might 
well be cases where the permanent loss to the tenant of quota could be 
viewed expropriatory537. Still, it is not clear to whom the quota belongs. 
But the tenant does at least deserve a share of the quota because the land­
lord's contribution, the capital, should be weighed with that of the pro­
ducer, namely his labour538.
Since the tenants' exercise of the quota is not only restricted but he is 
deprived of his property right539, the question arises whether the depri­
vation constitutes, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of those rights540 5412. 
The deprivation of the property right of these tenants is not in the interest 
of the Community, because it does not contribute to the stabilization of 
the milk market nor to the obeyance of the transfer rules. In this respect, 
the deprivation of his right to property is disproportionate.
In addition, the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Art. 40 
(3) of the EEC Treaty54!, might be infringed because the difference in 
treatment between tenants who before 1986 quit the farm and those who 
after 1986 left the holding is not ojectively jusufied.
In practice, the manifold difficulties that arose in the relationship be­
tween landlord and tenant in the UK resulted in the creation of other 
methods of agricultural occupations such as share-farming or partnership 
fanning and tenancies not protected under the Agricultural Holdings Act 
1986547.
536 see Cardwell, (1992) C.M.L. Rev., p. 742; Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, N., 
Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 3, Fasc. D-l, p. 10
537 Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Emâhrung und Forstwirtschaft, [1989] 
E.C.R., p. 2609 (2631)
538 Nies, V., (1989) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 201, Nies, V., (1990) Agrarrecht, 
p. 226; VG Frankfurt, (1990) 2 C.M.L.R., p. 301 even attributes the whole of the 
property right to the tenant
539 for the difference between restriction and deprivation see Case 44/79 Flauer v Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] E.C.R., p. 3727 (3746)
540 see for the formula; Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernahrung und 
Forstwirtschaft, [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2639)
541 Case 201-202/85 Klensch v Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Agriculture et à la Viticulture 
[1986] E.C.R., p. 3477 (3507)




























































































Most of the English lawyers regard the quota as a species of interest 
alien to English property and land law, thus the quota is a concept sui 
generis543. Though statutory rights of the tenants concerning the quota 
have been created, the legal nature has not been clarified by the statutory 
rules544. In particular, the question of the ownership of the quota is still 
unclear545. Because no owner can be identified scholars think that the 
quota is only a quasi-property right546.
III. Legal nature o f the reference quantity
543 Pinfold, E„ (1986) 280 EG, p. 1212; Pinfold, E„ (1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 
1307; Rodgers, C. P., Agricultural Law, p. 320 et seq; Gregory, M.; Sydenham, 
A., Essential Law for Landowners & Farmers, p. 116; Muir Watt, J„ Agricultural 
Holdings, p. 226
544 Pinfold, E„ (1986) 280 EG, p. 1212; Pinfold, E., (1985) 82 LS Gaz, No 17, p. 
1307
545 Pinfold, E„ (1986) 280 EG, p. 1212 proposing that the quota has to belong to the
producer who occupies the land 




























































































Implementation of the Milk quota regulations in French Law
A. Agriculture policy and quota policy
/. Agricultural policy
In France, agriculture enjoys a predominant economic importance. 
France has the highest amount of agricultural land in the Community 
(31,527,000 ha in 1984; Germany; 12,004,000 ha; UK: 18,690,000 
ha547). In 1983, agricultural exports accounted for 18 % of all exports 
(UK: 7.6 %; Germany: 6.0 %)548, important for the reduction of the 
negative foreign-trade account. In 1983, 8.1 % of the employed civilian 
population in France were employed in agriculture, in Germany the fig­
ure was 5.6 % and in the UK 2.7 %549. The share of agriculture of the 
Gross National Product in 1983 was 4.0 % in France, 2.1 % in the UK, 
2.2 % in Germany and 3.6 % in the whole Community550 51.
Apart from the economic importance, agriculture enjoys a socio-politi­
cal importance which is due to French concern about the problem of the 
depopulation (désertification) of French rural areas55!. The population 
density is the third lowest in the Community, after Greece and Ireland. In 
1984, there were 100 inhabitants per km^ in France, in the UK 232 and
547 Bundesministerium fiir Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch iiber Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1985, p. 359
548 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1985 Report, p. 195
549 Commission of the European Communities, The Agricultural Situation in the 
Community, 1984 Report, p. 282
550 Bundesministerium fiir Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch iiber Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1985, p. 360
551 Treiber, W., Frankreich, in: Priebe, H.; Scheper, W.; von Urff, W. (eds.), 




























































































in Germany 245552. Agricultural policy is thus closely linked to regional 
policy.
The main features of French agricultural policy are both the increase 
of productivity and exports553 and promotion of young farmers and 
farmers in disfavoured areas554.
II. Quota policy
The French dairy industry is rather divided with efficient production 
structures in the West of France (Grande-Ouest) and inefficient ones in 
the East of France555. The West of France (comprising "Bretagne", 
"Pays-de-Loire" and "Normandie") has, since 1978, greatly increased its 
deliveries and an intensive dairy production can now be recognized556. In 
1990, 20.56 % of the milk produced in France was produced in 
"Bretagne" and 10.82 % in "Basse-Normandie"557. In 1983, the average 
yield per cow in "Bretagne" was 4,270 1 per annum and in France, 3,800 
1 per annum558. As far as the number of purchasers as defined by the 
levy system is concerned, in 1985, there have been 1,322 purchasers 
(dairies) in France, 489 purchasers (dairies) in Germany and 5 pur­
chasers (Milk Marketing Boards, see third chapter) in the UK559. In 
1982, the size of the French (1,528 dairies in 1982) and German dairies 
(562 dairies in 1982) varied from over 5,000 litres to over 3 million 
litres of milk collected. In 1982, most of the French dairies (1,136) col­
552 Bundesministerium für Emâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch über Emâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1985, p. 359
553 enshrined in several versions of the "loi d'orientation", Kroll, J. C., Politique agri­
cole et relations internationales, p. 36 et seq, p. 217; Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 
250
554 Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 250 et seq
555 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: 
Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 85; Bonnafous, P., L'incidence des quotas, p. 33; 
Chambres d'agriculture (ed.); Quotas laitiers. Mars 1986, p. 4
556 Desbrosses, B.; Hairy, D.; Perraud, D.; Foulhouze, I.; (1988) Ecomomie rurale, 
No 187, p. 18
557 CNIEL, L'économie laitière en chiffres, édition 1991, p. 11, p. 23 et seq
558 Bonnafous, P., L'incidence des quotas, p. 33
559 Bundesministerium für Emâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch über Emâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1987, p. 411; the British 





























































































lected less than 5,000 litres per annum and most of the German dairies 
(101) between 10,000 and 20,000 Mio. litres of milk560.
The French dairy industry was in the process of growth when the su­
per-levy system was introduced56!. The goal of the French milk produc­
ers and industry has always been to catch up with the degree of produc­
tion sufficiency in Northern Europe562. Thus, the proposition to intro­
duce reference quantities came as a shock for many producers. The 
French government refused any quantitive restrictions and supported a 
progressive co-responsibility levy. Quantitive restrictions would have a 
negative effect on the French goal of increasing production563. The pro­
ducers' organizations expressed their fierce opposition through many 
publicity effective demonstrations564. Because any increase of production 
was restricted by the pending levy for all Member States, the French tried 
to use this "frozen situation" in order to restructure their dairy indus­
try565. This policy, financed by public funds566, was supposed to be 
double-track in that it firstly envisaged the encouragement of producers 
with less efficient production structures to give up milk production. 
These small producers are held responsible for the structural setback of 
the French dairy industry seen as a whole567. Secondly, those quantities 
released were supposed to be allocated to prior producers568 569, among 
them young farmers. Quotas were thus the opportunity to speed up the 
concentration of the industry560. Though conflicts of interest prevail
560 Bundesministerium für Emàhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch über Emàhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1985, p. 389
561 Gadbin, D„ (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 509
562 Cordonnier, P„ (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 121; Burrel, A., (1988) Cahiers d'é­
conomie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 95
563 Treiber, W„ Frankreich, in: Priebe, H.; Scheper, W.; von Urff, W. (eds.), 
Agrarpolitik in der EG, p. 59; Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de 
la politique laitière, in: Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 86
564 Agra-Europe 18/84, Lànderberichte, p. 1 et seq; Agra-Europe 14/84, Kurz- 
meldungen, p. 3 et seq; The ONILAIT director was even kidnapped; see Agra- 
Europe 23/84, Lànderberichte, p. 32 et seq
565 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: 
Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 87
566 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 4; Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk Quotas in 
France; in: Burrel, A., Milk Quotas in the European Community, p. 7
567 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: Cou­
lomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 89
568 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 4
569 Hairy, D.; Prost, M„ Milk Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in 




























































































within the producers' organization between the West of France and the 
East of France, the FNPL (Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Lait) 
has succeeded in maintaining the "acquis paysage"570.
B. Legal acts incorporating the milk quota Regulations into 
French law571
The Prime Minister enacted the "décret No. 84-661" of 17 July 
1984572 in order to incorporate the EEC milk quota Regulations into 
French law573. Several "arrêtés" were passed later574. "Décrets" and "ar­
rêtés" are regulations575. "Décrets" are enacted by the President or the 
Prime Minister, whereas "arrêtés" are passed by one Minister of the gov­
ernment, a "préfet" or the "maire”576. Regulations may be autonomously 
enacted without a delegated legislation on the basis of Art. 37 of the 
French constitution or may be passed in order to execute a "loi" accord­
ing to Art. 21 of the French constitution577. EEC Regulations are incor­
porated usually as "règlements" by the government, because the govern­
ment is regarded as executing a "loi" on the basis of Art. 21 of the French 
constitution when incorporating Community Regulations578.
The "décret No. 91-157" of 11 February 1991 revoked the original 
"décret"579. The "arrêtés" usually provide rules on how to determine the
570 With the Western French producers demanding a greater flexibility of the regula­
tions to expand their production and to profit from weak producers giving up. 
Interview with FNPL and FNSEA officials in Paris in February 1992
571 direct sales are not treated
572 J. O. of 21. 7. 1984, p. 2373; a "circulaire” of 23. 5. 1984 was elaborated by the 
Agricultural Ministry which fixed the new regulations, see Bonneau, J.-R. (1984) 
(2esem.) Gazette du Palais, doctrine, p. 405
573 sources of law are: The constitution, laws ("lois"), regulations ("réglements" and 
"arrêtés"), and custumory law ("coutume"); see Constantinesco, V.; Hübner, U., 
Einfiihrung in das franzôsische Recht, p. 5 et seq
574 latest "arrêté" as to January 1992: "arrêté" of 31. 12. 1991, J. O. of 9. 1. 1992, p. 
436
575 Rivero, J., Droit administratif, p. 89, Art. 52 of the French constitution
576 Rivero, J., Droit administratif, p. 89
577 Art. 21 of the French constitution
578 Constantinides-Mégret, C., La politique agricole commune en question, p. 51; 
Isaac, G., Droit communautaire en général, p. 191




























































































reference quantities for the purchasers and on the administration of the 
reference quantities in each twelve-month period580.
C. Institutions charged with the application of the milk quota 
Regulations
The Ministry of Agriculture, ONILAIT (Office national interprofes­
sionnel du lait et des produits laitiers), the dairies, the "Commissions mix­
tes départementales" and the "préfet" have been conferred the administra­
tion of the super-levy system581.
France is a centralized state582 583. For administrative purposes, it is di­
vided up into regions and "départements"585. The state administration is 
either carried out by territorial corporations under public law such as the 
local governments (collectivités locales), the "départements" and the re­
gions584. Moreover, so-called "établissements publics" exist. These are 
non-territorial corporations of public law that are charged with special 
administration and are conferred a certain amount of financial and 
administrative autonomy585.
I. Ministry o f Agriculture and "préfet"
The general representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture in the "dé­
partements" or the regions are the "préfets"586. They are responsible for
580 ONILATr, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 9
581 Two more administrative consultative resp arbitration bodies, the "commission de 
conciliation des litiges" (Art. 16 of the "décret No. 84-661") and "les commissions 
régionales interprofessionnelles" (Art. 10 of the "décret No. 84-661") have been set 
up; in addition, CNIEL (Centre national interprofessionnel de l'économie laitière, a 
private organization) can be consulted by the "préfet", see Art. 7 of the "arrêté" of
10. 7. 1987, J. O. of 7. 8. 1984, p. 8923
5 8 2  opposed to federal state; Rivero, J., Droit adminsiratif, p. 429
583 Rivero, J., Droit administratif, p. 420 et seq
584 Regions were formed in 1960 mainly for implementing structural policy 
(Aménagement du territoire), Rivero, J., Droit administratif, p. 424
585 Rivero, J., Droit administratif, p. 594
5 8 6  x h e  " p r é f e t "  w a s  g i v e n  t h e  t i t l e  " C o m m i s s a i r e  d e  l a  R é p u b l i q u e "  b y  a  " d é c r e t ”  o f
11. 5. 1982 and given his traditional name back by a "décret" of 29. 2. 1988, see 




























































































general agricultural administration587. Moreover, they have to direct and 
co-ordinate the "Directions départementales de l'Agriculture et de la 
Forêt" (D.D.A.F.) which deliver the so-called "services extérieures" of 
the Ministry of Agriculture588. "Services extérieures" are mostly of a 
technical nature, but also concern the agricultural policy in general589.
II. ONI LAIT
Among the "établissements publics" that are charged with agricultural 
subject matters are those which are conferred the task of administering 
the organisation of the production and agricultural markets, namely the 
common organizations of the markets. These are called public bodies of 
market intervention590.
In the 1980s, five public multi-professional bodies for the purpose of 
market intervention were created by way of "décret"59!; among them was 
ONILAIT592 593. The legal nature of ONILAIT is as an industrial and com­
mercial public body (établissement public industriel et commerciale 
(EPIC) )595. As a multi-professional organization, it is administered by a 
council that is composed of dairy producers, representatives of the dairy 
industry and traders, representatives of the employers, the consumers and 
the public authorities594. ONILAIT has to implement the common agri­
cultural policy, especially the intervention measures in the markets, and 
also to organize and govern the milk marketing chain595. The reason for 
setting up such bodies was to strengthen the state's role in the marketing
5 8 7  functions of the préfet in general; see Bottin administratif 1992, p. 1018
588 Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 319, there are also "Directions régionales de l'agricul­
ture et de la forêt"
589 Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 319
590 Organismes publics d'intervention sur les marchés, Jegouzo, Y., Juris-Classeur 
administratif, vol. 4, Fasc. 358, p. 23
591 The "Loi No. 82-847" of 6. 10. 1982, J. O. of 7. 10. 1982, p. 2979 envisaged the 
creation of interprofessional offices; see Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 470
592 see "décret No. 83-247" of 18. 3. 1983, J. O. of 29. 3. 1983 , p. 965
593 the EPIC belong to the group of "établissements publics", Rivero, J., Droit admin­
istratif, p. 607 et seq; Jegouzo, Y., Juris-Classeur administratif, vol. 4, Fasc. 358, 
p. 24; Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 470
5 9 4  see "décret No. 83-247" of 18. 3. 1983, J. O. of 29. 3. 1983, p. 965
5 9 5  see "décret No. 83-247" of 18. 3. 1983, J. O. of 29. 3. 1983, p. 965; Jegouzo, 




























































































chain and to overcome deficiencies of private multi-professional organi­
zations5^ .  ONILAIT is supervised by the government596 97.
III. Commissions mixtes départementales
The "commissions mixtes départementales" were set up by a regulation 
in 1983598. They are presided over by the "préfet" of each "départe­
ment"599 and composed of civil servants and other representatives of the 
various bodies of the agricultural administration, persons competent in 
agricultural economics and representatives of the various agricultural 
professional organisations6*81. The "commission" is charged with structu­
ral policy, in particular it has to give its opinion on development plans to 
the approving "préfets"601. For the purpose of the administration the 
milk quota regulation, the "commission" is enlarged by representatives of 
the dairy cooperatives and the dairy industry602. A special department 
(section laitière) within the commission, consisting of State representa­
tives, representatives of the dairy industry and the producers, was created 
later603.
596 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D.; Crise et transformations de la polititque laitière, in: Cou­
lomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 85; Lorvellec, L„ Droit rural, p. 470 et seq
597 "sous tutelle" see Cheverry, P.; Bigot, J., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 1, Fasc. 1, p. 
6
598 "Décret No. 83-442" of 1. 6. 1983, J. O. of 3. 6. 1983, p. 1670
599 Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analythique, Quotas laitiers 
(régime juridique), p. 792
600 Art. 26 of the "décret No. 83-442" of 1. 6. 1983, J. O. of 3. 6. 1983, p. 1670
601 "Décret No. 83-442" of 1. 6. 1983, J. O. of 3. 6. 1983, p. 1670. "Décret No. 85- 
1144" of 30. 10. 1985, J. O. of 1. 11. 1985, implementing Council Régulation 
797/85; see Lorvellec, L„ Droit rural, p. 259
602 "Décret No. 84-1017" of 19. 11. 1984, J. O. of 20. 11. 1984, p. 3572
603 Art. 6 of the "arrêté" of 10. 7. 1987, J. O. of 7. 8. 1987, p. 8922; Art. 22, 23 of 





























































































The French dairies have also been attributed administrative tasks. No 
public power, however, has been conferred on the dairies for the per­
formance of these tasks604.
D. Observance of the national guaranteed quantity when allo­
cating reference quantities605
France did not exceed its national guaranteed quantity when allocating 
reference quantities606. Under which legal scheme this was possible will 
be shown.
/. Allocation o f reference quantities to purchasers and producers
France implemented Formula B. The French national guaranteed 
quantity is divided up yearly by ONILAIT between the purchasers of 
milk (the dairies)607. The initial basis for the calculation of the pur­
chasers' quantities was the sum of 1983 deliveries to dairies, deducted by 
a certain percentage608. In the first-twelve month period the deductive 
percentage of the purchasers' quotas envisaged in the initial "décret" had 
to be corrected from 2 % to 2.8 % in order not to exceed the national 
guaranteed quantity when allocating reference quantities609 610. The dairies 
allocate the reference quantities to the producers yearly on the basis of 
their deliveries in 1983 deducted by a certain percentage6!0. In practice,
604 Zimmermann, F„ (1990) Revue de droit rural, No 182, p. 224; Conseil d'Etat, 
Welter, Rec. de Conseil d'Etat 1988, p. 83, confirmed by Conseil d'Etat, Gilet, 
(1991) Revue de droit rural, No 189, p. 43
605 only deliveries to dairies are treated
606 see Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/11
667 Art. 1 of the "décret No. 84-661" of 17. 7. 1984, J. O. of 21. 7. 1984, p. 2373
608 Art. 17 of the "décret No. 84-661"; for mountain areas see Art. 1 of the "arrêté" of 
22. 11. 1984, J. O. of 29. 11. 1984, p. 366
609 Prost, M„ (1986) Economie rurale, No 172, p. 23; Bonnafous, P., L'incidence 
des quotas, p. 27
610 Art. 1 of the "décret No. 84-661"; Art. 3 of the "arrêté" of 22. 11. 1984, J. O. of 




























































































the reference quantities for the producers are determined by way of ne­
gotiation between ONILAIT and the purchasers611.
II. Allocation of reference quantities to producers in special situations
In France, all provisions for producers in special situations envisaged 
by the European legislator have been taken into account. The categories 
of the producers were constantly enlarged during the various campaigns 
and they varied in the yearly "arrêtés". In particular, young farmers612 
and farmers who undertook development plans were considered to a high 
degree613.
III. Sources from which additional and specific reference quantities are 
allocated
Producers in special situations receive reference quantities (quantités 
supplémentaires) both from out-goer schemes and the national reserve.
1. Out-goer schemes
Purchasers are allocated reference quantities yearly by ONILAIT, in­
cluding 90 %614 of the quantities released by out-going milk producers. 
From these amounts, the purchasers allocate the reference quantities in­
cluding additional and specific reference quantities to the producers. The 
Minister, in a yearly "arrêté", defines those producers who are entitled to 
receive supplementary reference quantities and determines the order in 
which these producers have to be considered615.
611 Zimmermann, F., (1990) Revue de droit rural, No 182, p. 224
612 examples: Art. 5 of the "décret No. 84-661"; Art. 4 of the "arrêté" of 14. 10. 1988, 
J. O. of 25. 10. 1988, p. 13459; Art. 9 of the "arrêté" of 26. 4. 1989, J. O. of 30. 
4. 1989, p. 5559
613 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 10
614 percentage varied between 80 and 90 % during the campaigns; 80 % in 1985/86 see 
"Arrêté" of 10. 7. 1985, J. O. of 14. 7. 1985, p. 7979
615 example: Art. 4 and 5 of the "arrêté" of 22. 11. 1984, J. O. of 29. 11. 1984, p. 
3660; Art. 3 of the "arrêté" of 10. 7. 1985, J. O. of 14. 7. 1985, p. 7979; Art. 5, 





























































































Producers in special situations are, moreover, allocated reference 
quantities from the national reserve. First of all, 10 % of the quantities 
released by out-goer schemes were supposed to feed the national reserve 
administered by ONILAIT6*6. In addition, all quantities that are released 
by subtracting quotas from the transferee of reference quantities are 
added to the national reserve. They are re-allocated by the "préfet" after 
consultation with the "section laitière de la commission mixte départe­
mentale6!7". The re-allocation of these reference quantities, however, has 
to be carried out according to the "arrêté"6 !8. [n practice, many 
reference quantities are re-allocated to the producers who released 
them61 7819. This demonstrates the powerful role which the administration 
was given in the restructuring process.
According to a provision of the "décret No. 84-661", producers in 
special situations, including producers with a development plan, are only 
re-allocated reference quantities up to 200,000 litres or 97 % of the de­
livery objective of the plan620. This ceiling was widely criticized because 
it punishes larger producers62*. However, the amount of reference 
quantities for producers in special situations is limited622. The "Cour 
d'appel de Rennes" referred to the ECJ623 asking for compliance with 
Community rules. According to the ECJ, the establishment of a ceiling 
does not contravene the implemented Art. 3 of Regulation 857/84 because 
it is an objective critérium in order to determine the specific reference 
quantity, and the promotion of small producers is at the discretion of the 
Member State624. Moreover, the ECJ ruled on whether the French regu­
616 Art. 2 of the "arrêté” of 22. 11. 1984, J. O. of 29. 11. 1984, p. 3660; percentage 
varied, see above
617 "circulaire” of 14. 8. 1987, Art. VI, published in ; Répertoire du Notariat 
Defrenois, 3 0  Novembre 1987, le  partie, p. 1409; Art. 14 of the "arrêté" of 26. 4. 
1989, J. O. of 30. 4. 1989, p. 5557, Art. 5 of the "décret No. 84-661”
618 Art. 14 of the "arrêté" of 26. 4. 1989, J. O. of 30. 4. 1989, p. 5557
619 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 416; Rameau, (1990) Revue 
de droit rural, No 184, p. 312
620 "Arrêté” of 14. 10. 1986, J. O. of 25. 10. 1986, p. 13459; see also "arrêté" of 29. 
3. 1991, J. O. of 7. 4. 1991, p. 4885
621 Prost, M„ (1986) Economie rurale, No 172, p. 22
622 Prost, M„ (1986) Economie rurale. No 172, p. 22
628 Case 196/88 to 198/88 Cornée et al v Coopérative agricole laitière de Loudéac 
"Copall" [1989] E.C.R., p. 2309
624 Case 196/88 to 198/88 Cornée et al v Coopérative agricole laitière de Loudéac 




























































































lation that foresees that the purchasers re-allocate reference quantities to 
their affiliated producers according to an order of priority discriminates 
producers of one dairy against those of another. The ECJ pointed out that 
this regulation does not infringe the principle of the prohibition of dis­
crimination provided that if necessary such re-allocations are adjusted 
subsequently in order to neutralize any differences in treatment between 
producers affiliated to different purchasers625
To sum up, the French "producteurs prioritaires" had no legal title to 
receive supplementary reference quantities, but the allocation depended 
on the quantities available in each campaign626.
3. Régionalisation of the restructuring process
The purchasers re-allocated the "quantités supplémentaires" in their 
own region. The result of these regional re-allocations was that in certain 
regions (in particular in the East of France and South-West of France) 
unused quotas ("quotas morts"627) were retained by the purchasers. The 
competences of the purchasers that have been widely criticized628 have 
been limited, because, since 1987/88, the national out-goer schemes have 
been supplemented by regional and départemental schemes (so-called 
"conventions")62^. The re-allocation of these quantities is restricted to the 
region where they are released and is carried out by the purchasers under 
supervision of the "Commission mixte départementale" presided over by 
the "préfet"630.
Because the amount of reference quantities available for re-allocation 
in the regions increased steadily, the restructuring process was region- 
alised631. Restructuring measures carried out nation-wide with the help 
of the national reserve were of minor importance632. The result of the
625 Case 196/88 to 198/88, ibid, p. 2309 (2347)
626 see Art. 4 of the "decret No. 84-661"
627 Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in 
the European Community, p. 8; see Dérouillé, J.-P., (1987) Agriculture Magazine, 
No. 15, February, p. 46
628 Charles-Le Bihan, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 516
629 see Albert, J.-L., (1989) Revue de droit rural. No 173, p. 227
630 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 11
631 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: 
Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 93
632 Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in 




























































































régionalisation was that the milk production structure in France was 
frozen633. Hardly any movement of reference quantities to other "dé­
partements" took place. Thus, the expansion of the more efficient regions 
was slowed down and the decline of less efficient regions has been de­
layed634. Another disadvantage of the régionalisation was the unequal 
treatment of prior producers from different dairies and regions, because 
the quantities available for re-allocation differ from region to region635.
E. Implementation of Formula B
The territory of France was divided up into two regions for the appli­
cation of the milk quota regulation: mountain areas and the rest of the 
country636. France opted for the implementation of Formuala B637 for 
the whole of the country. There were two main reasons for choosing 
Formula B: First of all, Formula B allows an equalization between over- 
and underdeliveries within the area of one purchaser, thus is more flexi­
ble because the levy amount paid is less than the full target price638. The 
"shock" of the introduction of milk quotas could consequently be softened 
in France (which was in the process of gently restructuring its dairy in­
dustry639 *). Secondly, administration under Formula B seemed to be eas­
ier because there are fewer dairies than producers649.
633 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 5
634 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D„ Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: 
Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 93
635 Prost, M., (1986) Economie rurale, No 172, p. 24
636 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 10
For the mountain areas, a specific quota policy has been pursued: for example ad­
ditional reference quantities of the national reserve were affected or a lower percent­
age of reduction of individual reference quantities was applied to them; see 
ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 10 et seq, Prost, M. (1986) Economie ru­
rale, No 172, p. 22
637 Art. 2 of the "décret No. 84-661"; Prost, M., (1986) Economie rurale, No 172, p. 
23
638 Bonneau, J.-R., (1984) (2e sem.) Gazette du Palais, doctrine, p. 406
639 Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 509
646 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in: 




























































































I. Diversity o f milk production structure, equalization
The levy initially paid by producers in France was low because of the 
possibility of national and regional equalization and Formula B. In fact, 
in 1985/86, for example, no levy was paid, though many dairies in the 
West were in excess of their reference quantities641. The possibility of 
the regional and national equalization was introduced because in some ar­
eas of France a high degree of "quotas morts" existed at the end of the 
campaign642. The national and regional equalization is carried out by 
ONILAIT643.
The disadvantage of implementing Formula B in France was that only 
producers of one dairy were treated equally. The reasons are both the di­
verse milk production and milk-collection structure. France has many 
small and dispersed dairies644. Because the equalization depends in the 
first place on the degree of over- and underdeliveries within one dairy, 
producers of one dairy have profited from equalization to strikingly dif­
ferent degrees than producers from other dairies645. The level of penal­
ties varied significantly646. Moreover, some dairies favoured certain 
producers by obscure practices of calculating their levy647.
From 1985/86 onwards, several efforts were undertaken to reform the 
calculation of the super-levy648, taking the European reform on Formula 
B into account. The objective was to have every producer in excess of his 
reference quantity pay at least a certain percentage of the levy indepen­
dently of the excess of the dairy and to compensate the inequalities be­
tween prior producers. Actually, certain producers are allocated provi­
641 Court of Auditors, Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/19, Lefèvre, D„ (1987) 
Agricultural Magazine, No 15, February, p. 45
642 see second chapter, F. I. 2.; Lefèvre, D„ (1987) Agricultural Magazine, No 15, 
February, p. 45
643 Art. 2, 3 of the "arrêté" of 4. 7. 1986, J. O. of 23. 7. 1986, p. 9098
644 see under A.; Petit, M. et al, Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Com­
munity, p. 51
645 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 39; Lefèvre, D., (1987) Agricultural 
Magazine, No 15, February, p. 47
646 Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in 
the European Community, p. 9
647 Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in 
the European Community, p. 18
648 for a survey see ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 12 et seq, p. 39 et seq; 
Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in 




























































































sional reference quantities by the purchasers during the twelve-month 
period, the sum of which is a percentage of the estimated amount of un­
derdeliveries to their dairy649. Provisional reference quantities are, in the 
first place, allocated to "producteurs prioritaires", and secondly to all 
other producers650. If producers exceed the finalised reference quantity 
at the end of the year (including their own and provisional quota), how­
ever, they have to pay the full target price of the super-levy651. 
Offsetting is still possible under these reforms, but only to the extent that 
the amounts for which the producer pays levies might be different; the 
levy rate is, however, always the same percentage of the target price. 
Producers are treated more equally now. By making the producer more 
responsible for his own production, elements of Formula A have been 
introduced in France652. The levy, which is calculated by ONILAIT, 
must be paid by the purchasers to ONILAIT653.
II. Administrative viability
As shown, ONILAIT is mainly charged with the administration of the 
super-levy system654. In addition to this central level of administration by 
ONILAIT, the various regional organizations, including the dairies, hold 
an important position in the re-allocation of reference quantities.
The dairies have to notify the producer's reference quantities including 
the "quantités supplémentaires” to the producers. The allocation of the 
reference quantities to the producers by the purchasers are according to a 
judgement of the "Conseil d'Etat", purely a matter of private contract
649 Art. 6 of the "décret No. 91-157" of 11. 2. 1991, J. O. of 13. 2. 1991, p. 2199, 
Art. 13 of the "arrêté" of 29. 3. 1991, J. O. of 7. 4. 1991, p. 4884
see also as examples: Art. 11 of the "arrêté” of 11. 4. 1987, J. O. of 14. 4. 1987, 
p. 4246; Art. 4 of the "arrêté" of 10. 7. 1987, J. O. of 7. 8. 1987, p. 8922; Art. 3 
of the "arrêté" of 26. 4. 1989, J. O. of 30. 4. 1989, p. 5557
650 examples: Art. 14 of the "arrêté" of 29. 3. 1991, J. O. of 7. 4. 1991, p. 4884; Art. 
17 of the "arrêté" of 26. 4. 1989, J. O. of 30. 4. 1989, p. 5557; Rameau, (1987) 
Revue de droit rural, No 184, p. 311
651 Art. 19 of the "arrêté" of 29. 3. 1991, J. O. of 7. 4. 1991, p. 4884, unused quanti­
ties at the end of the campaign are foremost allocated to prior producers
652 see Hairy, D.; Prost, M. Milk Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.). Milk Quotas 
in the European Community, p. 11; Rameau, (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 184, 
p. 311
653 Art. 1 of the "décret No. 84-661", J. O. of 21. 7. 1984, p. 2373




























































































between the dairies and the producers, thus only pursueable in civil 
courts655. The position of the dairies remains ambiguous because they are 
delegated, being private enterprises, some implicit powers by 
ONILAIT656.
There has been misuse of the scheme by dairies in that they favoured 
certain producers657 and tried in particular to attract producers with a 
huge quantity of reference quantities from other dairies in order to ex­
haust their production capacities658. In detail, dairies are alleged to have 
notified reference quantities to producers in excess of their purchaser's 
quota, to have infringed the rules when they allocated additional refer­
ence quantities or provisional reference quantities and not to have notified 
the producers' reference quantities to ONILAIT659. Moreover, they have 
not prevented leasing arrangements from taking place660. Finally, be­
cause the competitive situation among dairies and producers increased, 
the state decided to subject the dairies’ administration to stricter con­
trol661. The powers of ONILAIT were enlarged in 1990 by authorising 
them to collect administrative penalties from the dairies if the dairies fail 
to correctly administer the quota system662. In 1990, ONILAIT con­
trolled the dairies to the extent that 72 % of national milk deliveries were 
checked by the office663.
853 Conseil d'Etat, Welter, Rec. de Conseil d'Etat 1988, p. 83, confirmed by Conseil 
d'Etat, Gilet, (1991) Revue de droit rural. No 189, p. 43
656 Zimmermann, F„ (1990) Revue de droit rural 1990, No 182, p. 224
657 Têtu, G., (1990) La propriété agricole, No 174, p. 6
658 Dérouillé, J.-P., (1987) Agricultural Magazine, No 15, February, p. 46 et seq 
showing that in particular in less efficient regions with "quotas morts", dairies were 
lacking milk
659 see ONILAIT, Rapport annuel 1990, p. 72; Fédération Nationale des Producteurs 
de Lait, 47e Assemblée générale 1991, p. 35
660 see ONILAIT, Rapport annuel 1990, p. 72; Fédération Nationale des Producteurs 
de Lait, 47e Assemblée générale 1991, p. 35
661 Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Lait, 47e Assemblée générale 1991, p. 35
662 Art. 52 of the "Loi No. 90-85" of 23. 1. 1990, J. O. 25. 1. 1990, p. 998, applying 
rules in "décret No. 91-157" of 11. 2. 1991,1. O. of 13. 2. 1991, p. 2199




























































































F. Transfer of reference quantities
I. No visible quota markets
The original "décret" that implemented the EEC milk quota 
Regulations into French law did not contain any provisions for the trans­
fer of milk quotas. Only a "circulaire"664 65was enacted in 1986 to prevent 
sham transactions. Black markets had developed and quotas were, espe­
cially in the West of France, transferred without any land666.
In 1987, the French Agricultural Minister finally passed a regulation 
concerning the transfer of milk quotas in France666. This "décret" has 
been interpreted and even modified by a number of "circulaires". The 
most important ones are the "circulaire" of 14 August 1987667 and the 
"circulaire" of 20  January 198866 .̂ There were doubts as to whether the 
instrument of a "circulaire" was used legally and correctly in France be­
cause it modified regulations, although its function in French administra­
tive law is limited to explaining "décrets" and to this purpose, "circu­
laires” are adressed to the administration669.
The French rules on the transfer of reference quantities established a 
very rigid regime670. Notably, leasing is not allowed. The quota has not 
developed into a tradeable asset in France; at least, no official publications 
indicate that a value has been attached to the quota itself671. However, 
black markets in which quotas are not transferred according to the rules 
but are leased out, exist672. A "circulaire" of 14 November 1991 tried to
664 "Circulaire du 7 octobre 1986", see Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 
150, p. 55
665 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 150, p. 55
666 "Décret No. 87-608" of 31. 7. 1987, J. O. of 2. 8. 1987, p. 8727
667 published in : Répertoire du Notariat Defrenois, 30  Novembre 1987, le partie, p. 
1409
668 Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analythique, Quota laitiers 
(régime juridique), p. 786
6 6 9  Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 11, p. 14; Lorvellec, 
L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 416; Peignot, B., (1991) Agriculteurs 
de France, No 57-58, p. 20; Tribunal de Rennes, André, (1990) Revue de droit ru­
ral, No 182, p. 225
670 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 416
671 apparently, however, the value of the land disposing of quotas increased, see 
Bénard, J.-D., (1989) Paysans, No 197, p. 35
6 7 2  s e e  Peignot, B., (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 116, According to Duluc, J.-C.; 
Maréchal, C., (1987) Le Nouvel Agriculteur, 20 February, p. 21, the prices on the 




























































































forbid all irregularities that occurred such as leasing out reference quan­
tities673.
In order to ascertain why the reference quantity has not become a vis­
ible tradeable asset, the transfer rules will be investigated.
II. Conditions for the transfer o f reference quantities
1. Transactions of the holding or parts of it that entail the transfer of 
reference quantities under French law
According to Art. 1 and Art. 3 of "décret No. 87-608", the transactions 
entailing the transfer of reference quantities are sale, donation, lease and 
inheritance of land. All other transactions that have a similar effect, 
whether they include the transfer of a right of property (propriété) or of 
use (jouissance), also entail the transfer of reference quantities674.
Under French law, a lease protected by the "code rural", would have to 
be concluded for seven years. Such a lease grants exclusive possession675. 
Other forms of letting agreements not protected under the "Code rural" 
would be e.g. a sale of grass (vente d'herbe). Such a sale, however, would 
not grant exclusive possession to the transferee and thus would not com­
ply with the French quota rules and Community law676. Still, there are a 
few short-term lettings not protected under the "Code rural" that grant 
exclusive rights of possession677.
The French legislator did not allow any temporary re-allocation of ref­
erence quantities without any land transaction taking place678. The reason 
was fear of any wild restructuring that might arise and thus endanger the 
state-controlled restructuring process.
neighbours at the end of the campaign, FNIL, (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 112; 
Têtu, G„ (1990) La propriété agricole, No 174, p. 7; Gouin, D.-M., (1986) 
Economie rurale, No 175, p. 32
673 (1991) Revue de droit rural, No 198, p. LXXXI
674 examples are: "la constitution d'usufruit", "le partage de la communauté", see 
Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analythique, Quotas laitiers 
(régime juridique), p. 787
675 see Art. L. 411-5 Code rural for both holdings (Baux de fermage; Art. L. 411-1 
Code rural) and parcels (Baux de parcells; Art. L. 411-3)
676 Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 12
677 Art. L. 411-3 Code rural; other exceptions see art. L. 411-2 Code rural; Hudault, 
J., Droit rural, p. 166 et seq
678 de Crisenoy, C., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No 7, p. 158; 




























































































2. Formal requirements for the transfer of reference quantities 
The transfer of milk quotas must be declared to the D.D.A.F., whose 
representative is the "préfet"679. The "préfet" then fixes the new amount 
of reference quantities and decides on which reference quantities are to be 
transferred to the national reserve. This decision has to be notified to 
ONILAIT and to the purchasers. The power of the "préfet" to fix the 
amounts of reference quantities that have to be transferred to the national 
reserve has been challenged in court because the "circulaire" in question 
was not a sufficient legal basis for his competence680. Since 1991, provi­
sions in the "décret No. 91-157" expressly define his power681. The 
function of the "préfet" can be described as that of ensuring the applica­
tion of the transfer rules682 *.
III. Transfer o f reference quantities as legal effect
1. Transfer of reference quantities to the transferee
The whole reference quantities of an undertaking are in accordance 
with the principle of attachment of quotas to land transferred when a 
whole undertaking is transferred to one beneficiary682.
In the case of a partial transfer of a holding, the reference quantities 
are divided up among the producers according to the amount of reference 
quantities that are attached to the transferred surface684. No reference 
quantities are attached to certain surfaces which are defined by Art. 3 of 
the "décret"; these are forest, wasteland, ponds, fallow land and perma­
nent cultures. The French legislator thus enacteed a clear and broad def­
inition for the criteria that determine the areas used for milk production.
679 Art. V (a) of the "circulaire" of 14. 8. 1987, published in: Répertoire du Notariat 
Defrenois, 30  Novembre 1987, le  partie, p. 1409
680 Tribunal de Rennes, André, (1990) Revue de droit rural, No 182, p. 225
681 J. O. of 13. 2. 1991, p. 2199
682 Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 8, Zimmermann, F., 
(1990) Revue de droit rural. No 182, p. 224
688 Art. 1 of the "décret No. 87-608” of 31. 7. 1987, J. O. of 2. 8. 1987, p. 8727




























































































2. Transfer of reference quantities to the national reserve
The French legislator made thorough use of the possibilities of adding 
reference quantities in certain cases to the national reserve in order to 
pursue an active policy of restructuring685.
If the transferee does not want to continue the milk production, the 
reference quantities are added to the national reserve686. This applies 
both to the partial transfer of land and to the transfer of an entire hold­
ing687. In this way, the French legislator tried to avoid the so-called 
"quotas morts"688. If the reference quantity of the beneficiary exceeds the 
amount of 200,000 litres after the transfer of reference quantities, 50 % 
of the exceeding amount is added to the national reserve689. This applies 
both to the transfer of one holding to another holding (called "réunion d'- 
exploitations laitiers") and to the transfer of parts of a holding (called 
"démembrement"). Finally, if parts of a holding (up to 20 ha) are trans­
ferred, all reference quantities are released to the national reserve690. 
This relatively large mimimum surface of 20 ha and the ceiling of 
200,000 litres slow down the transfer of land691.
3. Reference quantities retained by the transferor
According to Art. 7 of the " décret No. 87-608", the out-going pro­
ducer might retain reference quantities if land is transferred to authorities 
or because of public interest. In this case, he must intend to continue with 
milk production. As to the out-going tenant see under G.
IV. The flexibility o f the rules
An examination of the history of milk quotas casts some doubt over the 
rigid transfer rules in spite of a certain success in the restructuring pol­
685 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 415; Rameau, (1987) Revue 
de droit rural. No 184, p. 311
686 Art. 4 of the "décret No. 87-608"
687 de Crisenoy, C., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No 7, p. 156
688 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 411
689 Art. 2 and Art. 4 of the "décret No. 87-608", threshold of 200,000 litres fixed by 
"arrêté" of 14. 9. 1987, J. O. of 16. 9. 1987, p. 11469
690 Art. 3 of the "décret No. 87-608"
691 see Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analythique, Quotas laitiers 




























































































icy692. The restructuring process was quite successful if we consider that, 
from 1984/85 to 1990/91, 4.4 million tonnes (17 % of the national guar­
anteed quantity693) of reference quantities were released by way of out- 
goer schemes694. Consequently, the average cow per farm and the aver­
age yield per cow increased and a number of small producers went out of 
production695. In particular, the number of dairies declined696. Yet in 
1989, the average yield per cow and number of cows per farm was below 
the British average697.
Increasing demand for individual reference quantities698 and the con­
tinuing necessity of restructuring the dairy sector699 led to a fierce debate 
over whether and how to allow any kind of quota market to fulfill these 
demands700. Moreover, the state is unwilling to finance future restructur­
ing programs to the extent that it has before701. The necessity of allowing 
non prior producers to receive additional reference quantities is also rec­
ognized702. Organisations like the FNPL (Fédération Nationale des 
Producteurs de Lait) and the purchasers demand the authorization of 
leasing703. ONILAIT imagines a bourse of reference quantities, where 
both leasing and sale of quotas are controlled704. The Minister of 
Agriculture has pointed out that he refuses to authorize a quota market 
but that more flexibility of the regulation will be discussed705. He fears 
the rise of wild restructuring if a free market is allowed, in particular
692 Grynspan, A., (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 107, see also Rép. min. Agriculture et 
Forêt, J. O. déb. Ass. nat., Q (Questions), 20. 3. 1989, p. 1358; Rép. min. 
Agriculture et Forêt, J. O. déb. Ass. nat., Q, 18. 9. 1989, p. 4158, published also 
in: (1989) Revue de droit rural. No 177, p. 463
693 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 10
694 Landry, S., (1991) Revue laitière française 1991, No 512, p. 14
695 for details, see ONILArr, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 28, 31
696 ONILAIT, Quotas laitiers, un bilan, p. 36
697 see third chapter, A.; Annex
698 see Peignot, B„ (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 115, 117
699 Cordonnier, P., (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 121 points out that, for France, a 
higher output per farm per annum (200, 000 litres/farm, in 1989 only 100, 000 
litres/farm) is necessary to gain optimum productivity factors
700 for a survey of the different opinions (Ministry of Agriculture, professional organi­
zations and experts) see FNIL, (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. I l l  et seq
791 see FNIL, (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. I l l
792 FNIL, (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 111
793 see Ortalo, M., (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. llO ; see FNIL, (1990) Purpan, No 
155, p. 112
794 see Peignot, B„ (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 119




























































































endangering young farmers?06. The system of state-controlled restructur­
ing by out-goer schemes in France would be endangered in a market 
where competition between producers is the instrument of restructur­
ing706 07.
G. Position of the tenant
In France, the proportion of tenanted land was 50.8 % in 1983708. 
Strikingly, this proportion has hardly changed since 1890709. However, 
the proportion of leased land in regions with owner-occupier areas in­
creased, whereas owner-occupation increased in former rented areas, 
mainly because of the reform of the landlord and tenant law, detrimental 
to landowners. The amount of mixed operations is increasing steadily at 
the expense of full tenants units or full owner occupations710. Since 1946, 
France has had a special law on landlord and tenant, the so-called "Statut 
du fermage et métayage". This law is relatively favourable to the tenants 
and has replaced the essentially liberal rules of the ’’Code civile”711. 
Powerful tenants' organizations were able to enforce this reform after the 
war in 1946712.
I. Retention o f reference quantities by the tenant
Generally speaking, the French tenant enjoys high security as to the 
termination of the tenancy713. Basically, the tenancy is supposed to last 
for nine years714. No security, however, is granted for tenancies if the
706 see FNIL, (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. I l l ;  see also Rép. min. Agriculture et Forêt, 
J. O. déb. Ass. nat., Q, 20. 8. 1990, p. 3886
707 Cordonnier, P., (1990) Purpan, No 155, p. 121; Hairy, D.; Prost, M., Milk 
Quotas in France, in: Burrel, A. (ed.), Milk Quotas in the European Community, p. 
17
708 Ministère de l'Agriculture, La structure des exploitations agricoles en 1987, Paris 
1988, p. 16
709 Bergmann, D„ (1985) 19 Agricultural Administration, p. 209
710 Bergmann, D., ibid, p. 209
711 Bergmann, D., ibid, p. 209
712 Bergmann, D., ibid, p. 209
713 Bergmann, D., ibid, p. 214




























































































surface is less than a certain number of ha715. To circumvent the rules, 
sales of grass are often undertaken716.
Under French law, the tenancy may be terminated by the dissolution 
(résiliation) of the contract and by refusal to renew the contract through 
delivery of a notice to quit.
The contract can be dissolved in a few limited cases e.g. because of 
faulty behaviour of the tenant or if the land may be used for urbaniza­
tion717. Secondly, after nine years, the landlord may refuse, by way of a 
"congé", a renewal of the tenancy in some special situations such as a be­
haviour on the part of the tenant which contravenes the contract718. In 
particular, the renewal of the tenancy may be refused if the landlord him­
self or his relatives want to exploit the land719 (so-called "droit de 
reprise"). Renewal for those parts of the tenanted land on which the 
landlord intends to construct a farmhouse may also be refused720. If the 
landlord does not refuse the renewal, the tenancy is automatically ex­
tended to another nine years721. Because for each "département", the 
"préfet" fixes the limits between which rents must remain, the tenant may 
even continue his lease under similar conditions and is not subject to un­
justified rent increases722. Since 1975, when the rules were reformed723, 
the size limits have been raised only very slowly724.
To sum up, in only a few cases do tenants have no right to renew their 
tenancy under similar conditions. In most of these cases (urbanization and 
construction of farmhouse) the French legislator envisages that out-going 
tenants may keep reference quantities if they intend to continue milk pro­
duction. (Art. 5 and 6 of the "décret No. 87-608") However, if the tenant 
has to restitute the holding due to a notice to quit by the landlord because
715 Art. L. 411-3 Code rural; other exceptions see Art. L. 411-2 Code rural; Hudault, 
J., Droit rural, p. 166 et seq
716 Bergmann, D., (1985) 19 Agricultural Administration, p. 214; Art. L. 411-1 Code 
rural tries to prevent the misuse of these forms, see Hudault, J., Droit rural, p. 141
717 A rt L. 411-30 to Art. L. 411-32 Code rural
718 Art. L. 411-53 Code rural
719 Art. L. 411-58 Code rural
726 Art. L. 411-57 Code rural
721 Art. L. 411-51 Code rural
722 Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 105, Art. R. 411-1 Code rural
723 before 1975, rents were fixed on the 1939 basis, see Lorvellec, L., Droit rural, p. 
105




























































































the latter wants to exploit the holding723 (droit de reprise), the landlord 
has to agree in a written statement that the tenant preserves quotas726. No 
retention is foreseen if the tenancy is dissolved due to a fault of the tenant 
or because he is of retiring age727. However, in these cases the tenant is 
vouchsafed no protection.
II. Compensation rights as to reference quantity 
1. Out-goer schemes
The participation of tenants in out-goer schemes in France caused many 
problems and a set of judgements have been delivered to deal with 
this72**.
According to French law, the landlord's consent is not required if the 
tenant applies for compensation under an out-goer scheme729. The reason 
is that, according to the "Code civil", the tenant is entitled to free man­
agement of the holding730. The authorities have to inform the landlord if 
the tenant wants to take part in out-goer schemes73!. in addition, since 
1987, the Landowners' Association (FNPA) has been able to enforce non­
attribution of compensation to the tenant if the latter received a notice to 
quit ("congé"), if the tenancy is dissolved ("résilié") or if the tenant does 
not want to renew the tenancy732.
Problems have arisen, as to whether the landlord can demand damages 
for the lost quota733. The "Tribunal paritaire d'Avesnes-sur-Helpe" held 
that the tenant was liable for the payment of damages because his applica-
725 droit de reprise, Art. L. 411 -58 Code rural
726 see Art. 6 of the "décret No. 87-806"
727 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural. No 157, p. 412
728 Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 3
729 Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analythique, Quotas laitiers 
(régime juridique), p. 790; see as examples out-goer schemes of 1985 and 1990: 
"décret No. 85-709" of 12. 7. 1985, J. O. of 13. 7. 1985, p. 7926, "décret No. 
90-884" of 2. 10. 1990, J. O. of 3. 10. 1990, p. 11992
730 Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 4; see Art. L. 411-29 
Code rural
731 "Circulaire" of 5 Mai 1987 of the Agricultural Ministry, published in (1987) Revue 
de droit rural. No 158, p. XXIX, see also Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, 
vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 4
732 "cirulaire" of 5 Mai 1987 of the Agricultural Ministry, Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris- 
Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C-3, p. 4; Legigan, R., (1991) La propriété agricole. 
No 192, p. 9




























































































tion for compensation under the out-goer scheme constituted a breach of 
the tenancy agreement if this stated that the tenant was obliged to run a 
dairy farm734. On appeal, the "Cour d'appel de Douai" concluded that by 
applying for compensation under the out-goer schemes, the tenant de­
prives the landlord of a part of his holding's value since reference quan­
tities are attached to land. If the landlord is able to re-rent the holding 
deprived of the reference quantities without any decrease in the rent, 
however, there is no loss735. It is likely that the landlord's property 
rights to the quota might be infringed by not requiring his consent to the 
participation in out-goer schemes736. However, the landlord is granted a 
compensation if the rent decreases because of the loss of quotas. This is 
why a disproportionate infringement of the right to property is not given 
in this case.
2. Quota as an improvement
In 1984, the French legislator introduced new provisions in the "Code 
rural" concerning the compensation of tenants. If the landlord gives a no­
tice to quit (congé) because he or his successors intend to exploit the 
holding737, the tenant may, according to Art. L. 411-71 "Code rural", 
receive compensation for any improvements of technical and economic 
conditions of the holding. The milk quota is at least considered a licence 
to commercialise milk and thus it is an economic condition of the ex­
ploitation of the holding738.
734 Tribunal paritaire d'Avesnes-sur-Helpe, Charlet (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 
150, p. 56
735 Cour d'appel de Douai, Heuclin (1988) Revue de droit rural, No 161, p. 123; see 
also Cour d'appel de Dijon, 21 October 1987, quoted by Lorvellec, L., (1988) 
Revue de droit rural, No 161, p. 125; The "Cour d'appel de Rennes" held on 15 
Mai 1991 that a tenant has to pay damages to the landlord because of the loss the 
holding suffered after the disappearance of the reference quantities, Dictionnaire 
Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Bulletin 181 (3 Janvier 1992), p. 5667
736 The FNPA (Fédération Nationale de la Propriété Agricole) has asked the 
Commission for investigations; see Legigan, R., (1991) La propriété agricole, No 
192, p. 9
737 Art. L. 411-58 Code rural




























































































The French lawyers hold different views on the legal nature of the ref­
erence quantity under French law739. Though all recognize that the ref­
erence quantities are licences to market a quantity of milk (autorisation 
administrative à commercialiser) without paying a levy740, they do not 
agree on whether the reference quantity is an interest in land (accessoire). 
According to scholars quotas are not interests in land because they would 
then belong to the owner of the land. Such a classification, however, 
would contradict both the tenant’s right to apply for compensation under 
the out-goer schemes without the landlord's consent and the fact that the 
tenant may retain reference quantities. Reference quantities are consid­
ered a right of the producer (droit incorporel accessoire de l’ex­
ploitant741 742)- Other scholars think that the owner of the land is also the 
owner of the reference quantities and the producer is only entitled to 
their use747.
Finally, some scholars assume that reference quantities are of a nature 
sui generis that cannot be classified by the existing categories of French 
law743. Reference quantities, according to this opinion, belong to no­
body744 *but are mere licences.
III. Legal nature o f the reference quantity
739 Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, voi. 4, Fase. C-3, p. 15
740 Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, voi. 4, Fase. C-3, p. 15; de Crisenoy, C., 
(1988) Cahiers d'éonomie et sociologie rurales, No 7, p.156; de Crisenoy, C., Les 
quotas laitiers, p. 68; Lorvellec, L„ (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 412; 
Bernard, A., (1987) Revue de droit rural. No 150, p. 51
741 Lorvellec, L„ Droit rural, p. 488; Lorvellec, L., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 
136, p. 529, however, after the French legislator incorporated the European trans­
fer rules in a "décret" in 1987, Lorvellec modified his view; see (1988) Revue de 
droit rural, No 161, p. 125 especially as far as the landlord's rights over the quota 
are concerned, Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410
742 Bernhard, A., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 150, p. 54
743 de Crisenoy, C., Les quotas laitiers, p. 67
744 de Crisenoy, C., Les quotas laitiers, p. 68; Têtu, G., (1988) La propriété agricole,




























































































Implementation of the milk quota regulations in German law
A. Agricultural policy and quota policy
I. Agricultural policy
German agricultural policy has traditionally since the end of the 19th 
century been protectionist and interventionist745. Since the 1950s, the 
main distinct features of agricultural policy have been to ensure the farm­
ers' incomes and to preserve the family farm746. Price support is histori­
cally an instrument of securing farmer’s incomes747. In 1983/84, German 
farm incomes belonged to the lowest in the EEC with Greece and Italy, 
considering the nominal values of the income748. The German structural 
policy is criticized for having prevented any improvement of the un­
favourable farm structure749. Though preserving seems to be an impor­
tant feature in German agricultural policy, a policy on modernization of 
farms also has been pursued. Still, structural adjustment is related to a 
strong social policy750.
745 Hendriks, G., Germany and European Integration, p. 27 et seq
746 Trede, K.-J., Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Priebe, H.; Scheper, W.; von Urff, 
W. (eds.), Agrarpolitik in der EG, p. 46; Bundesregierung, Agrarbericht 1986, p. 
65
747 Hendriks, G., ibid, p. 30
748 Bundesministerium fiir Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch iiber Emahrung, Landwdirtschaft und Forsten 1987, p. 374
749 Blumental, M., (1984) 35 N.I.L.Q., p. 29; see also third chapter, A.
750 Trede, K.-J., Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Priebe, H.; Scheper, W.; von Urff, 





























































































The Northern German dairy structure is more efficient than the 
Southern German one751. In 1985, the average yield per cow in the two 
Northern "Lander" varied from 4,852 kg per annum (Schleswig-Holstein) 
to 5,363 kg per annum (Niedersachsen). In Bavaria, however, the average 
yield per cow was only 4,269 kg and in "Baden-Wurtemberg” 4,102 
kg752. In 1985, the average number of cows per farm was 34.3 in 
"Schleswig-Holstein" and 13.1 in Bavaria753.
Germany was the only country that initially agreed with the quota sys­
tem. Both the agricultural Minister and the German Farmers' Union 
(DBV= Deutscher Bauemverband) supported the milk quota system, be­
cause they were convinced that only quotas could save German dairy 
farmers' incomes754. The alternative of cutting dairy prices was opposed 
by the German government755. The German position was quite close to 
that of the Commission756.
The German government and the DBV, however, did not agree with 
two details of the Commission proposals:757 Both favoured quotas being 
allocated to producers instead of dairies. Secondly, both urged that more 
regard should be paid to producers who have invested money into dairy 
facilities. The principle of legitimate expectation would demand such re­
gard. This demand was supported by some "Lander" like Bavaria, where 
a lot of investments had been made758. To consider producers in special 
situations was an important issue of the German quota policy759.
751 Doll, H., Milchquotenregelung, p. 118
752 Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtstelle fiir Erzeugnisse der Land-, Forst- und 
Emahrungswirtschaft GmbH (ed.), ZMP Bilanz '88 Milch, p. 20
753 Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtstelle fiir Erzeugnisse der Land-, Forst- und 
Emahrungswirtschaft GmbH (ed.), ibid, p. 20
754 Hendriks, G., Germany and European Integration, p. 71, Born, H. (1983) top 
agrar, No 7, p. 3, Agra-Europe 43/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 22; Agra-Europe 
42/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 17, The DBV in fact had proposed a quota system 
already in 1979, alongside with premiums for the non-marketing of milk. Bom, H. 
(1983) top agrar. No 7, p. 3
755 Agra-Europe 42/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 17; Agra-Europe 44/83, Europa- 
Nachrichten, p. 15
756 Hendriks, G., Germany and European Integration, p. 71
757 Agra-Europe 44/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 15; Agra-Europe 43/83, Europa- 
Nachrichten, p. 22 et seq
758 Agra-Europe 44/83, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 17
759 see Kiechle's demands to complete the Community proposals for producers in 




























































































Reference quantities for producers in special situations were constantly 
missing. The non-flexibility of the German quota system because of an 
overallocation of reference quantities, was continuously critized760.
B. Legal acts incorporating the EEC milk quota Regulations 
into German law761
On the 25th of May 1984, the Agricultural Minister enacted a regula­
tion, the so-called "Milch-Garantiemengen-Verordnung” (MGVO now 
MGV)762, in order to incorporate the EEC milk quota Regulations763. 
The MGV was enacted on the basis of the "law for the application of the 
common organizations of the market (MOG)764 . The "MOG" authorizes 
Ministers to enact national measures in order to implement Community 
provisions765. The milk quota regulation is based on the "MOG" because 
according to Art. 80 German Basic Law the principle of the reservation 
of law766 requires a sufficient legal basis in the form of a law for the en­
actment of subordinate legislation767. The MGVO has been amended 22 
times (up to January 1992768).
7 6 0  Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edi­
tion, p. 85; Agra-Europe 5/86, Sonderbeilage, p. 3; Wehland, W„ (1989) top 
agrar, No 3, p. 160; Agricultural Minister of "Rheinland-Pfalz", Agra-Europe 
11/89, Kurzmeldungen. p. 21; Gallus, G., Secretary of State of the Federal 
Ministry of Agriculture; Agra-Europe 11/89, Kurzmeldungen, p. 22
761 The specific regulations concerning the milk quota system in the new "Lander'' and 
direct sales are not explored
762 published in BGB1.1 1984, p. 720
763 six sources of law exist, enlisted according to their hierarchy: the constitution, 
laws, regulations, statutes, customary law, administrative directives and case law; 
Ossenbiihl, F„ in: Erichsen, H.-U.; Martens, W. (ed.), Allgemeines Verwaltungs- 
recht, p. 75 et seq
764 "Gesetz zur Durchfiihrung der Gemeinsamen Marktorganisationen, MOG"-in the 
version of 27. 8. 1986, BGB1.1 1986, p. 1397; see Preamble of the MGV of 25. 
5. 1984, BGB1.1, p. 720
7 6 5  Friedrich, K., (1988) Zeitschrift fur Zolle, p. 194
766 enshrined in Art. 2 0  Basic Law
767 Ehle, D., Abgaben und Erstattungen, in: Kruse, H. W. (ed.), Zolle, p. 224; BFH, 
(1987) Recht der intemationalen Wirtschaft, p. 396
768 latest amendment considered MGV of 20. 12. 1991, BGB1.11991, p. 2384; if not 




























































































C. Institutions charged with the application of the milk quota 
Regulations
The main institutions which are charged with the application of the su­
per-levy system are the following: the federal financial administration, 
the agricultural administrative bodies of the "Lander", and the dairies. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany, administration is carried out either di­
rectly by the federal Government or the "Lander" or indirectly on both 
levels by public institutions, foundations and corporations under public 
law such as professional corporations769.
I. Federal financial administration
The federal financial administration is basically competent for the ap­
plication of the EEC Regulations establishing the super-levy system770. 
The reason is that the federal financial administration is, according to 
Art. 108 (1) Basic Law and § 12 (1) MOG, charged with the administra­
tion of levies for the purpose of regulating agricultural markets771. Both 
federal and "Lander" laws and regulations are regularly carried out by 
the administrative agencies of the "Lander" with different degrees of 
control as far as federal laws are concerned772. Only a few subject mat­
ters enumerated in the constitution such as consumer taxes and special 
levies are left to the federal administration.
II. Agricultural administration in the "Lander"
The agricultural administration of the "Lander" is part of the general 
"Lander" administration. The agricultural administration regularly com­
prises three stages773. The inferior stage is competent for the execution 
of the tasks under the MGV. These are in some "Lander" the local gov­
769 see Rudolf, W., in: Erichsen, H.-U.; Martens, E., Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, 
p. 635 et seq
™  § 2 MGV
771 see Friedrich, K., (1988) Zeitschrift fiir Zolle, p. 201
772 Art. 83, 84, 85 Basic Law
773 Müller-Glôge, R., Landwirtschaftsverwaltung, in: Handwôrterbuch des Agrar- 




























































































ernments and in others the agricultural administrative chambers 
("Landwirtschaftskammern"). The latter are administrative agencies for 
agricultural affairs with a compulsory membership and are thus corpora­
tions under public law774. They are attributed administrative tasks such as 
information and promotion of farmers775.
///. Dairies
The dairies, as private enterprises, are also charged with a number of 
administrative tasks. They are commissioners of the financial administra­
tion and thus an assisting organ of the administration776. Whether the acts 
of the dairies under the MGV can be qualified as public law or private 
law, is not yet clear although this problem is being discussed in 
Germany777. The reason for the discussion is that such an instrument as a 
levy on exceeding milk quantities is alien to the German legal order778.
D. Observance of national guaranteed quantity when allocating 
reference quantities
Germany did not manage to observe its national guaranteed quantity 
when allocating reference quantities779. The procedure for the allocation 
of reference quantities will subsequently be explained.
I. Allocation o f reference quantities concerning deliveries to dairies
Germany has implemented Formula A and according to § 4 MGV, ref­
erence quantities are allocated to the producers by the purchasers, the 
latter being dairies. The producers' reference quantities are calculated ac­
cording to their deliveries to dairies in 1983 minus a certain percentage.
774 Bendel, B., Landwirtschaftskammern, in: Handwôrterbuch des Agrarrecht, voi. 2, 
column 360
775 Bendel, B„ Landwirtschaftskammern, in: Handwôrterbuch des Agrarrecht, vol. 2, 
column 362
776 BFH, (1985) Zeitschrift für Zolle, p. 338; Nies, V., (1988) Agrarrecht, p. 2
777 see Schrômbges, U., (1992) Zeitschrift für Zólle, p. 101 et seq
778 Schrômbges, U., ibid, p. 107




























































































The German legislator considered almost all categories of producers in 
special situations, except for small producers and producers realizing a 
milk development plan after 1984. Young farmers and farmers undertak­
ing farming as their main occupation were considered little780. Farmers 
who have invested in dairy facilities have been carefully considered (§ 6 
MGV). According to surveys, this group of producers was allocated 79 % 
of the reference quantities for producers in special situations781.
II. Sources from which reference quantities were allocated to producers 
in special situations
1. Overalloation of reference quantities 
In the beginning, German authorities allocated special reference quan­
tities to both producers in special situations who have invested in dairy 
facilities (§ 6 MGV) and producers whose milk production has been af­
fected by an exceptional event in excess of the national guaranteed quan­
tity (so-called vendor's tray)782 783. In 1984/85, for example, the quantities 
allocated in excess of the national guaranteed quantity were 1,184,000 
tonnes (nearly 5 % of the national quota)782. In 1985/86, the over-alloca­
tion was still 1,1 million tonnes more than the national quota (4.6 %)784. 
The government was charged with the levy for these exceeding quantities 
because the producers could only be held liable for their individual ex­
cess. In 1985/86, producers paid 131 million DM and the government was 
charged with 19 million DM, whereas in 1986/87, the government was 
charged with 167 million DM and producers only paid 151 million
780 Lukanow, J.; Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hâhnel, W.; Die 
Milchgarantieraengen-Regelung, 2nd edition, p. 24; § 6 (8) MGV, as amended by 
Regulation of 27. 11. 1984, BGB1. I 1984, p. 1434; § 6 (8) MGV, as amended by 
Regulation of 16. 10. 1985, BGB1. I 1985, p. 2008
781 situation in 1989, Doll, H., Milchquotenregelung, p. 39
782 Gomoll, E„ (1985) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 33; Deutscher Raiffeisenverband 
(ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 19
783 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 21; Court of 
Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/10
784 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/10, this overalloca­
tion also occurred in the Netherlands and Belgium, however to a lower extent 




























































































DM785. Because of the overallocation, a national reserve could not be 
established786.
2. Reasons for the overallocation
Once the producers who have invested in dairy facilities fulfill the cri­
teria entirely set out in § 6 MGV, they are entitled to receive a specific 
reference quantity. The authorities delivered an adminstrative act to set 
this amount. These act were not delivered on the condition as to the 
amounts available. The German legislator in drafting § 6 MGV had to 
undertake the considerable risk of defining criteria in order to separate 
investments in two parts: those for whom the constitution demands pro­
tection and others which need not be protected787.
It is alleged that the drafters of § 6 MGV were too generous788. In 
other words, the constitution would not have required that all producers 
be considered. For example, taking into account all investments that were 
promoted by subsidies without introducing a limit on the amount of 
money invested789, is not required by Art. 14 Basic Law, where the right 
to property is enshrined. Another reason for the excess is, that the 
German government had, in its initial calculation, underestimated the de­
mand for reference quantities by producers in special situations790 despite 
knowing that in Germany many investments in dairy facilities were un­
dertaken in the late 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s791.
The fact that there is no deadline for the application of special refer­
ence quantities might also have contributed to the excess. In 1992, admin­
istrative agencies were still responsible for the calculation of special ref­
785 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 21
786 xhe levy for the quantities delivered that did not exceed the national quota, how­
ever, could be used for financing national out-goer schemes; see Art. 5 (c) of 
Regulation 804/68 as amended by Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 
90/10. In the final account of the EAGGF of 1989, for example, the Commission 
renounced the German levy for the overallocation because Germany had established 
an out-goer scheme in order to buy out the overallocated reference quantities, see 
Agra-Europe 51/92, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 13
787 Bundesverwaltungsgericht, (1992) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 43; 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, (1991) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 137
788 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.). Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 19
789 see § 6 MGV
790 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.). Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 19; Heeren-Jank, 
H., (1988) Agrarrecht, p. 341
791 Lukanow, J.; Nies, V. in: Hahnel, W.; Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantie- 




























































































erence quantities. Moreover, German farmers have been especially af­
fected by the dismantling of MCAs; the authorities, namely the agricul­
tural administration, generously took their situation into account and did 
not thoroughly comply with the criteria fixed for the allocation of special 
reference quantities792. In addition, it is alleged that dairies supported 
generous allocations in order to ensure that their production capacities 
were exhausted793.
One judgement that held a provision of § 6 MGV as infringing Art. 14 
Basic Law (where the fundamental right to property is enshrined) even 
rendered a re-allocation of 50,000 tonnes of quotas necessary794 and was 
consequently detrimental to the abatement of the German overallocation. 
The void provision had restricted the allocation of specific reference 
quantities according to § 6 MGV to the average amount of milk delivered 
by 80 cows in 1983 in the "Land" in question795. One of the reasons for 
this limit was that the German rules implementing Directive 72/159 on 
the modernization of farms only envisaged the promotion of investments 
in dairy facilities of up to 80 cows796.
3. Efforts undertaken in order to reduce the excess
The Federal government hoped to compensate the excess by underde­
liveries of farmers797. In fact, the sum of underdeliveries exceeded the 
sum of overdeliveries in all six campaigns until 1989/90798. However, 
only part of the overallocated sum could be compensated by this 
method799. In addition, it was thought that the excess would be compen­
sated for with national out-goer schemes. But though between April 1984 
and September 1986 5.4 % of the levy-exempt quantity could be bought
792 Gomoll, E., (1985) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 33; Rohr, H.-J., (1984) 
Agrarrecht, p. 296; see Doll, H., Milchquotenregelung, p. 39; Heeren-Jank, H., 
(1988) Agrarrecht, p. 341
793 Rohr, H.-J., (1984) Agrarrecht, p. 296
794 BVerwG, (1989) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 71; Deutscher Raiffeisenverband 
(ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 20
795 § 6 (6) MGV; reformed rules: regulation of 19. 7. 1989, BGB1.1 1989, p. 1509
796 Rahmenplan der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe "Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur" fur den 
Zeitraum von 1979 bis 1982, Bundestag Drucksache 8/2754, p. 33
797 Rohr, H.-J., (1984) Agrarrecht, p. 296
798 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 21
799 in fact, this was possible during the 1984/85 and 1987/88 campaigns, see 




























































































out in Germany (France: 7.6 %, UK: 2.3 %800), (mainly due to 
favourable conditions of the scheme801), most out-goer schemes were a 
failure802. One of the explanations is that producers lack alternatives to 
dairying and the dairy sector is relatively profitable in relation to other 
subsectors803 804. Only in 1990 did Germany manage to reduce the excess of 
the national guaranteed quantity8181. This reduction was carried out firstly 
by using the "Nallet quota"805 in order to decrease the excess806 and sec­
ondly by introducing a special out-goer scheme offering a relatively high 
premium to out-going producers807.
The Commission has opened infringement procedures under Art. 169 
of the EEC Treaty against Germany. In March 1987, however, the 
Commission decided not to pursue these actions, following undertakings 
given by the German authorities with respect to the 1987/88 and 1988/89 
quota years808, namely the promise to compensate for the excess with un­
derdeliveries. However, Germany apparently could not thoroughly fulfill 
these undertakings until 1990.
Germany has infringed Art. 5 (c) of Regulation 804/68 and Art. 5 of 
Regulation 857/84 which envisage that the Member States may allocate 
reference quantities only up to their national guaranteed quantity.
4. Consequences of the overallocation
Because of the overallocation there was a lack of reference quantities 
for producers who had not invested in dairy facilities, but who also found 
themselves in a special situation for different reasons. That is why out- 
goer schemes of the "Lander" were constituted809. Two other categories 
of producers in special situations, young farmers and producers undertak­
ing farming as their main occupation, were only considered at the end of 
1984 and in 1985, by dividing up a sum of 185,000 and 60,000 tonnes
800 Oskam, A. J. et al. The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 39
801 Oskam, A. J. et al. The superlevy - Is there an alternative?, p. 39
802 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 20 et seq
803 Dillen, M.; Tollens, E., Milk quotas, vol. 1, p. 25
804 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1991, p. 85
805 see second chapter, C. I.
806 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1990, p. 88
807 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1991, p. 85
808 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87,0 . J. 1987, C 266/11
809 § 6 (8) MGV, as amended by Regulation of 16. 10. 1985, BGB1.1 1985, p. 2008; 




























































































between the "Lander"810. The "Lander" drafted internal guidelines for 
the allocation of the reference quantities and thus could ensure that only 
available reference quantities were allocated811.
A large amount of trials came before both the financial and adminis­
trative courts812. Producers challenged the criteria laid out in § 6 MGV 
as being unconstitutional813. Undoubtedly this was also an attempt on the 
part of the producers to increase their basic reference quantities. Most of 
the appeals, however, were rejected814.
Finally, the overallocation, in many respects, prevented the introduc­
tion of more flexible provisions in the quota system815; the temporary re­
allocation of reference quantities (leasing) and regional and national 
equalization were not introduced until 1990, the rule according to which 
a large number of reference quantities had to be released to the national 
reserve after a transfer of reference quantities was only abolished in 
1991. Because the underdeliveries were needed to compensate for the 
overallocation to a certain extent, national and regional equalization and 
leasing were prohibited816. By not allowing the temporary re-allocation, 
the German legislator wanted also to prevent mitigation of the success of 
the out-goer schemes which were credited with reduction of the national 
excess.
E. Implementation of Formula A
The German legislator opted for the Formula A system. In Germany, 
there are both private dairies and cooperatives of varying sizes and there
810 § 6 (8) MGV as amended by Regulation of 27. 11. 1984, BGB1. I 1984, p. 1434 
and by Regulation of 16. 10. 1985, BGB1.1 1985, p. 2008
811 e.g. by decree in Lower-Saxony of 24. 1. 1985, Niedersachsisches Ministerialblatt 
1985, p. 89
812 Lukanow, J.; Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hâhnel, W., Die 
Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 2nd edition, p. 9; VoB, R., Die Milchquoten als 
Gestaltungsmittel, in: Schwarze, J. (ed.), Der Gemeinsame Markt, p. 64
813 for example: OVG Lüneburg, (1988) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 13; BVerwG, 
(1990) Agrarrecht, p. 57
814 BVerwGE 79, 180 (185); BVerwGE 79, 192 (197), OVG Lüneburg, (1988) Recht 
der Landwirtschaft, p. 13
815 Bundesminister für Ernàhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, (1991) 
Agrarpolitische Mitteilungen, No 7, p. 3




























































































is a difference in size between the holdings in Northern and Southern 
Germany817. Because of this diverse structure, equal treatment of all 
producers had to be ensured and this was the reason for the choice of the 
Formula A818. Moreover, the intention was also not to burden the dairies 
with the administration of the super-levy system819. During the negotia­
tions, the dairies had opted against Formula B820.
/. Diversity o f milk production structure; equalization
One of the disadvantages in the choice of Formula A was the lack of 
the possibility of equalization within one dairy. German producers have 
paid the full levy rate (initially 75 % of the target price) since the begin­
ning821. But although, since 1984/85, regional and national equalization 
would also have been possible under Formula A, both the German DBV 
(German producers' association) and government agreed not to introduce 
this possibility because underdeliveries were needed to compensate for the 
national overallocation822. Since the abatement of the excess, however, 
equalization has been carried out within the area of one dairy823.
The equal treatment of the producers in Germany could be ensured. 
According to surveys, underdeliveries to dairies vary from 2 % to 10 % 
in Germany824 and consequently, the payment of different levy rates 
would have been likely.
II. Administrative viability
The dairies administer the super-levy system. They calculate the refer­
ence quantities including their cut and suspension and those for producers
817 see fourth chapter, A.
818 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1985, p. 63
819 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.), Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 11; Nies, V. in: 
Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edition, p. 85
820 Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., ibid, p. 85
821 see Court of Auditors, Special Report No 2/87, O. J. 1987, C 266/19 for 1985/86
822 Agra-Europe 11/85, Kurzmeldungen, p. 2; Agra-Europe 11/85, Landerberichte, p. 
20
823 Regualation of 17.12.1990, BGB1.1 1990, p. 2911




























































































in special situations825. The amount of the levy of each producer is calcu­
lated and collected by the dairies and paid to the "Bundeskasse 
Bremen"826. The agencies of the financial administration are, in compari­
son, simply notified of the amount of reference quantities and levies by 
the dairies. Legally, however, because the dairies are assisting organs, 
this notification means that both the fixation of the reference quantities 
and the levy are regarded as having been determined by the federal 
administration827.
The calculation of special reference quantities by the dairies is only 
carried out if the producer supplies documents from the agricultural ad­
ministrative agency certifying that the conditions required for a special 
situation exist828. The agricultural administrative agencies were delegated 
these competences because they supposedly had the expertise to judge data 
concerning farms829. In practice, because of the imprecise wording of the 
MGV, it was not clear which facts had to be certified by them830. A 
number of judgements were necessary to clarify this problem831. In ad­
dition, the competence of the agricultural administration to take part in 
procedures concerning the imposition of levies, was challenged832. The 
challenges were rejected by the courts833.
Because several authorities were competent for the administration of 
the super-levy system, many producers did not know which authority was 
compentent for their appeal. They appealed to both the financial and agri­
cultural administrative authorities834. Consequently, the administrative 
bodies were overloaded with appeals. This was also true for the courts of 
both the financial and general administrative jurisdiction which were re­
ferred to when the appeal was dismissed. Finally, the courts ruled on
825 § 10 ( 1) MGV
826 § 16 MGV
827 Dusing, M., Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd edition, p. 75
828 §§ 9 (2) (1) and 10 (1) MGV
829 Dusing, M., Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd edition, p. 15; BFH, (1986) Zeitschrift 
fur Zolle, p. 150
830 Dusing, M„ Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd edition, p. 11
831 see for example BFH, (1986) Zeitschrift fur Zolle, p. 149 and BFH, (1988) 
Zeitschrift fur Zolle, p. 89
832 Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edi­
tion, p. 27
833 BVerwGE 79, 180 (172 et seq), BFH, (1988) Zeitschrift fur Zolle, p. 88
834 Vofl, R., Die Milchquoten als Gestaltungsmittel, in: Schwarze, J. (ed.), Der 




























































































which agency is competent for which acts under the MGV and to which 
jurisdiction (financial or administrative) the appeals are subject835.
As shown, dairies were largely responsible for the administration of 
the super-levy system836. On the request of one dairy, the Federal 
Financial Court held that the delegation of administrative tasks to the 
dairies was lawful and compared it with employers who under German 
law have to subtract tax from the wages837. However, the state has to re­
spect the principle of proportionality and, taking into account the perma­
nent changes of the EEC Regulations, in particular the cuts and with­
drawals of reference quantities, the dairies are disproportionately 
responsible.
F. Transfer of reference quantities
I. No visible quota markets
Since the incorporation of the milk quota Regulation into German law, 
the provisions on the transfer of milk quotas have been altered signifi­
cantly. On the one hand, the rules on the transfer of reference quantities 
have been liberalized because the excess of the national guaranteed quan­
tity abated838 839and, on the other hand, the relationship between landlord 
and tenant has made an impact on rules governing the transfer of refer­
ence quantities.
The quotas are only transferable assets in that they may be leased out as 
of 1990/91839. in 1990/91, 1.3 % of the national guaranteed quantity was 
leased out840. According to surveys, 8.8 %  of the deliveries to dairies in 
1983 of Germany were transferred by sale, inheritance or lease of the
835 BFH, (1985) Agrarrecht, p. 154, BFH, (1986) Zeitschrift für Zolle, p. 217; Elsen, 
H., (1987) Agrarrecht, p. 105
836 Deutscher Raiffeisenverband (ed.). Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 13
837 BFH, (1986) Zeitschrift für Zolle, p. 249
838 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1991, p. 85
839 Regulation of 3. 7. 1990, BGB1. I 1990, p. 1334; for prices paid see Deutscher 
Raiffeisenverband (ed.). Die Milchquotenregelung, p. 24





























































































land up to 1988841. Prices and rents for land with quota increased842 *but 
no visible market of quotas emerged in Germany. However, circumven­
tions of the transfer mles occurred, such as leasing out of quotas before it 
was allowed in 1990/91843 or concluding fictitious leasing and sale 
agreements844. The lack of the possibility of leasing until 1990 or other 
flexible transfer schemes hindered structural adjustment as the the aver­
age size of German dairy farms and their reference quantities could not 
be significantly increased845. In addition, the quantities released from the 
out-goer schemes were mostly used to abate the national excess instead of 
increasing the producers' reference quantities. This deficit has been con­
stantly deplored84 .̂ Under which legal scheme the emergence of a visible 
quota market could be avoided will be explained subsequently.
II. Conditions for the transfer o f reference quantities
1. Transactions entailing the transfer of reference quantities 
The sale of an entire holding or parts thereof, its lease and the inheri­
tance, are judicial acts which entail the transfer of reference quantities847. 
According to § 7 (5) MGV, the rules on the transfer of reference quanti­
ties apply also to transactions that have the same effect848. Examples are 
the return of leased parts of a holding849 or of an entire leased holding.
Under German law, leases confer exclusive rights of possession (§ 581 
BGB). Thus only a transaction which would confer an exclusive right of 
possession by a lease would entail the transfer of reference quantities. 
Short-term agreements possible under the German agricultural tenancies 
law would have to be considered as a sale of grass if they granted no ex­
clusive right of possession. The sale of grass, however, would not have
841 Doll, H„ Milchquotenregelung, p. 47
842 Lukanow, J., Rechtsprechung zur Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 1st edition, p. 
28
842 Riemann, A.; Streyl, H„ (1986) top agrar No 12, p. 29
844 Lukanow, J., Rechtsprechung zur Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 1st edition, p. 
25
845 Wehland, W., (1988) top agrar, No 1, p. 28; see third chapter, A.; Annex
846 Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edi- 
ton, p. 85
847 § 7 MGV
848 as amended by Regulation of 27. 9. 1984, BGB1.1 1984, p. 1255




























































































comparable legal effects to those brought about by a sale, lease or inheri­
tance of a holding or parts thereof, because the right of possession of the 
holding or parts thereof would not have been granted.
Thus, transactions require changes in the right of property or posses­
sion. Since 1990/91, exceptions have been the temporary re-allocations of 
reference quantities850.
2. Formal requirements of the transfer of reference quantities
According to § 9 (2) (3) MGV, the producer has to prove to the pur­
chaser which reference quantities have been transferred to him. This is 
done through certification by the agricultural agencies of the "Lander".
III. Transfer o f reference quantities as a legal effect
The conditions for the transfer having been fulfilled, reference quan- 
titites are transferred without further acts to either the transferee, to the 
national reserve or are retained by the transferor.
1. Transfer to the transferee
As far as the transfer of an entire holding is concerned, in the case of a 
transfer by sale, inheritance of lease of an entire undertaking or the 
restitution of an entire leased farm, the whole amount of the reference 
quantity is basically transferred to the purchaser, heir or lessor or lessee 
of the undertaking85!.
As regards the transfer of parts of a holding, the rule is, that in the 
case of the transfer of parts of a holding by sale, inheritance or lease, 
milk quotas are transferred proportionately as far as areas used for milk 
production are concerned. The term "areas used for milk production" has 
not been defined by the German legislator. The courts agree that they are 
those parcels that provide forage for the cattle852. But apart from this 
general definition, the term was in many respects interpreted differently
850 Regulation of 3. 7. 1990, BGB1.1, p. 1334
851 see also Düsing, M„ Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd edition, p. 36





























































































not regard extremely short-term agreements as reasonable because the use 
of short leases is not very economically viable for a holding860.
2. Transfer of reference quantities to the national reserve
Until 1991, a certain percentage of reference quantities, varying from 
20 % to 80 % during the various campaigns861, was released for the use 
of the Federal Republic in case of any transfer of land. The released 
quantities were used for producers in special situations862 and the provi­
sion was also introduced in order to avoid any speculative rise of prices 
and rents for land863. It was doubted whether these provisions were in 
accordance with the constitution864. In 1991, the release of reference 
quantitites for the benefit of the national reserve in the case of any trans­
fer of land and quota was abolished, mainly because of the abatement of 
the German overallocation865.
3. Reference quantities retained by the transferor
According to the German rules, reference quantities may be retained 
by the transferor if parts of a holding that are transferred do not exceed a 
minimum surface (at least 1 ha)866. This is also true if the amount of the 
reference quantities transferred exceed a maximum amount. Until 
1989/90, only 5,000 kg per ha could be transferred, in 1990/91 this 
amount was raised to 12,000 kg per ha867.
The rules on the maximum amount of reference quantities introduced 
the detachment of a certain amount of quotas from land. The Community 
Regulations, however, do not expressly authorize the Member States to 
restrict the amount of reference quantities per ha that may be transferred 
for the benefit of the transferor868. The German provisions on the
860 Riemann, A.; Streyl, H., (1986) top agrar, No 12, p. 29
861 see Regulation of 27. 9. 1984, BGB1.1 1984, p. 1255; Regulation of 21. 2. 1989, 
BGB1. I 1989, p. 233
862 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1985, p. 64
863 Bundesregierung (ed.), Agrarbericht 1985, p. 64
864 Düsing, M., Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd edition, p. 50 ; Ahrens, P., (1991) 
Agrarrecht, p. 184; OVG Lüneburg, (1990) Agrarrecht, p. 288 held that the provi­
sion infringes Art. 14 Basic Law
865 Regulation of 20. 12. 1991, BGB1.1 1991, p. 2384
866 § 7 MGV
867 Regulation of 3. 7. 1990, BGB1.1 1990, p. 1334
868 see Art. 7 (2) of Commuission Regulation 1546/88,0 . J. 1988, L 139/12 aud 



























































































by German administrative agencies and German courts853: In ] 
the administrative court of the Northern part of Germany (S 
Holstein) demands a concrete use of the land in question for mil 
tion854 85. The areas that are used for milk production during a sh 
of the year only (e.g. intercrops) are considered as a smaller j 
than those that are permanently used. Areas that are used for 1 
not considered at all. The highest administrative court of "li 
Westfalen" (North-West Germany) uses a more abstract defi 
According to its ruling, it is sufficient if areas are used for mi! 
tion and fodder occasionally. Thus, it may be presumed that all 
dairy holding are regulary used for milk production856. A  
heifers are included. Only parcels that are definitely not usei 
production such as gardens may be neglected. Because of this 
agricultural administrative agencies in the area of this court 
abstract definition. This is also true for the administration i| 
"Rheinland-Pfalz" and "Baden-Wiirtemberg"857. The reasoi 
different rulings may be regional disparities, because in 
Germany there is a higher proportion of permanent grassland.
As far as the role of the agricultural administrative agenc 
cemed, it is important to point out that according to German 
have to certify every transfer because, otherwise, the dairies c 
sider the transfers858. As regards the apportionment, they hat 
whether the quotas were divided up according to the areas us> 
production. However, in practice, the control is less strict if 
agreed on areas used for milk production and the basis of theit 
seems to be reasonable859. Administrative agencies indicate tl
853 Nies, V. in: Lukanow J.; Nies, V, Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regel 
tion, p. 36; Hâhnel, W. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hâhnel, W„ Die N 
mengen-Regelung, 2nd edition, p. 38
854 vG  Schleswig, (1987) Agrarrecht, p. 226; VG Schleswig, (1987) j 
229, OVG Lüneburg, not published see Düsing, M., Milch-Quoten 1 
edition, p. 42
855 OVG Münster, (1989) Agrarrecht, p. 109; Düsing, M„ Milch-Quo 
2nd edition, p. 42
856 OVG Münster, (1989) Agrarrecht, p. 109
857 Düsing, M., Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd editon, p. 42
858 § 9 MGV




























































































maximum amount thus have no expressed legal basis869. As to the reten­
tion of reference quantities by the tenant see below.
G. Position of the tenant
In Germany, in 1983, 32.9 %  of the area used for agriculture was ten­
anted870. The proportion of tenanted areas has increased steadily since 
1971871. Only 3 % of this area is used for tenancies on entire holdings; 
whereas the rest is tenanted as parcels872. The lease of parcels is an im­
portant feature in German structural policy because the lease enables the 
farmers to increase their relatively low amount of farmed land873. In 
1952, the agricultural tenancies law was drafted in a liberal way in order 
to ensure the necessary mobility of land874. In 1985, the law was re­
formed and the position of the tenant was improved with regard to the 
change of the use of the holding875, compensation for investments876 and 
periods of notice. However, all new provisions may be altered by way of 
contracts877. The relationship between landlord and tenant is left entirely 
to the parties, only a few dispositions of the agricultural tenancies law are 
mandatory878.
8®9 Lukanow, J. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edi­
tion, p. 69; see also BVerwG, (1992) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 161
870 Bundesministerium fur Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch iiber Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, 1985, p. 39
871 Bundesministerium fur Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.), Statistisches 
Jahrbuch iiber Emahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1985, p. 39
872 Hotzel, H.-J., Einleitung, in: FaBbender, J.; Hotzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J„ Land- 
pachtrecht, p. 31
873 Hotzel, H.-J., Einleitung, in: FaBbender, J.; Hotzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J., Land- 
pachtrecht, p. 31; Trede, K.-J.; Filter, W., Agrarpolitik und Agrarsektor in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 20
874 Lukanow, J., § 581 BGB, in: FaBbender, J.; Hotzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J., Land- 
pachtrecht, p. 64
875 § 590 BGB
876 §§ 590 b, 591 BGB
877 Lukanow, J., (1989) Agrarrecht, Supplement 1/2, p. 11




























































































In order to understand the German regulations implementing Art. 7 (4) 
of Council Regulation 857/84, the German rules on the termination of a 
lease will be explained. Under German law, no minimum length of ten­
ancy is fixed.
Tenancies may firstly be terminated by notices of termination both 
from the landlord and the tenant. As of 1986, leases for an unlimited pe­
riod must be terminated with two years' notice87® (before 1986, half a 
year879 80). However, this period can be reduced by contract881. Secondly, 
leases are terminated on the expiration of the period for which the con­
tract was concluded882 83. In these cases, the tenant may ask for extension of 
the tenancy. If the landlord does not refuse, the tenancy automatically be­
comes an unlimited tenancy. However, the landlord is entirely free to 
agree or not.
In the case of expiration of the tenancy or if the tenant has received a 
notice to quit, the tenant is under exceptional circumstances entitled to the 
extension of the tenancy888. This is a mandatory disposition. If there is a 
disagreement between the tenant and the landlord, a civil court may be 
referred to884. This is the only provision of the agricultural tenancy law 
which aims to protect the tenant on termination of the lease885 and has 
not been changed by the reforms886. Extension is, however, only granted 
if the termination of the tenancy causes exceptional hardship for the ten­
ant and his family and endangers his economic existence. In practice, 
there are rare cases in which this endangering is accepted887. In addition, 
courts only grant a transitional period to the tenant888. The extension is 
both granted to tenants fanning an entire holding or parts of a holding.
879 § 594 (a) BGB
8 8 0  § 595 BGB old version, see FaBbender, J„ § 594 a BGB, in: FaBbender, J.; 
Hôtzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J., Landpachtrecht, p. 436
8 8 1  §  5 9 4  a  ( j )  B G B ,  h o w e v e r ,  s u c h  a n  a g r e e m e n t  s h o u l d  b e  c o n c l u d e d  in  w r i t i n g
8 8 2  §§ 594 a> 594 b> 594 BGB
883 § 595 BGB
884 § 595 BGB
885 Lukanow, J., § 595 BGB, in: FaBbender, J.; Hôtzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J., 
Landpachtrecht, p. 481
886 Lukanow, J.; § 595 BGB, in: FaBbender, J.; Hôtzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J., 
Landpachtrecht, p. 482
887 Lukanow, J., (1989) Agrarrecht, Supplement 1/2, p. 10
888 Lukanow, J., (1989) Agrarrecht, Supplement 1/2, p. 10




























































































Though the tenant may suffer from exceptional hardship, he is not enti­
tled to be granted an extension if the landlord reclaims the holding or 
parts thereof because he or his family want to exploit it889.
It remains to be seen whether, if the tenant extends his contract, similar 
conditions (in particular the rent), would apply. The amount of the rent is 
not regulated by legal provisions, but may be freely negotiated by the 
landlord and tenant890. If the tenant's contract is extended by the civil 
court, the civil court may increase the rent891.
To sum up, German tenants are rarely entitled to extensions of their 
lease on similar terms.
1. Restitution of parts of a holding
As early as 1984, the German legislator introduced a regulation to 
grant reference quantities to tenants on the termination of the lease892. 
Those tenants who signed the contract before the 2nd of April 1984 and 
who had to return parts of a holding, had only to restitute the reference 
quantities attached to areas that exceeded 5 ha893. The German legislator 
wanted to consider those tenants who had exercised milk production on 
the leased land before the introduction of the quota system (so-called 
"old" contracts). The group of tenants protected was seen as being de­
prived of the reference quantities. In addition, no reference quantities are 
transferred if the size of the surface is below a certain threshold (see 
above).
In 1989, the Federal Administrative Court held that the German legis­
lator had not been competent to introduce the protection of the tenant by 
detaching reference quantities from land without any authorization by the 
Community legislator894. Since 1985, Regulation 857/84 has provided for 
a legal basis for the retention of reference quantities by the quitting ten-
889 § 595 (3) BGB
890 only if the amount of the rent is disproportionate to the profit the tenant gains from 
the holding, the agricultural administrative agencies to which the contract must be 
certified, may object to the rent agreed upon, see § 4 Landpachtverkehrsgesetz, 
Hotzel, H.-J., in: Fat!bender, J.; Hotzel, H.-J.; Lukanow, J., Landpachtrecht, p. 
698 et seq
891 § 595 BGB
892 Regulation of 27. 11. 1984, BGB1.1 1984, p. 1434
893 § 7 (3) (a) MGV, Regulation of 27. 11. 1984, BGB1.1 1984, p. 1434
894 BVerwG, (1990) Agrarrecht, p. 219; Diising, M., Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 2nd 





























































































ant896. That is why the same provision that had been declared void by the 
Federal Administrative Court was re-enacted after the judgement896.
Later amendments after the enactment of Council Regulation 590/85 
enforced the protection of the tenant: If the contract was signed before 
the 2nd of April 1984 and more than 5 ha are restituted, only half of the 
reference quantities, at most 2,500 kg per ha, is restituted to the land­
lord897. The provision on the protection of the "old contracts tenants" has 
been vaguely formulated and the tenant's intention of continuing milk 
production is not required. Some courts tried to restrict generous inter­
pretations of the protection clause898.
In tire case of the restitution of leased parts of a holding for which the 
contract was signed after the 2nd of April 1984, the tenant has to restitute 
the whole amount of the reference quantities to which he was still 
entitled899.
2. Restitution of entire holdings
If an entire leased holding is restituted tenants have to transfer the 
whole amount of reference quantities to the landlord. This rule also ap­
plies to contracts that were signed before the MGV came into force. The 
tenant of an entire holding, however, is in the same difficult economic 
and social situation as the tenant of parts of a holding because he may 
only under exceptional circumstances ask for the extension of the lease. 
The economic background of the German refusal to grant reference 
quantities to out-going tenants of an entire holding may be, that in entire 
holdings, the landlord's share prevails the tenant's share because the capi­
tal seems to be the most important factor. In addition, entire holdings 
rented in Germany are leased for a fixed term without any entitlement to 
extension. Thus, tenants could not in any case expect that they could make 
use of their investments including licences for commercialisation which 
have been allocated to them by public authorities9^ .
895 Art. 7 (4) of Regulation 857/84, as amended by Council Regulation 590/85, O. J. 
1985, L 68/1; see second chapter, E. I. 1.
896 Regulation of 21. 3. 1990, BGB1.1 1990, p. 556
897 see Regulation of 11. 9. 1985, BGB1.1 1985, p. 1916
898 OVG Liineburg, (1992) Agrarrecht, p. 264; BVerwG, (1992) Recht der 
Landwirtschaft, p. 161
899 § 7 (3) (b) MGV, introduced by Regulation of 18. 6. 1986, BGB1.1 1986, p. 911






























































































Under the German provisions, the landlord's consent is required if the 
tenant who has rented an entire holding applies for the premium under an 
out-going scheme901. In most out-goer schemes, tenants who have rented 
parts of a holding do not need to ask for the landlord's permission if they 
apply for a premium902 But according to the agricultural tenancies law, 
they have to ask for permission if they change the use of the rented object 
to an extent that affects the holding after the expiration of the lease903. 
According to § 591 b BGB, the landlord may ask for compensation if the 
conditions of the holding have deteriorated.
2. Quota as improvement of the holding
No special provisions concerning the compensation for milk quotas for 
quitting tenants were introduced in the agricultural tenancies law904. 
Tenants generally receive compensation for certain investments that con­
tribute to the improvement and maintenance of the rented object. The 
Federal Civil Court held that although a restituted holding has a higher 
value with a milk quota this improvement is not due to the tenant's in­
vestments, but to the introduction of the milk quota system by the legisla­
tor905. The tenant's investments in dairy facilities like parlours or the 
purchase of quotas, of course, may be compensated.
/ / . Compensation rights as to reference quantities
III. Infringement of fundamental rights o f tenants o f entire holdings
The position of the tenant of entire holdings gives rise to constitutional 
doubts.
If he has to restitute an entire holding rented before 1984, he is not 
entitled to retain any reference quantities. An infringement of his right to
901 §§ 3 (2), 8 (3), 13 (3) "Verordnung über die Gewàhrung einer Vergiitung fur die 
Aufgabe der Milcherzeugung", BGB1.1 1987, p. 1699
902 first and third scheme see §§ 3 (2); 13 (3) ''Verordnung über die Gewahrung einer 
Vergütung fur die Aufgabe der Milcherzeugung", BGB1.1 1987, p. 1699
903 Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edi­
tion, p. 84
994 §§ 585-597 BGB




























































































property is likely906. A disproportionate deprivation of his property 
right is given because the aim pursued with the restrictive rule (to ensure 
the observance of the principle of attachment to land) cannot in this case 
be justified since the tenant suffers an unacceptable economic loss907. In 
particular, his labour which contributed to the creation of the quota is not 
compensated for under the German agricultural tenancies law and the 
landlord's consent is required for the cessation of milk production. The 
Federal Administrative Court, however, held that the agricultural tenan­
cies law is enough to ensure the protection of the tenants of entire hold­
ings because the tenant may ask for compensation for his investments in 
dairy facilities908. Because quotas are not improvements but creations of 
public authorities, this view seems to be dubious909.
As far as the requirement of the landlord's consent is concerned, one 
inferior administrative court held that the basis for the allocation of quo­
tas is limited to the reference year and the fact that the producer deliv­
ered milk in that year910. Hence the producer is entitled to the whole of 
the quota and the landlord's consent is not required911. The ownership of 
the land and the live and dead stock of the holding are of no importance 
for the creation of the quota912. This assumption is doubtful because the 
production factor soil also contributed to the allocation of reference 
quantities913.
906 see also Düsing, M., Milch-Quoten Ratgeber, 3rd edition, p. 43 et seq
907 see for the formula: Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernâhrung und 
Forstwirtschaft, [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2639)
908 BVerwG, (1991) Recht der Landwirtschaft, p. 102
909 see Nies, V., (1990) Agramecht, p. 225
9 1 0  VG Frankfurt, (1990) Agrarrecht, p .  288
911 the court, however, does not specify whether the producer is the owner of the 
quota, VG Frankfurt, (1990) Agrarrecht, p. 289
912 VG Frankfurt, (1990) Agrarrecht, p. 288




























































































German lawyers and courts agree that the reference quantity is a right 
to commercialise a certain amount of milk or milk products without be­
ing subject to a levy9!4.
Whether this right is a real right has been discussed by lawyers and the 
courts. The only possibility under German property law would be that the 
reference quantity is a right attached to the property of the land and as 
such, the reference quantity could be an essential part of the land (§ 96 
BGB). However, the courts ruled that the reference quantity is not at­
tached to the property of the land9!5. Reference quantities are allocated to 
persons and are attached to the holding, but not to the property of the 
holding914 516. In other words, the German courts recognized that the refer­
ence quantity according to the categories of property law does not belong 
to anybody, but is a licence allocated to the producers917. German schol­
ars are of the same opinion918. In particular, the statutory provisions on 
the retention of quotas did not resolve the question of the ownership of 
the quota because the quota is simply divided up.
IV. Legal nature o f the reference quantity
914 Lukanow, J., Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hâhnel, W., Die Milchgarantie- 
mengen-Regelung, 2nd edition, p. 28; p. 49; BGH, (1992) Agrarrecht, p. 56; OLG 
Celle, (1988) Agrarrecht, p. 170 et seq
915 OLG Celle, (1988) Agrarrecht, p. 170; BGH, (1992) Agrarrecht, p. 56
916 BGH, (1992) Agrarrecht, p. 56
917 see, however, the ruling of the administrative court of Frankfurt (under G. III.) 
which, however, did not specify whether the producer is the owner of the quota
918 Palandt-Heinrichs, H., Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, § 96 BGB, Annotation 2; 
Lukanow, J. in: Lukanow, J.; Nies, V.; Hâhnel, W., Die Milchgarantiemengen- 
Regelung, 2nd edition, p. 49, see also guidelines of the Federal Ministry of 





























































































Comparison of the implementations of the milk quota 
regulations in English, French and German law
The comparison of the implementation of the Community objectives 
considered is carried out by way of microcomparison. This means that 
specific legal institutions or problems are compared9!9 in order to find 
out whether the Community objectives were achieved. Where necessary 
the legal issues are completed by references to the policy-formulation 
phase and the socio-economic conditions in order to reveal the objectives 
of the Member States.
A. Choice of different Formulas
In order to repeat the reason for the choice between two Formulas, the 
Community legislator intended when granting this choice, to take into ac­
count the administrative problems arising, the diversity of the milk pro­
duction structures in the different regions of the Community and the re­
gional development policy920. Despite the different possibilities of equal­
ization under each Formula, equivalence of results under both Formulas 
was envisaged in the beginning by fixing a different amount for the 





Zweigert, K.; Kotz, H., Introduction to comparative law, vol. 1, p. 5 
Preamble of Council Regulation 856/84, O. J. 1984, L 90/10 




























































































I. Taking into account administrative problems arising
One reason for providing two different Formulas was to allow for 
administrative problems that might arise. As outlined in the second chap­
ter, this means that Member States could adopt the Formula that is most 
suitable for their administrative structure and thus ensure its administra­
tive viability.
1. Formula B countries: UK and France
a) Number and tasks of the administrative units involved
The application of the same Formula in the UK and France for their 
regions was carried out through a different administrative structure that 
was already provided by the existing administrative bodies or producers' 
organizations. The number of administrative units involved in the alloca­
tion of reference quantities to producers in special situations in the UK 
was significantly smaller than in France. In the UK, only the Ministry or 
the Tribunal allocated these quantities, whereas in France, in particular 
the Ministry, ONILAIT, the purchasers and "la commission mixte dé­
partementale" were involved. The procedures of allocating special refer­
ence quantities were more complicated in France, clearly reflecting the 
predominant concern of these groups of produceps.
The Agricultural Ministry conferred many tasks on the MMBs. In fact, 
the MMBs exercised functions that in France were divided between the 
French dairies and the "préfet", such as the notification of the transfers. 
ONILAIT, however, has similar functions to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and IBAP.
b) Legal status and numbers of the purchasers
Both the British and French purchasers were at the same time recipi­
ents of administrative actions in that they had to pay the levy and they 
were implementers in that they had to collect the levy from the produc­
ers. Nevertheless, the MMB is a semi-public co-operative and as an agent 
of the Ministry, it holds a different position in the state administration 
than the private French dairies do. Difficulties as to the legal nature of 




























































































The most striking issue is that the number of purchasers in the UK 
were the five MMBs922, whereas in France, the number of purchasers 
was 1322 in 1985923. The consequence of this low number of purchasers 
was that the UK quotas could be allocated more efficiently because of the 
structure provided by the MMBs including the registers the MMBs held 
on producers.
Moreover, because of the MMB's monopoly for purchasing fresh milk 
and its huge collection area, the fight for producers in order to exhaust 
production capacities that occurred between dairies in France did not 
happen between dairies in England and Wales924 925. Striking infringements 
of the allocation rules by the MMBs have not been recorded. Yet the 
MMB owns manufacturing creameries and dairies, whose administration 
and financial management are, however, separate923. But the MMB had, 
because of its huge, centralized collection area, no vital economic interest 
in falsifying producers' reference quantities at the expense of other pro­
ducers, for example in order to attract producers from other Board ar­
eas. The control by the producers, institutionalized by the Board, may 
have contributed to this fact.
In addition, since there was a lack of rivalry among dairies, the emer­
gence of the quota market was favoured because transfers within the huge 
regions of the MMBs would not result in a transfer of reference quanti­
ties from one purchaser to the other and affect the volumes of milk deliv­
ered to dairies.
Because of a low number of purchasers, the control of the MMBs was, 
in fact, much easier to enforce in the UK than in France. However, both 
in France and in the UK, purchasers did not comply with the rules of 
transfer. In the UK, this occurred with the silent consent of the Ministry, 
whereas in France, any circumvention of the rules endangered the state- 
controlled restructuring process. Thus, the relationship between public 
authorities in France (including ONILAIT) and the purchasers was char­
acterized by tension and distrust. The UK purchasers and the Ministry, on
922 the purchasers in the small areas that are not subject to Board areas can be ignored
923 see Bundesministerium für Ernâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten (ed.) 
Statistisches Jahrbuch iiber Ernâhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten 1987, p. 411
924 Burrel, A., (1988) Cahiers d'économie et sociologie rurales, No. 7, p. 79




























































































the other hand, worked confidently together which was supported by the 
fact that the MMB was an agent of the Ministry.
To sum up, the implementation of Formula B in France caused more 
difficulties than in England and Wales. The administrative structure, 
namely the existence of compulsory producers' organizations such as the 
MMBs, provided by the British system was much more suitable for im­
plementing Formula B than that of the French. By conferring most of the 
administration of the super-levy system to the MMB, the UK exercised 
the institutional autonomy the Member States enjoy when implementing 
the Community Regulations.
The EEC legislator employed the broad term "purchaser" and thus al­
lowed that not only dairies but also producer's organizations like the 
MMB could be defined as purchasers. Both are the first purchasers of 
fresh milk. This definition lies within the discretion enjoyed by the EEC 
legislator926 and any discrimination between producers in Formula B 
countries is not apparent.
2. Formula A and B countries : UK, France and Germany 
a) Number and tasks of the administrative units involved
In Germany, which adopted Formula A, both private and state organi­
zations (dairies and financial administration) were involved in the alloca­
tion of reference quantities to producers. In the UK, only the MMBs and 
in France, only the dairies, allocated reference quantities to the produc­
ers. This is due to the Formula, because under Formula B the debtors are 
the purchasers and the state administration is thus only involved in allo­
cating reference quantities to purchasers.
As far as the allocation of additional and specific reference quantities is 
concerned, the agricultural administrative agencies were also conferred 
with tasks. The allocation of additional reference quantities can thus be 
compared with the French and English system, where the Ministry, 
ONILAIT, the dairies and the "commissions mixtes", respectively the 
Ministry and Tribunals, were involved.
The German objective when implementing Formula A of not burden­
ing the dairies with administrative tasks and thus ensuring administrative 
viability, could not be fulfilled. In comparison with the purchasers in
926 Case 197-200, 243, 245 + 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmiihle v Council and 




























































































France, the German dairies had been conferred the same number of tasks. 
The reason is that, for practical reasons dairies could more easily calcu­
late producers' reference quantities and levies than other administrative 
bodies in the German administration.
In Germany, problems arose as to which administrative agencies were 
competent for which parts of the administration of the quota system. 
This, however, was not caused by the application of Formula A but by the 
introduction of the peculiar combination of a super-levy (financial admin­
istration) connected with a reference quantity (criteria for the allocation 
of these in the case of special situations and transfer is part of agricultural 
administration) into the existing German administrative system.
b) Legal status of the purchasers
The private German dairies were, in fact, responsible for the adminis­
tration of the milk quota system, though legally the dairies were only as­
sisting the financial administration.
No producers' organizations such as the MMBs, which could have been 
conferred with the administration, exist in Germany. The apparent advan­
tage of Formula A, that reference quantities are only allocated at one 
level in the state administration, was not true for the German dairies. 
However, Formula A could presumably prevent the fight for production 
capacities by illegal administration of the quota system to a certain extent, 
because the debtors are the producers. The German dairies were imple- 
menters but no recipients of administrative action as far as the levy is 
concerned. Moreover, the allocation of reference quantities to producers 
is administered by the state and the dairy’s allocation only becomes valid 
if they notified the amount to the financial administration. Under the 
British and French system, the allocation of reference quantities to the 
producers is a matter of private law whereas the allocation of reference 
quantities under German law constitutes an administrative act.
German dairies could not favour producers by equalization or by allo­
cation of special reference quantities because until 1990, equalization has 
not been allowed and it is the agricultural administration which deter­
mines whether a producer is treated as being in a special situation.
To sum up, only in the UK could the objective of ensuring the adminis­
trative viability by the choice of the Formula be realized to a satisfying 




























































































choice of the Formula927, apparently not the1 decisive one for France and 
Germany.
//. Diversity o f milk production structure
With the choice between Formulas, the Community legislator wanted to 
take into account the diversity of the milk production structure, in par­
ticular the need to facilitate structural change and adaption. This vague 
formulation apparently meant both the diversity between Member States 
and the diversity within the Member State. In brief, the possibility of 
equalization would be ideal for facilitating structural adjustment and the 
non-possibility of equalization would be ideal for a Member State with 
diverse milk production and milk-collecting structures. The Formulas 
could, consequently, according to the EEC Regulations, be implemented 
into regions with diverse structures or into the whole Member State.
The UK had, in the first year, applied Formula A in Northern Ireland, 
where the production structures are different from England, Wales and 
Scotland. In the UK, the equalization of over- and underdeliveries within 
the collection zone of one purchaser comprised a much higher number of 
producers than in France. Thus, the phenomenon of the "dead quotas" oc­
curring in France in the beginning was not a problem in the huge MMB 
regions (especially in England and Wales). In addition, again because of 
the low number of purchasers, problems of unequal treatment between 
producers of different purchasers, especially producers in special situa­
tions did not occur in the UK to such an extent as in France. Diverse pro­
duction and collection structures did thus not have a negative impact on 
the application of Formula B in the UK.
Germany and France both implemented the same Formula for the 
whole territory. Either the same Formula fitted by chance into entirely 
diverse regions or else the consideration of diverse structures within the 
Member State was not such an important issue.
In the case of Germany, accounting for diverse production structures 
in the North and South and diverse collection-structures of the dairies, the 
equal treatment of all producers as to the levy rate could be ensured928.
927 see Art. 2 (1) of Regulation 857/84




























































































The impossibility of obtaining temporarily re-allocated reference quanti­
ties by leasing or by way of equalization, however, could not contribute 
to the facilitation of any significant structural adjustment because produc­
ers could not rely on unused reference quantities at the end of the 
campaign929.
It would have, considering the milk production structures, been possi­
ble to incorporate the Formula B in Southern Germany in order to allow 
adaption and facilitate structural change for the less efficient Southern 
producers and the Formula A in Northern Germany in order to guarantee 
an equal treatment of the producers. It would also be possible to incor- 
parate Formula B into the whole of Germany if the structural adjustment 
of the whole country had been a political objective.
The French dairy structure, as far as regional diversities and variation 
between collection zones is concerned, is much more similar to the 
German than to the British one and the number of French purchasers is 
even higher than the German one. The problems of unequal treatment of 
producers of different dairies thus had to be mitigated in France by in­
troducing some elements of Formula A. Another problem of the high 
number of purchasers was that "dead quotas" came into existence.
It can be assumed that, considering the general quota policy, the French 
objective was not principally that of taking into account diverse produc­
tion and collection structures within the country, but that of profiting 
from the advantage under Formula B of re-allocating unused reference 
quantities in order to facilitate structural change for the whole of the 
country. The diverse production structure within France was taken into 
account through different instruments such as the allocation of reference 
quantities to producers in special situations, the setting up of out-goer 
schemes, and the special treatment of mountain areas. With these instru­
ments, the restructuring of the dairy sector could be pursued, and the 
Formula had only to soften the process.
The ECJ has ruled that Member States enjoy great discretion in deter­
mining the Formula unless the choice obviously does not comply with 
Member States' structures930. The ECJ, however, does not define when
929 see Wehland, W., (1988) top agrar, No 1, p. 28; Nies, V. in: Lukanow, J., Nies, 
V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edition, p. 85
930 see Case C-267/88 - C-285/88 Wuidart et al v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise et al 




























































































there is no compliance with structures. From the comparison it can be 
deduced that each Formula is obviously suitable to all kinds of production 
structures. Thus, the Germans could have opted for the same Formula as 
France and vice versa without exceeding their discretion.
To sum up, every country chose a Formula for entirely different rea­
sons, clearly reflecting their attitude towards the quota system. The 
Germans opted mainly for Formula A in order not to disrupt the unity of 
the farm community. The French opted for Formula B because their po­
litical goal was to restructure the whole of the country by administrative 
means. The UK opted for Formula B because the administrative structure 
provided by the MMBs was ideal and the possibility of equalization would 
reduce the levy liability.
Most objectives pursued by the Member States through the choice of 
Formula could be achieved; however, the administration in Germany 
proved to be more complicated than expected and France had to recog­
nize that they had neglected their internal structures to benefit the struc­
ture of the whole country.
The objectives that were pursued by the Community legislator in offer­
ing the choice between two Formulas are thus only a conglomerate of 
these diverse attitudes. The question arises, however, as to whether the 
implementation of a levy by entirely diverse Formulas does not give rise 
to discrimination between producers, especially as far as the amount of 
the levy paid is concerned. The Council has probably infringed its discre­
tion when granting the choice between two Formulas.
///. Amount o f the levy-rate paid by producers under Formula A and B
Under Formula A, the original Regulations envisaged a levy-rate of 75 
% and under Formula B, 100 %  of the target price in order to offset the 
disadvantages of Formula A. However, as was proved in the national re­
ports, the differences in the amount of the levy paid by German produc­
ers in comparison to French and English producers, before Formula B 
was reformed, was much larger than 25 %. This was confirmed in a re­
port by the Court of Auditors in 1987931. 931




























































































The discrimination between producers under Formula A and B seems 
to be apparent. In a preliminary ruling, the ECJ, however, held that the 
choice granted to Member States between Formula A and B did not 
breach the prohibition of discrimination between Community producers, 
rather, it ensured that the system was fully effective in view of the di­
versity of milk production structure and milk-collecting in the different 
regions of the Community932. Belgian producers, subject to Formula A, 
had alleged the breach of the principle of non-discrimination. To prove 
that no discrimination was given, the ECJ pointed to both the different 
levy rates under Formula A and B and to the possibility of regional and 
national equalization for both Formulas. By these provisions, the possi­
bility of offsetting at the level of the purchasers under Formula B was 
neutralized and equivalence in the actual levels of the levy under the two 
Formulas was ensured. Though the difference between the levy actually 
paid by producers under the Formula A system in comparison to a 
Formula B producer in practice turned out to be much higher than 25 %, 
this did not constitute an infringement of Art. 40 (3) of the EEC Treaty, 
because the Council had broad discretion in matters concerning agricul­
tural policies. This discretion has not been abused according to the ECJ, 
because the Council could reasonably assume that a difference of 25 % 
would be sufficient to neutralize the advantage which producers under 
Formula B enjoy.
If the Council had not introduced the possibility of regional and na­
tional equalization, the Court would probably have ruled that the choice 
between two Formulas gave rise to discrimination. However, the possi­
bility of introducing regional and national equalization is not a mandatory 
provision. This fact was not considered by the ECJ. The reason may be 
that a Belgian court had referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling and 
in Belgium, the possibility of equalization has been introduced933. In 
Germany, only in 1990 was the offsetting at dairy level allowed. This 
constitutes an unequal treatment of German producers towards the others 
in the Community by the German government. However, an infringement 
of Art. 40 (3) of the EEC Treaty by the Council when providing for only
932 5̂  Case C-267/88 - C-285/88 Wuidart et al v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise et al 
[1990] E.C.R., p. 1-435 (1-480)
933 Commission of the European Communities, Report to the Council on the applica­




























































































a facultative possibility is not apparent because the collected levy could be 
used for financing national out-goer schemes if the deliveries did not ex­
ceed the national quota934 935.
B. Observance of the national guaranteed quantity when allo­
cating reference quantities
When allocating reference quantities, in particular to producers in 
special situations, Member States were obliged not to exceed their na­
tional guaranteed quantity. Germany infringed this principle. France and 
the UK, however, managed to observe their national guaranteed quanti­
ties. By comparing the legal principles and procedures determining the 
allocation, the reasons might be discovered.
The criteria that the German producers undertaking investments into 
dairy facilities had to fulfill to be eligible for a specific reference quantity 
are defined in § 6 MGV. This provision gives a direct right for the allo­
cation of reference quantities, once the producer meets the criteria. In ad­
dition, the adminstrative acts delivered to the producers fixed the ref­
erence quantities without any conditions as to the amounts available. 
Whether a producer meets the requirements under § 6 MGV was decided 
by the agricultural administration which in most cases was to the benefit 
of the producer. The ceiling of the 1983 deliveries of 80 cows in the 
"Land" in question, moreover, has been declared void by the courts be­
cause of an infringement of the right to property. This judgement con­
cerned a producer from Lower-Saxony, where the limit was 406,400 
kg933.
In France, no direct rights for the prior producers derive from the 
"décrets" and "arrêtés”. Instead, producers are allocated reference quan­
tities yearly depending on how many quantities were made available by 
the out-goer schemes. In addition, the limit of 200,000 litres was a re­
striction imposed so as not to overallocate reference quantities. This was 
recognized by the ECJ, who did not, however, rule on whether the right 
to property was infringed. The referring court had not alleged such an 
infringement.
934 see second chapter, F. I. 2.




























































































In the UK as well, no direct rights arose from the Dairy Produce 
Quota Regulations but the British producer received an award by the au­
thorities over an amount of secondary reference quantities on condition 
that quantities are available.
The German producer was not subject to any deadline when applying 
for specific reference quantities, whereas the English producer had to 
meet different deadlines as soon as a new special case provision was 
made.
To sum up, the German rules prove to be very awkward. Because these 
rules grant direct rights to one large group of producers in special situa­
tions936 and the authorities do not allocate reference quantities on condi­
tion of their availability, the authorities were obliged to allocate reference 
quantities to the producers who observed the requirements. The constitu­
tion, in particular the principle of legitimate expectation, would not have 
required any such legal construction of the regulations. This proves that 
the German farmers' organization could exercise a considerable influence 
on the draftsmen. The British and French legislators have set up more 
convincing schemes by allocating reference quantities only if they are 
available. In France, however, the draftsmen might have expected that the 
state-financed restructuring programs, in particular the out-goer schemes, 
would provide enough reference quantities during the various campaigns 
to satisfy the prior producers.
C. Transfer of reference quantities
The intention of the Community legislator was to avoid any speculation 
of reference quantities and a rise of markets. The EEC objective was sup­
posed to be fulfilled by having the transfer governed by the principle of 
attachment of reference quantities to a holding and defining which 
changes to the holding entail a transfer of reference quantities. Rules on 
the apportionment of quotas and on the restriction of the number of ha 
and quantities per ha that may be transferred were enacted because of the 
same intention. Last but not least, the non-legislation on the ownership of 
the reference quantity can be explained by the same intention.
936 the producers whose milk production has been affected by an exceptional event also 




























































































I. Emergence of quota markets
In the UK, a market of quotas developed in that the quota became a 
tradeable asset in its own right. This was possible by circumventing the 
transfer rules but also by employing legal forms of transfers, in particu­
lar temporary transfer arrangements. The control and pressure by the 
Commission were legal constraints, requiring the UK government to 
tighten up the transfer rules. The fact that the Community rules did not 
specifiy the legal nature of the reference quantity could not prevent the 
quota from becoming tradeable.
No visible market of quotas developed in France, though some black 
markets allegedly exist. The French objective of subjecting the transfer to 
strict rules in order not to endanger the state-controlled restructuring 
process, was thus achieved to a large extent. The discussion in France on 
the introduction of more flexible schemes such as leasing shows how eco­
nomic necessities may overrule ambiguous legal provisions which, by 
creating administrative licences, negate any economic value.
The Germans were forced not to introduce more flexible schemes be­
cause of their costly overallocation and thus, they could easily convince 
the farmers that the application of the strict transfer rules was necessary. 
However, with leasing being allowed, the quota becomes a tradeable asset. 
Apparently, in practice, circumvention of the rules also occurred.
It is obvious that the main reason that no market of quotas emerged in 
two countries (France and Germany) but arose in another country (UK) 
was that the relatively efficient milk production structure in the UK 
(namely England, Wales and Scotland) enabled the producers to afford 
expansion by buying milk quotas and favouring a market-based sys­
tem937. Because of a high demand for transfers in the UK, enforcing a 
strict control of transfers would be too expensive in the long run938.
It is not quite clear, however, to what extent the emergence of markets 
or non-emergence of markets was caused by the different national legal 
orders including the national land law or only by the way the Community 
rules were incorporated and controlled. With respect to this, English 
lawyers have pointed out that the English transfer rules are a natural 
product of their land law which is completely different from the conti­
937 see Harvey, D. R., Milk quotas, p. 52
938 Amies, S. J., Transfer of Milk Quotas in England and Wales, in: Burrrel, A. (ed.). 




























































































nental systems939. Thus the land law is blamed for the emergence of the 
quota market.
Because the quota market in the UK could obviously also emerge be­
cause of the use of short-term letting agreements, the crucial question is 
whether the transfer by short-term letting agreements and the use of the 
English "trick" of detaching the quotas from land by not using the land 
for milk production would also have been possible under the German and 
French quota and land law rules. In order to reach sufficient conclusions 
with regards to the legal reasons for the divergent practices and incorpo­
rations, the differences in the letting agreements that entail the transfer of 
reference quantities will be compared, including the rules governing the 
apportionment of quotas and limitations on the amount of quotas 
transferred.
//. Comparison o f legal framework for transfers by letting agreements
1. UK
In the UK, all possible letting agreements such as grazing licences ini­
tially entailed the transfer of reference quantities. The reformed rules 
envisage the granting of an exclusive right of possession; any transfer by 
a mere grazing licence that does not constitute a tenancy is no longer 
possible. However, quotas are still transferred by tenancy agreements. 
This is also due to the fact that, since the beginning, the quota rules on the 
apportionment and limitations on the transferred amount in the UK have 
been favourable to the transfer of quotas and emergence of a market. The 
apportionment of quotas is left to negotiations of the parties and only in 
the second place, is it decided by an arbitrator. Thus, a relatively high 
number of reference quantities can be transferred with a few parcels of 
land. The guideline of 20, 000 litres is only an internal guideline of the 
Minister and not all transactions are controlled.
The question arises whether this transposition of the transfer rules is 
legal under the EEC law. However, the EEC rules are drafted very un- 
clearly940. According to these, Member States may fix criteria for the 
apportionment either according to the areas used for milk production or
939 Crossley, G., (1985) 24 Farmland Market, p. 16




























































































according to other criteria. Member States have great discretion on the 
definition of the criteria for the apportionment of quotas941. The market 
of quotas that the European legislator tried to avoid was thus likely to 
emerge942. No rules in the UK have been passed on the size limit below 
or above which reference quantities have to be transferred to the national 
reserve943. But because the EEC rules on the national reserve are again 
entirely facultative, the UK rules are legal. The 5 ha limitation applying 
for grazing licences until 1989 apparently could not prevent the emer­
gence of a quota market.
2. The British "trick" in Germany
Under the German agricultural tenancies law, extremely short-term 
leases (§ 581 BGB) which confer an exclusive right of possession can be a 
transaction entailing the transfer of reference quantities. However, it re­
mains to be seen whether the British "trick" will work. No party agree­
ment on the apportionment is possible under German Law, but the agri­
cultural administrative agencies have to check and certify the transfer. 
Because in most parts of Germany (except in the North) all areas of a 
dairy unit are presumed by the courts and the administration to have been 
used for dairy production, the transferee would have to prove the con­
trary. In addition, if it is apparent that short-term leases which are not 
very economically useful are misused in order to transfer quotas, they 
would probably prevent this944.
Moreover, until 1990, large numbers of reference quantities had to be 
released to the national reserve which would not have made the use of 
short-term agreements very profitable. Likewise, a minimum number of 
ha and maximum amount of reference quantities which are retained by 
the transferor are fixed.
Thus, the British "trick" could not easily be employed in Germany. 
The reason is not the diverse land law, but the transfer rules and the con­
trol by the authorities.
941 Gadbin, D„ (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 513
942 Lorvellec, L., (1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410
943 except for the 5 ha limitation, see English Report




























































































3. The British "trick" in France
Under French law the granting of an exclusive right of possession 
would have been necessary if the transaction occurred by lease. The sale 
of grass would not have conferred exclusive possession. But even if short­
term tenancy agreements other than the sale of grass which are not sub­
ject to a minimum length of tenancy, are used to transfer reference 
quantities, the English practice could not have been employed. If a parcel 
is not grazed by cows but by other animals, under the broad definition of 
the areas used for milk production, they would still be such areas, unless 
they were not forests, wasteland, ponds, fallow land and permanent cul­
tures. To establish these cultures in a short period would, however, not 
have been practically possible and profitable. The transferor would not 
agree to any such transformation of the areas. Because the apportionment 
is not left to the parties but must be notified to the "préfet" who has been 
instructed to enforce the rules, any such misuse is also less likely.
In addition, any transfer below 20 ha would not have entailed a trans­
fer of reference quantities because the quantities would have to be added 
to the national reserve. In France, a higher percentage of reference 
quantities is released to the national reserve than in Germany and the UK. 
Thus, speculations could be avoided and special producers be served.
The French transfer rules and its control thus did not allow for the 
British "trick".
4. Peculiarities of land law are irrelevant
To sum up, the main reason for the exorbitant use of short-term 
agreements in English law is that the agreements were not carried out and 
the performance of the agreements was not sufficiently controlled by the 
Ministry. In addition, the rules on the apportionment and size limits were 
favourable to transfers. Considering these facts, the peculiarities of 
English land law seem to be of minor importance for the transfer of ref­
erence quantities by letting agreements945.
To sum up, the attitude towards the quota system clearly governed the 
incorporation of the transfer rules. In the French case, in contrast to the 
market-based British system, restructuring by administrative means was 
the goal. Germany, however, though deploring the necessity of increasing




























































































the size of farms by quota transfers, in particular leasing, was forced for 
budgetary reasons to maintain a rigid system for quite a long time946.
One interesting observation on the legal style of drafting rules in 
France and Germany can be made. In France, many terms of the transfer 
rules have been defined in the intitial "décret", e.g. areas for milk pro­
duction. In addition, the transfer rules have been interpreted to a high 
extent by "circulaires" adressed to the administration and by responses of 
the Agricultural Minister given in Parliament. In Germany, however, the 
transfer rules remained ambiguous in many respects, in particular as far 
as areas for milk production were concerned. The judiciary had to inter­
pret the transfer rules, which resulted in regionally different interpreta­
tions. The French transfer rules, however, did not take into account the 
diversity of the milk production structures947.
D. Position of the tenant
As regards the position of the quitting tenant, the European legislator 
wanted to take into account the difficult economic and social situations of 
these tenants by giving them, under certain circumstances, the possibility 
of keeping all or part of the reference quantity attached to the quit 
premises if there is the intention to continue milk production. This pro­
vision is entirely facultative and is particularly relevant if tenants were in 
occupation of the holding in 1984. As underlined by the ECJ in the 
"Wachauf” case, this provision and the provisions on out-goer schemes 
give the Member States a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to en­
able them to apply these rules in a manner consistent with the require­
ments of the protection of fundamental rights.
I. Reference quantities belong to nobody
Though the tenant's legal position is considerably different throughout 
the Member States, with a liberal agricultural tenancies law in Germany 
and a law ensuring the protection of the tenant in French and English law,
946 sgg Lukanow, J.; Nies, V., Die Milchgarantiemengen-Regelung, 3rd edition, p. 85




























































































the crucial issue in all Member States was how and if to guarantee a share 
of the reference quantities to the tenant. The legal construction offered by 
the Community legislator in order to ensure the protection of the tenant is 
left entirely to the Member States. No hint to the amount or even basis of 
the calculation or to whether the landlord has to consent to the cessation 
of milk production by the tenant is given. And what is worse, the owner­
ship of the quota has not been clarified.
The Member States tried to define the tenants' rights to the reference 
quantities by resorting to their national property laws. In particular, they 
tried to clarify to whom the reference quantity belongs. But strikingly, in 
all three Member States, the reference quantity cannot be classified by the 
categories of the property law. They belong neither to the tenant nor to 
the landlord948. In fact, legally, reference quantities, as foreseen by the 
Commission, seem to be no more than a licence to commercialise a 
quantity of milk or milk products by the producer of a holding. This 
could have been an easy solution if the reference quantities had not gained 
a capital value, subject to offer and demand, at least when leased out.
For lack of any solutions in their property and agricultural tenancies 
law, the Member States enacted statutory provisions in order to divide 
either the reference quantities or their value between the landlord and 
tenant.
II. Thorough protection of the tenant in France
In France, tenants whose rural leases are about to expire have, only 
under exceptional circumstances, no right to renewal of the contract un­
der similar conditions. In these cases the retention of reference quantities 
is foreseen. Even tenants who rented a holding after 1984, are consid­
ered, although they did not contribute by their labour to the "creation" of 
quotas in 1984.
This incorporation of Art. 7 (4) of Regulation 857/84 and the compen­
sation rights granted to the tenants by national agricultural tenancies law 
and in out-goer schemes could give rise to the impression that, in France,
948 some French scholars, however, attribute the quotas either to the producer resp ten­
ant or to the owner resp landlord, see French report. Nevertheless, these solutions 





























































































the producer is the "owner" of reference quantities. However, because the 
landlord might be compensated for quotas released to the national reserve 
by an out-going tenant if the rental value decreases, his share of the quota 
is also considered. The French rules on the tenant's rights seem to have 
recognized more than the transfer rules that the quota has an economic 
value in its own right. The application of the French rules casts no doubt 
on any infringement of the tenants' rights to property. Landlords' rights 
to property might even be impaired. The rules reflect clearly the strong 
position of the tenants under French law.
III. Protection of the tenant in parts o f a holding in Germany
In Germany, the tenants whose rural leases are about to expire are in a 
difficult economic and social situation because the agricultural tenancies 
laws, as seen, does not entitle them to an extension of the lease under 
similar terms. Tenants who have to restitute parts of a holding which they 
rented before 1984 may thus retain reference quantities and in addition, 
under some schemes, they have not needed to ask for the landlord's con­
sent if they want to take part in out-goer schemes. Tenants who rented a 
part of holdings after 1984 are also subject to the unfavourable rules of 
the agricultural tenancies laws. However, because they rent parcels to 
which reference quantities are attached, they are aware of the fact that 
they have to restitute the reference quantities. Moreover, this group of 
tenants did not contribute with their labour to the "creation" of the quota 
in 1984.
Tenants who have to restitute an entire holding rented before 1984 are 
not entitled to retain reference quantities and moreover, they have to ask 
for the landlord's consent if they want to participate in out-goer schemes. 
As shown, this casts doubt on whether Germany has applied the 
Commuinity rules in accordance with fundamental rights. The Federal 
Adminstrative Court which held on the retention rules did not assume any 
infringement of fundamental rights.
The marginal importance of the lease of entire holdings in Germany 
might have prevented a protection of tenants farming entire holdings. 
Justification of the the rules by pointing to the prevailing production fac­




























































































IV. Division o f quota value in the UK
No retention of quotas is foreseen because the rules on the termination 
of a lease do not result in economically and socially difficult situations for 
the tenant. Though the landlord's consent is required if a producer wants 
to give up milk production, the low number of British producers taking 
part in out-goer schemes seems to justify such a regulation.
A lacuna in the compensation rules of the Agricultural Holdings Act 
1986 exists which gives rise to an infringement of the right to property of 
the group of tenants who quit their holdings between 1984 and 1986. 
Apart from this lacuna, however, the British legislator seems to have es­
tablished the most convincing system because it attempts to weigh care­
fully the tenant’s and the landlord's share of the quota by considering 
both the capital and labour value. Such a pragmatic solution means there 
is no need to define the ownership of the quota. This solution also recog­
nizes the fact that the quotas became a tradeable asset in the UK.
To sum up, the incorporation of Art. 7 (4) of Regulation 857/84 was 
entirely different in the Member States. Economic and social difficulties 
do not arise in all Member States to the same degree on the termination of 





























































































A. Reasons for the differences in the implementation of the 
objectives
Summing up the differences which occurred in the implementation 
process pointed out in the last chapter, four reasons turned out to be de­
cisive for the different fates of achievement or even failure of the objec­
tives considered.
I. Discretionary rules and non-regulation as outcome o f the policy-for­
mulation phase
The first reason for differences in implementation of the Regulations is 
that the Council made non-uniform applications of the rules possible by 
the way the Regulation was drafted. In terms of the implementation re­
search, deficiencies in the programme can be recognized. Both the 
Regulations establishing the super-levy system and its changes led to a 
more national policy in the dairy sector. The initial Regulations already 
allowed a certain discretion of the Member States such as the choice of 
the Formula and the reference year949. Member States, moreover, enjoy 
great discretion as far as the transfer rules (apportionment of quota and 
role of national reserve, relationship between landlord and tenant) are 
concerned. The amendments of the Regulations conceded even more dis­
cretions to the Member States such as the choice of whether to allow 
leasing arrangements or regional and national equalization950. Regional
949 s. VoB, R., Die Milchquoten als Gestaltungsmittel, in: Schwarze, J. (ed.), Der 
Gemeinsame Markt, p. 83; Gilardeau, J.-M., Juris-Classeur rural, vol. 4, Fasc. C- 
3, p. 8; Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in : 
Coulomb, P. et al (eds.), p. 88
950 Hairy, D.; Perraud, D., Crise et transformations de la politique laitière, in : 




























































































and national equalization even caused a nationalisation of the quota95! jn 
that every Member State tried to make the optimum use of its national 
quantity. However, the intitial allocation of national guaranteed quantities 
to Member States was the first step to a nationalisation of quotas.
To sum up, the EEC legislator only set up general principles and it was 
left to the Member States how to implement these principles951 52. Several 
references for primary rulings have been made to the ECJ in order to 
clarify provisions953. In particular, the rules on the transfer of reference 
quantities contained several lacunae and no precise and clear provi­
sions954. The provisions conerning the landlord and tenant law constitute, 
in fact, a non-regulation. The super-levy system does not present a uni­
form system, but is split into derogations, exceptions and discretions. 
Because some provisions can clearly be recognized as having been intro­
duced under the pressure of one of the Member States considered, e.g. the 
protection of the tenant or the regional and national equalization, the out- 
coming Regulations prove again that the real actors in the CAP are the 
Member States.
The legal remedy if the Council exceeds its wide legislative discre­
tionary power is Art. 173, 177 of the EEC Treaty. This discretionary 
power is limited firstly by the fundamental rights but also by the princi­
ple of non-discrimination. Both principles were held to have not been in­
fringed by specific provisions of the Regulations, such as the choice be­
tween two Formulas or the non-regulation of the tenant's rights to the 
reference quantity. Because the EEC Regulations, despite their direct ef­
fect, consist of a set of discretionary and vague provisions, the ECJ in the 
context of milk quotas several times was forced to rule that implementing 
Member States may not infringe principles that originally had to be re­
951 Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 543, 547; Gadbin, D., 
(1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 511
952 Dictionnaire Permanent Entreprise Agricole, Table analytique, Quotas laitiers 
(régime juridique), p. 786
953 examples are : interpretation of producer (Case C-341/89 Ballmann v Hauptzollamt 
Osnabrück [1991] E.C.R., p. 1-40); of holding (Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt 
für Emâhrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2638); of exceptional 
event (Case C-177/90 Kühn v Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems, (1992) Recht 
der intemationalen Wirtschaft, p. 248); of choice of another reference year (Case 
113/88 Leukhardt v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1989] E.C.R. p. 1991 (2014))
954 see Gadbin, D., (1985) Revue de droit rural, No 138, p. 513, Lorvellec, L., 
(1987) Revue de droit rural, No 157, p. 410, Blumann, C.; Lusson-Lerousseau, 




























































































spected by the Council955, such as the fundamental rights. Since the uni­
form application of the Regulations cannot be ensured by mandatory 
provisions in the Regulations, the application of the provisions has to be 
subject to general principles.
II. Legal systems of the Member States; in particular structure o f the
implementers
Secondly, different implementations of the EEC Regulations are caused 
by the differences between the legal orders of the Member States. In the 
case of the implementation of the milk quota Regulations, this is striking 
as far as the administrative structure provided by semi-public producers' 
organizations is concerned. The MMB with its structure and monopoly 
for purchasing milk could provide an efficient administration of the ref­
erence quantities. In addition, their structure was in many respects eco­
nomically favourable to the British producers, because of the equalization 
or transfer conditions. However, the MMB has so far only preserved its 
specific status as a compulsory producers' organization with the 
monopoly of purchasing fresh milk because of special Community 
Regulations. Its future status is uncertain.
The German administrative structure, by contrast, was overburdened 
with the super-levy sytem as the system did not fit the existing adminis­
trative structures.
The phenomenon of different administrative structures is not new, be­
cause in the CAP, though Member States may not any longer legislate on 
many subject matters in the market and price policy, the different admin­
istrative organizations, traditions and procedures and the autonomous 
competences of the Member States prevent a uniform application of 
Community legislation956. In particular, the different structures of the
955 Case C-267/88 - C-285/88 Wuidart et al v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise et al 
[1990] E.C.R., p. 1-435 (1-486); Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Emâhrung 
und Forstwirtschaft [1989] E.C.R., p. 2609 (2638); Case 196/88-198/88 Cornée et 
a! v Coopérative agricole laitière de Loudéac "Copall" [1989] E.C.R. p. 2309 
(2347); Case 201-201/85 Klensch v Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Agriculture et à la 
Viticulture [1986] E.C.R., p. 3477 (3507)
956 Schwarze, J., Europâisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 439; p. 464; Blumann, 





























































































important public or half-public intervention agencies in some Member 
States lead to a more favourable treatment of their producers957.
This fact results in a non-uniform implementation of the CAP under 
national law which in turn leads to different competitive situations in the 
Community958. A uniform procedure is especially important in the agri­
cultural sector, because this sector is largely characterized by state inter­
vention, on the one hand, granting aids or subsidies and, on the other 
hand, collecting levies of all kinds959. It could be asked whether, apart 
from the laborious way of harmonizing national laws according to Art. 
100 of the EEC Treaty960 961, other ways would have been possible when 
enacting the EEC milk quota Regulations to guarantee a more uniform 
application of the super-levy. The ECJ has recognized differences caused 
in implementation by different national administrative systems, but keeps 
to the national competences and proposes harmonization by way of Art. 
100961.
A completely different solution would have been to modify existing 
administrative structures by creating a European Agency with several 
branches in every country; a European Milk Agency which allocates the 
reference quantities to producers and is also the debtor of the levy962. 
But the Council with its large discretion was not obliged to make use of 
such a measure. Yet, it must be taken into account that the use of the ad­
ministrative structure of Member States might be more efficient in the 
long run and guarantee the implementation according to Community 
law963.
The position of the tenant is entirely different in the Member States 
also owing to the different structure of tenancy farming. The EEC legis­
lator took this fact into account by granting a wide discretion to the 
Member States and by abstaining from any interference in the national 
agricultural tenancies laws, also with regard to Art. 222 of the EEC
957 Snyder, F. G., Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, p. 65 et seq.; Blumann, 
C., (1988) Revue de droit rural, No 164, p. 251
958 Nicolaysen, G., Europarecht I, p. 76
959 Boest, R., Die Agrarmarkte im Recht der EWG, p. 288
960 see Schwarze, J„ Europaisches Verwaltungsrecht, vol. 1, p. 464
961 Case 205-215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor et al v Federal Republic of Germany 
[1983] E.C.R., p. 2633 (2667)
962 see, for example, the proposition to set up a European Environmental Agency, 
COM (86) 485 final




























































































Treaty. Demands for harmonization of the agricultural tenancies laws 
have been made several times964; however, the national reports and the 
results of the comparison qualify these demands as unrealistic wishes.
With the help of Community control, the ECJ, especially, is deemed to 
contribute to a uniform interpretation and application of the Community 
law in the different legal orders comprising different traditions, adminis­
trative organizations and judicial control965. This was proved in particu­
lar by the ruling of the ECJ in the "Wachauf' case. The reference to the 
fundamental rights as parts of the Community legislation that also must be 
considered by Member States applying Community law is a means of en­
suring equal application of Community rules especially in a field with dif­
ferent legal concepts such as agricultural tenancies laws. The diversity of 
agricultural tenancies laws which is far from being harmonized thus 
causes few distorsions because the principle of fundamental rights over­
rides the implementation process. The ECJ has again proved to be an im­
portant engine for integration where different legal orders seem to pre­
vent any equal application of Community law.
III. Socio-economic conditions o f the subsector, in particular o f the 
recipients
Thirdly, differences in implementation are due to socio-economic 
conditions of the subsector considered. The diversity of the European 
milk production structure had prevented any sufficient reduction of the 
milk surpluses until quotas were introduced. The super-levy system op­
erating in the Member States could not deny this diversity. The efficient 
dairy structure in the UK, largely due to the favourable size of farms, is 
the reason for the emergence of a market of reference quantities. The 
draftsmen of the English transfer regulations took this into account. The 
Germans' fear of decreasing producers' prices caused them to overallo­
cate reference quantities. The French intention to expand their dairy in­
dustry in order to compete with more efficient dairy producers in other 
Member States such as the UK, but also its concern over depopulated ar­
964 Lukanow, J., (1989) Agrarrecht, Supplement 1/2, p. 14
965 Boest, R., Die Agrarmarkte im Recht der EWG, p. 292; Lasok, D.; Bridge, J. W., 
Law & Institutions of the European Communities, p. 318; Cartou, L., 




























































































eas and producers in special situations, created a strong national consensus 
that the administration be conferred with the pursuit of these contradict­
ing policies. Socio-structural and economic conditions entirely deter­
mined the quota policy pursued and these diverse policies are enshrined in 
the Regulations. The whole fragmentary set of Regulations reflects the 
diverse dairy structure within the Member States. In the implementation 
process, moreover, it turned out that diverse economic structures within 
the Member States influences the implementation process.
IV. Infringement o f Community law by implementers
Finally, differences in implementation occur, because Member States 
infringe the EEC Regulations in question, thus reducing the scope of the 
Regulations and endangering the uniform application of the provisions in 
the Community. This was the case with the German overallocation and 
the insufficient British control on whether changes of land had occurred. 
The legal remedy would have been Art. 169 of the EEC Treaty, but only 
in the case of the German overallocation, did the Commission initiate in­
fringement procedures. The Commission abstained from the procedures 
because of German undertakings. In the case of the UK, British legisla­
tion was changed. But still, the lack of control by the Ministry demands 
the Commission's supervision. In the terms of the implementation re­
search, deficiencies of the implementers, which were, in Germany, the 
agricultural administrative agencies and, in the UK, the supervising 
Ministry, can be held responsible for the infringement of the rules. In the 
UK, the recipients of administrative action, the producers, by 
circumventing the transfer rules contributed to the failure of the 
program, i.e. the rise of a milk quota market.
V. Evaluation o f the reasons for differences in implementation
The reasons listed as having contributed to the success or failure of 
objectives enshrined in the Regulations are only related to the findings of 
this research and include a few factors determining implementation pro­
cesses. Other factors influencing both the programme formulation phase, 




























































































and interaction of interest groups or of the politico-administrative culture 
are possible, but for reasons of space could not be explored. Investigation 
into the socio-economic conditions of the recipients of administrative ac­
tion, in this case the producers and the purchasers, proved to be of great 
value for understanding the incorporation and enforcement of the rules.
The question arises which of the differences that were shown as having 
occurred in the implementation of the milk quota Regulations mostly de­
termined the implementation process.
The socio-economic conditions of the dairy sector seem to the the most 
important reasons for the differences in implementations. At least, they 
served as a general guideline of how to incorporate the facultative EEC 
Regulations and of how to control the application of the rules.
However, the role of the different legal orders should not be underes­
timated. The different administrative structure shaped the implementation 
processes in many respect, examples being the structure provided by the 
MMB, the problems of competence between agricultural and financial 
administration in Germany and the relationship between dairies and state 
administration in France. Last but not least, entirely diverse agricultural 
tenancies laws determined the incorporation of facultative provisions.
It is difficult to deduce which differences in the implementation of 
Community law in the Member States are due to specific features of the 
subsector concerned or to the problems of implementing Commmunity 
law in general in a Member State966. The socio-economic conditions of 
the dairy sector and the specific structures of both the implementers and 
recipients of administrative action on this sector have been shown as de­
termining the implementation of the EEC milk quota Regulations to a 
large extent. Any general remarks on how implementation processes pro­
ceed in the Member States considered, thus, cannot be made on the basis 
of one case study concerning such a specific sector.
Nevertheless, the case study allowed for some specific general obser­
vations such as the style of incorporating Community rules in Germany 
and France or the different administrative structure in the three Member 
States considered with regard to the agricultural sector in general. As far 
as land law is concerned it turned out that the differences between 
Common law and Romano-Germanic law was not decisive for the imple­
966 see Ziller, J., The Implementation of European Community Policies, in: 




























































































mentation of Community law967. Since striking differences in land law 
such as the law of trusts exist between the three Member States this state­
ment is again limited to the specific Regulation considered.
Though the Commission controlled the two most striking infringements 
of the quota system - the overallocation in Germany and the transfer rules 
in the UK - it could not enforce the Regulations. In the case of Germany, 
political reasons might have been important and in the case of the UK, the 
transfers are practically uncontrollable by the Commission.
B. Renationalisation or régionalisation of the CAP?
Having scrutinized the differences that occurred in the implementation 
of the milk quota Regulations and following an attempt to define the rea­
sons therof, the milk quota Regulations appear as a fragmentary set of 
national policies pursued, only connected by vague principles. In this 
context, the phenomenon of the renationalisation of the policy on the 
dairy sector suggests itself968. Renationalisation means the different 
treatment of the producers according to their nationality by leaving dis­
cretions and making concessions to Member States969. In the CAP, rena­
tionalisation occurs in sectors that have been characterized by a common 
policy such as the market and price policy. A slight trend toward rena­
tionalisation has existed since the late 1960s, and the potential of this 
trend was strengthened with the introduction of the Monetary 
Compensatory Amounts system970. The structural policy, in particular, 
however, has never been anything other than a national policy971. Other 
areas of policy not covered by a common policy are the social security
967 at least as far as letting agreements are concerned
968 Sorasio, D., (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 547; Kummer, H.-W., 
Art. 40 EWGV, in: von der Groeben, H.; Thiesing, J.; Ehlermann, C.-D. (eds.), 
Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Annotation 51
969 see Kummer, H.-W., Art. 40 EWGV, in; von der Groeben, H.; Thiesing, J.; 
Ehlermann, C.-D. (eds.), Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Annotation 49 et seq
970 VoB, R., Die Milchquoten als Gestaltungsmittel, in; Schwarze, J. (ed.), Der 
Gemeinsame Markt, p. 83; Feld, J. W„ The Two-tier Policy Making in the EC, in: 
Hurwitz, L. (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration, p. 128, 
138, 147




























































































and tax system972 and the agricultural tenancies laws. In these sectors, re­
nationalisation cannot be deplored.
As regards the milk quota Regulations, the discretion left to the 
Member States both initially and during their application apparently 
caused the renationalisation of the market policy in the dairy sector973. A 
different treatment of Member States, however, may be justified in the 
view of diverse national production structures which, according to Art. 
39 (2) of the EEC Treaty, have to be taken into account974. Because the 
milk quota system is closely linked to non-common fields of agricultural 
policies (structural policy, agricultural tenancies laws) a certain nationali­
sation was apparently unavoidable. From the legal point of view, the re­
nationalisation is unquestionable provided the principle of prohibition of 
discrimination has not been infringed; such infringement would endanger 
the unity of the market975.
Thus, the so-called "renationalisation" might be politically deplorable 
because the nationalisation of the quota is artificial, due to national bor­
ders and interests rather than to socio-economic realities.
The alternative to the renationalisation of the CAP is the régionalisa­
tion which is also being discussed in the CAP97 ,̂ especially in the context 
of environmental issues977. The diverse milk production structures would 
allow a régionalisation of the reference quantities. This is illustrated by 
the French and German examples, both countries with entirely diverse 
milk production conditions within their borders978. German courts inter­
preted regulations differently because of regional differences (e.g. "areas 
used for milk production" or "place of a cow"979). The French restruc­
turing policy was largely regionalised. In fact, a certain régionalisation 
was even envisaged by the initial Regulations allowing different Formulas
972 Pearce, J., The Common Agricultural Policy, in: Wallace, H.; Wallace, W.; Webb, 
C. (eds.), Policy Making in the European Community, p. 154
973 Sorasio, D„ (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 547
974 Sorasio, D„ (1985) Revue du marché commun, No 291, p. 547
975 see Case C-267/88 - C-285/88 Wuidart et al v Laiterie coopérative eupenoise et al 
[1990] E.C.R., p. 1-435 (1-449)
976 see Gallus, G., German Secretary of State of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, 
Agra-Europe 45/92, Europa-Nachrichten, p. 13
977 set-aside programmes, see for example in ''Baden-Wiirtemberg'', Agra-Europe 
25/91, Landerberichte, p. 5
978 this is also true for the UK to a certain degree, see Northern Ireland





























































































to be implemented on the territory of the Member States. The ECJ in the 
case "Cornée" approved the French practice of re-allocating reference 
quantities within a region, and denied an infringement of Art. 40 (3) of 
the EEC Treaty by the implementing French legislator980 81*.
The allocation of reference quantities to regions and the declaration of 
these as freely tradeable within the region, detached from the holding, 
could have been envisaged. Sales would have been restricted to regions, 
supervised by authorities and speculative prices might not have arisen if 
certain safeguards like a maximum amount were introduced. The levy 
would only be payable if the regional quota was in excess. A regional 
authority would administer the rules. The size of the regions would de­
pend on the discretion of the Member States; however, there must be a 
geographical unity and similar structural conditions. If the quotas were 
regionalised, neither the problems of the transfer rules nor of the differ­
ent Formulas would occur to such an extent981. And, more importantly, 
the landlord and tenant problems would be mitigated because the refer­
ence quantity is not attached to a holding but allocated to a producer.
The results gained from this comparison only leave the choice of con­
sidering the diversity of the EEC regions in the dairy sector in more 
depth.
980 Case 196/88-198/88 Cornée et al v Coopérative agricole laitière de Loudéac 
"Copali" [1989] E.C.R. p. 2309 (2347); see fourth chapter
981 see also proposition by Wienberg, D.; Holler, T., (1986) Berichte iiber 
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